




BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTE FOR
THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES AND KNOWLEDGE



CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH ON NATIONAL
SECURITY - CESNA B, BELGRADE, SERBIA

THEMATIC PAPERS

GEOPOLITICS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION - TENDENCIES AND CHALLENGES



PHILOSOPHY NOWADAYS

SECOND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

PROCEEDINGS

EDITORS
Slobodan Neskovic, PhD
Bogdana Todorova, PhD

Belgrade, 2019

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- TENDENCIES AND CHALLENGES**

E D I T O R S

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PREFACE

In 2008, in the palace abutting the River Seine, the leaders of 43 nations from Europe, the Middle East and North Africa have launched a Union for the Mediterranean, an idea of ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy and his aim to improve cooperation in the region with practical projects.

In 2019, in the coast of Varna, in the Creative House of BAS, scientists from 16 countries from Europe, Black sea region, Central Asia and Caspian sea region are together to discuss new “challenges” related to education, ecology, culture, religion, politics, economic, terrorism, security, new borders and migration and to develop practical projects. We believe that the region has always been able to preserve its own unique dynamics. The scientific diplomacy has always been the main instrument in the region.

The Black sea region can be a base for scientific and technological cooperation, for new scientific networks and exchange of students, for scientific and congress tourism; a guaranty for an economical security and as a part of a common policy about migration, refugees and new borders and as a cultural relation with Europe. The accent will be the Danube-Black Sea region which marks the European Union’s systematic strategy based on the ecological, economic, political and secure connection of the European continent with other areas. The original initiative of forming the Danube Region concerned the ecological protection of navigable transversals determined by the Danube River Basin in the Black Sea. It is necessary to discuss how to prevent the Black sea region from pollution and to cultivate respect for the environment and the protection of its resources for the sake of future generations; how, from economical point of view to promote the Black sea Union firstly, as a new unity in European diversity [the countries from this Union has a legal framework to an European standard that encourages investment and their geographical proximity to the EU makes them a trade springboard for the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Central Asia]; as a European tool to overcome crises in the Balkans; as a guarantor of the balance in the European area, which would provide a favorable living environment not only for local citizens but also for European society as a whole.

As scientists we should talk to world and have interaction with other countries to promote a science and the light of knowledge.

The region of the Black Sea, which in modern vocabulary is more broadly treated as the Black Sea - Caspian region, designates an area of essential importance for leading actors of the international community. This basin has huge reserves of energy and other natural resources, which is why in recent history it is a constant scene of conflict between regional and world hegemony. The interests of the great powers, constant tensions, constant conflicts and contemporary security challenges place him at the forefront of geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic importance. Understanding the complex specificities, complex contradictions and perspectives of a given space marks one of the most attractive topics for all researchers of social phenomena.

The current international conference brought together respectable scientists from the 13 countries of the observed region, who, through their presentations, competently discussed the given topic in several aspects. In the context of the implementation of the entire project, the final part is the development of a Thematic Proceedings of the relevant authors communicated at the conference, which has a prominent international value. The book was published by the Center for Strategic Research on National Security - CESNA B, Belgrade, Serbia, primarily with the support of the Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge - Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. At the same time, it is the twenty-ninth Proceedings which, over the course of fourteen years, has been implemented by CESNA B in collaboration with academic partners of the highest renown.

On behalf of the organizing committee,
Bogdana Todorova, PhD, ISSK - BAS, Bulgaria
Slobodan Neskovic, PhD, CESNA - B, Serbia



Bogdana Todorova¹

THE CHALLENGES BEFORE PHILOSOPHY AND SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION IN 21ST CENTURY

Abstract

The geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region is obviously - the crossroads of trade routes between Europe and Asia. Today there are many challenges and threats to the region's security. On the one hand, important integration processes are taking place, regional transnational institutions (such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization - BSEC or the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force - BlackSeaFor) have been established. On the other hand, the existing ethno-political problems (Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish Kurdistan, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria), have a negative impact on the military security of the region, because they have a serious conflict potential. The end of the Cold War has created a certain vacuum in the Black Sea region, which has fallen since the early 1990s from the USA, Turkey and, to a certain extent, from Iran. The Black Sea Strategy of these countries aims to exploit the advantages of the region - its key geographic location and natural resources. The combination of positive and negative factors for the strategic security of the Black Sea region shows that the policy of the countries in it does not always prove to be effective. A new security philosophy and the establishment of collaborative research networks should be developed. We have to analyze ongoing processes and new trends in the region, that's why this report is focusing on the mutual linking within the two concepts of the region that occur in the scientific literature and outlines the occurrence of common problems for all countries in the region.

Key words: challenges, security, philosophy, Black – Caspian – Sea –region

The geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region is obviously - the crossroads of trade routes between Europe and Asia. Today there are many challenges and threats to the region's security.

On the one hand, important integration processes are taking place, regional transnational institutions (such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization - BSEC or the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force - BlackSeaFor) have been established. On the other hand, the existing ethno-political problems (Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish Kurdistan, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria), have a negative impact on the security of the region, because of their conflict potential.

The end of the Cold War has created a certain vacuum in the Black Sea region, which has fallen since the early 1990s from the USA, Turkey and, to a certain extent, from Iran. The Black Sea Strategy of these countries aims to exploit the advantages of the region - its key geographic location and natural resources. The combination of

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positive and negative factors for the strategic security of the Black Sea region shows that the policy of the countries in it does not always prove to be effective. A new philosophy and the establishment of collaborative research networks should be developed. We have to analyze ongoing processes and new trends in the region, that's why this report is focusing on the mutual linking within the two concepts of the region that occur in the scientific literature and outlines the occurrence of common problems for all countries in the region.

The Black-Sea region is exceptionally diverse. It includes the countries of the South-eastern Europe (Bulgaria and Romania), the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Russia and Turkey). These countries are non-homogeneous in their economic structures, follow different aims of their foreign policies and belong to different transnational unions. The Black-Sea region is a cross-point of different social-political, economic and cultural systems.

The concepts for the regional division of the countries from the Black-Sea region are present. According to the first of them, the Black-Sea region is bound to the Caspian region and is defined as the Black-Sea-Caspian-Sea region. The membership of the countries such as Azerbaijan, which has an outlet on the Caspian Sea, in the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) supports this approach. Therefore, one of the topics included in the conference is the topic of the challenges and perspectives of the economic cooperation between the countries of BSEC (Bulgaria, Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine) and the EU. A special attention will be paid to the priority policies associated with financing of projects with the member states and the role of the Bulgarian presidency of BSEC. The second conception views the region as a united system, in which the territories of the countries belonging to the basins of the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea and Caspian Sea are included, in this was emphasizing the mutual commitment between these countries and the presence of common problems in all of them.

Zbigniew Brzezinski views the Black-Sea region as a part of the geopolitical construction, which he calls the Eurasian Balkans, including also the Caucasus, the Near East, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Expert analyses use also the term the „Large Black-Sea region“[1]

The Black Sea and coastal territories are an extremely important communication and transport junction, through which the petrol, gas and other various goods (the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan line tube) supplies pass. Establishing control over the Mediterranean Sea straits and the Black-Sea aquatory will enable the control over the entire legal and illegal international trade in the region, the impact on the available and built line tubes and the policies of the countries from the region.

In reality, the Black-Sea region should be viewed in a close connection with the Caspian region since they both practically form a united energy system: energy carriers are obtained in the Caspian region and the transit routes to their main users pass through the Black-Sea region. Right the energy and transit factors are key for the assessment of the strategical role of the region. This is exactly the reason why the countries such as Russia, Turkey, USA and partially Romania and organizations such as NATO and EU compete for control of it. The building of future line tubes such as TANAP and South Stream is of a huge importance. This fact motivates additionally analysts to view the Black-Sea region together with the Caspian region.

We can delineate the following main problems of the strategic security of the

Black-Sea region:

- the smouldering unresolved ethnic-political conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, the Kurd problem, etc.);
- the growing expenses for defence of the Black-Sea countries and general militarization of the region;
- transnational crime: smuggled trade, drug trafficking, human trafficking, etc.;

Ethnic-political conflicts are the most complicated and painful regional problem. They affect territorial integrity of the countries in the region and the ethnic-national factor generating the cultural and political contradictions between opposite parties.

The existence of ethnic-political conflicts fragments the Black-Sea region into separate coalitions of countries lowering its integration potential which is an obstacle to development of trade and economic cooperation between the countries in the region.

The probability of escalation of armed violence within the frameworks of the ethnic-political conflicts in the Black-Sea region forces a number of countries belonging to the region into the maintenance of rather large armies. Common militarization changes the structure of economy of the countries in the region, limiting the possibilities for investments in other industries, education, social sphere, etc.

The lack of military-strategic parity between Russia and NATO is also a key destabilizing factor. Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria (plus Greece and Albania, which are also member states of BSEC, although they do not have an outlet on the Black Sea) are the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance, and conversations on the eventual joining of Georgia take place. Russia aims to control the transit of energy carriers to Europe but it does not have allies and strategic partners in the region, while NATO, USA and Turkey practically act as its geopolitical enemies. Ukraine in its turn does not seem to be especially willing to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Oppositions between the countries in the region are too big. This, in spite of the currently maintained friendly relations of Russia and Turkey, from an objective point of view they remain geopolitical competitors claiming leading positions in the Black-Sea region.

What are the chances that the countries of the Black-Sea region will activate their interactions in the sphere of economy using BSEC for this purpose? This organization has a too wide composition (12 countries, only a half of which have a direct outlet on the Black Sea) and unites too heterogeneous and not rarely conflicting between themselves member states (Serbia and Albania, Russia and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), the majority of which are oriented to membership in the EU and do not consider multilateral regional cooperation a main priority. In general, the trade-economic cooperation in the region does not have a multilateral nature and the countries in it usually resolve foreign-policy issues avoiding the structures of BSEC and in the ideal case they maintain their close contacts and dynamic trade relations with only 2-3 member states of the organization.

The other regional integrative union BLACKSEAFOR (the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group established in 2001, in which Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Georgia participate) have difficulty in performing the set tasks for assurance of military security and development of naval compatibility between the member states, which are largely different in their military potentials. The idea for the

membership of potential enemies in a single organization demonstrated its failure during the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008. Additional obstacles for the efficient functioning of BLACKSEAFOR were caused by the NATO initiative Active Endeavours, which aim was the struggle against terrorism. Does this union have any perspectives for development and what are they?

The lack of a single hegemon in the Black-Sea region with the existence of several power poles – sets the basis for formation of a multipolar system for strategic security, and on the other side – given the presence of multiple players and a number of conflict zones, the countries in the region have difficulty in reaching mutually favorable solutions and forming steadily developing integration institutions.

Can we expect a new start of the integration process in the Black-Sea region? Bulgaria and Romania are engaged in solving the problems associated with their further integration in the EU. Russia actively takes actions to form a customs union within the frameworks of the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU). The government of Turkey is increasingly emphasizing the Near-East vector in its foreign policy. Ukraine continues to stand before the choice to work for its integration either in the post-Soviet or European spaces.

The world will no longer be a global community that complies with the international laws and regulations that were set after the cold war, on the contrary, it will become the battle field of the countries that are only thinking about their own national benefits and are not afraid of doing anything to gain their goals, even starting a nuclear war.

The power balance between different countries is starting to change; to make the matters worse, NATO has now adopted a new policy for launching pre-emptive attacks on other countries; in this situation, the world will be divided into two poles of friends and opponents.

In such a world, only the countries that have nuclear weapons might be able to provide their citizens with partial security; other countries, on the other hand, are pushed to become dependent on big powers in order to protect their national security.

Amid all these tensions and conflicts, Europe will be in the front line of war and peace between U.S. and Russia. Like a “security hostage without a free will”, Europe will be a bystander and might even a victim if any of two sides decide to use banned weapons.

This is why Europe is worried about Iran’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as this would disrupt Europe’s power in the Middle East, increases the tension and makes Europe even a bigger target of threats.

Therefore, it seems that in near future, we will see a new order in the world. The danger of conflicts associated with Islam is increased.

The Black Sea is a „borderline“ zone between the countries from the Western and Eastern civilizations and conditionally divides the North from the South and the East from the West. According to the executive director the International Center of Black-Sea Studies Serdiu Celak, the „Black Sea is a civilizational cross-road, where the impacts of Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam are crossed and parallelly the impact of western political culture is increased“. For this reason, a special attention will be paid to the topic of „religion and policy“ in the region. [2] We can consider religion as ‘The Soul of the 21st Century’ and to explore how identity and purpose are connected in diverse

ways in societies and communities around the world. At some level these ideas are also connected to conceptions of transcendence – even in critical theory. This is also what provides the basis – beyond an individualist ontology for interreligious dialogue.

The real problem is religion, is still ‘securitized,’ what the Copenhagen School of Security Studies argues when something is perceived to be a security threat, which legitimates extraordinary actions by states (migration, immigration have also recently been securitized). The role of religion in the United Nations and the European Union requires a lot more research since the idea religion in relevant to international institutions is denied, ignored, or forgotten by many elites, or secular elites, from developing countries. I am not sure it can be resolved entirely but there can be glimpses of hope for the future. The Catholic lay organization, Community of Sant’Egidio, which helped establish with the Italian government ‘humanitarian corridors’ for Syrian refugees which may turn out to be a model for Europe (a similar arrangement has recently been signed with the French government). What Pope Francis has done, is the link between social policy and interreligious dialogue. In the past interreligious dialogue has been about doctrines, but Pope Francis has linked it to how people from different religious traditions can work together on some of the major social policy questions affecting many states and societies. One of the key pointers towards the future on theory and practice may very well be the role of religious non-state actors (social ontology), and the kind of knowledge from below (social epistemology) which they have, and the new concept of religious engagement in foreign policy and international relations.

Can we understand and theorize religion in the framework of existing IR theories or we believe that there should be new theories? From my point of view this depends on the broad division between positivist and post-positivist approaches to the study of International Relations – and, how religion is conceived within in them. The discipline of International Relations not only seeks to explain the political world, but is a part of the political world, and a part of global politics. How we study religion and its impact in politics and international relations changes if we recognize that religion is not a transcultural or transhistorical concept but is socially and politically constructed. I mean with this not examining the consequences of mixing religion and politics, i.e. religion being securitized. What now need to be studying the politics surrounding the way the concepts – the sacred, the secular, and the political are socially and politically constructed in specific countries, contexts, and historic states-systems.

The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations, are fact and theory does matter. It opens up new way of seeing and interpreting what is going on. What critical theorists call ‘theory as negative critique’ – how the world got to be the way it is, should it be this way, and can it be changed, fits very nicely from a theological viewpoint with the idea of theory as prophetic critique, and offers a basis for critically assessing international relations from within the perspective of the Abrahamic religions. Critical theory’s approach to ‘theory as theory as every day social practice,’ argues every one of us – by our life styles, what we buy, what we consume, how we travel, etc., every one of us every day is living out a theory of international relations. Again, this view of theory fits with what every believer in the Abrahamic religions conceives of as the moral life, the social life, and the spiritual life.

It is necessary to create new philosophical paradigms and this is one of the main challenge before philosophy nowadays.

Philosophy plays a leading legitimizing role in the process of secularization

and new value systems, satisfies the need of a new sacred-rational substantiation of values, which determine human life. Due to its reflexive nature, philosophy has a dual characteristics - as a reaction to some social problems and as a part of social realities. Nevertheless, I am inclined to stake on an optimistic scenario, in which a shining future is in store for philosophy and the needs for it will be increased. The increasing need of analytical thought gives me a reason to state this. Also, the problem field of philosophy – the analysis of the bases of science and culture, which, in turn, need permanently a critical reflection, is preserved.

The need of philosophy is enhanced when significant social changes occur. Today, we have huge risks and aggravation of global crises which enhances the need of theoretical knowledge. However, here we can speak about the duality of the trend. The high level of crisisness of different processes due to acceleration and complication of social connections with continue to cause a „loss of social reality“, i.e., the loss of rational foundations of understanding and management of social processes which will accelerate the processes of philosophical mind of a crisis type, which finds its expression in a stable trend toward criticism to philosophy, fast development of any non-systematic forms of philosophy, the statements of the type of the „end of philosophy“ generally and non-cumulative versions of the development of philosophy.

Globalization increases interdisciplinary interaction. There are build societies that are based on knowledge and associated with the increasing quantity of information and interpretations which causes a permanent reassessment of the picture of the world. In this sense, the social and methodological roles of philosophy increase. Under the conditions of the huge data base philosophy increasingly rarely acts separately and increasingly more often interacts with other sciences and social practices. Philosophy will look ahead and together with a complex of social sciences will play the possible types of future through based on different world-views, normative and value prerequisites. The direction that will be followed by philosophy will depend on the level, at which it can react to existing need of philosophical interpretation of the processes around them and the expected. If philosophy remains turned back to the past, without analyzing today's dynamically changing world, then we will not have philosopher- analysts of the today's and tomorrow's problems, and this will ensure the future of this discipline. Also, the philosophers' participation in social processes and possible alternatives of development of the non-linear, local, national, regional and global worlds, in the construction of which the participation of philosophers is desirable, will depend of the degree, at which the philosophers will be adequate to the topical needs of their own society, and how they manage to present them to a larger mass of people.

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Slobodan Nešković¹

POLITICAL PROCESSES AND RELIGIOUS FEATURES IN THE MONTENEGRIN - CASPIAN REGION WITH THE REVIEW ON THE CROATIAN COMMUNITIES

Abstract

The Black Sea-Caspian region represents an essential hub, which is the area of constant political confrontations and expressed religious contradictions. Historically, as it is today, this area is characterized by a permanent settlement of the great powers and conflicts of traditional regional rivals, primarily Russia and Turkey. Countries that have shores or gravitate to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea have significant resources in natural havens, and some of them have huge reserves of energy, especially oil and gas. These postulates channeled political, social and economic flows through the functioning of members of various religious confessions. The paper emphasizes the leading role of the Christian community in the field of trade, crafts and other spheres of advanced societies of the observed countries. The activities of non-Muslim groups have always been of prime importance in the existence of the peoples in this analyzed region, conditioning specific political definitions, and different development trends. Postmodern challenges, risks, and current migration processes determine the position of the countries concerned and direct the integration processes into planetary collectivities.

Keywords: Black Sea - Caspian region, political processes, religion, trade, crafts, conflicts, Russia, Turkey, a Christian community

Introduction

Recent political history and relevant scientific documentation indicate that the Black Sea region and the Caspian Sea region, due to their peculiarities, especially geostrategic position, have a great international significance. The specificities of ethnic communities, long-standing wars, and permanent conflicts have produced numerous religious controversies, which in contemporary conditions have new substantially broader dimensions. The presented postulates define the current topic as one of the least investigated phenomena, and an attractive area for all researchers. Our work deals with the systematic presentation of traditional social relations in the context of proper understanding and perception of the current situation in the observed area.

Objective facts prove that Christian communities had a first-class role in positioning the Black Sea-Caspian region through the activities of trade and trades over a longer period. Religious contradictions and constant tensions between states channeled economic development, relations, and events among nations. In addition to the aforementioned, the economic context, reflected in natural resources, primarily by

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enormous reserves of energy sources, further affirms the analyzed basin. This space was in the past and today it represents the scene of the confrontation of the great powers, that is, regional hegemony. Crisis trends in the Middle East, the war in Syria and migration processes indicate contemporary challenges of undoubted importance for the existence of the population of the given territory.

When it comes to the Black Sea-Caspian region, one should not be disturbed by the fact that, as of today and history, it is one of the most important geopolitical nodes. All this region is inhabited by people of different national affiliations, different religions, languages, customs, habits and in all of this, one must seek the core of the constant turbulence that is happening in this region. At the very beginning of the story of the Black Sea-Caspian region, it would be necessary to precisely define the boundaries of the same, which automatically puts us in an uncomfortable position because different nations differently define the boundaries of this area. Thus, for example, modern Bulgaria, the Black Sea-Caspian region, will mean a region from the south of Burgas to the north of Vama, while Turkey will conceive a long coastline from Istanbul to Rize. For both of them, cities like Chisinau or Akreman are not part of their region. The border between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea is made up of the former Soviet countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, while for the northern border of this area we can consider a space that includes Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and even Uzbekistan. South of this region, we can consider the territories of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, but some other countries that are not directly connected with this territory, but have a dismal significance to it.

Knowledge of geopolitics enables easier understanding of the relations of the countries in this region, because this area is of great importance and is intertwined with the interests of the world and regional powers, and most often at the expense of the weak countries that exist on this territory. Some of the most important issues are the ships of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the trade and transfer of Caspian oil from the Black Sea corridor, the issue of terrorism is just some of the current issues.

European civilization, which implies organized urban life and the use of the letter, was created 3500 years ago in Mesopotamia, considering today's map are about today's Syria and Iraq, so this fact much talks about the importance and long history of this region, the connective tissue as a historical. With this region, the Egyptian state is also important and tied to the first civilizations. All this suggests that the precise definition of this space is not possible and is not necessary because the constant turbulence and events in some territories easily spill over to the neighbors and continue to send their reflections. In the end, it is important to say that the current boundaries did not apply throughout history and were subject to frequent changes. Thus, to understand the mutual relations of nations and religions leaning against the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea it is necessary to make a certain historical analysis of this territory.

Political and religious properties of the Black sea-Caspian region

The Black Sea Basin is an authentic geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic entity of essential international significance. Observed as part of the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, this area includes the following countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and Russia. The characteristics of these countries, the specifics of the peoples of that area, their political and religious diversity, as well as the richness of natural resources, implies a systematic approach to the development of the given

topic. Considering such complex issues require the use of available competent historical material and linking with current social trends.²

The ancient Black Sea region has established trade maritime, river and land routes between Europe, Orient and Asia, which to date represent the main characteristic of this area. The roads represented and today represent important Euro-Asian communications. The population on the shores of the ancient Black Sea was scarce and less developed than in ancient Mesopotamia, Persia, or Syria. From the Black Sea forests and mountains, the primitive and hungry population came down to the south, richer and more fertile lands. Indo-European nations came from the Caucasus region, moved along the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Danube, reaching European regions, creating a chain of related languages from Europe to India. The territorial integrity of the Indo-European speaking area was occasionally interrupted by invasions and conquests by the Mongolian, Nomadic peoples of Hun, Avar and Khazar, who spoke in other languages, so that the Turks-Seljuks, with their language, would forever interrupt the linguistic territorial connection between Europe and India.

Ancient trade routes from the Mediterranean through the Middle East to Asia were used by the Greeks, the Phoenicians and the Arabs. A thousand years before the new era, the Greeks were colonizers of the Black Sea region, and religion was polytheistic. In the 30s before the new era, the Roman Empire occupied territories around the Black Sea, and at the same time there appeared a monotheistic religion - Christianity - a bearer of the basic principles and values of contemporary European civilization.

The fifth century of the new era again becomes the scene of the penetration of new nations, cultures and religions. From the north, Slovenians come with non-Slovenian nations such as Avars and Bulgarians. The Avars invaded the Christian Europe. South Slavs, predominantly farmers, inhabit the Balkan Peninsula and the northwest coast of the Black Sea. In the 9th century, they formed their own countries, such as Bulgaria on the Black Sea coast and Raška, west of Bulgaria, and in the 10th century a large Macedonian Samuil's state was formed that reached the Black Sea coast. From the east, the Turks - the Ottomans approach the territories of ancient Greece and carry Islamic civilization with them.³

From 950 to 1150, almost all the Black Sea region was under Byzantium, except in the northern parts where the Russian empire with the Cossack tribes was formed, and the northeast part belonged to the Mongolian states. From the 11th century, from Asia, the nomadic tribes of the Turks - Selcukh started invading; in 1517 a new dynasty of the Ottomans emerged in Southeast Europe and on the Black Sea coasts. In the 16th century, entire Black Sea area was under the authority of the Turkish-Ottoman Empire: either as part of the state territory or vassal areas in the north. During that period, the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, Carigrad, was counted in large cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, such as Paris, Milan, Venice, and Naples. These cities were associated with commercial operations and roads that were valid for the only international communications before the discovery of new continents and the establishment of new, planetary roads, business and general communications. In the Black Sea region, the Eurasian sea and land routes

² Nešković, S., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, CROSS - BORDER COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 27.

³ Tetsu, S., IN SEARCH OF DISCONNECTED RELATIONSHIPS, Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media, 2010, p. 12.

continued to function. By the 19th century, the Black Sea coasts were largely under Turkish rule, and in the north they were partly occupied by the Tatars. By the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was more organized in the state sense than the European states. The Industrial Revolution pulled the West into a modern industrial civilization that would make it more dominant than other civilizations and cultures.⁴

In the 19th century, the geopolitical contours of today's Black Sea region with the states: Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania are created. The Eurasian land and sea routes that pass through here continue to have international and inter-continental importance. These geopolitical traits have retained strategic positions and importance since antiquity, and the discovery and use of oil and gas in the 20th century add new important communication roles to the Black Sea region.

The twentieth century was characterized by the formation of a global civilization. From the Second World War to the 1990s, the Black Sea region was politically divided between the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the leading Soviet Union in the north and the south with the NATO countries, Greece and Turkey, following European Union policy (originally EEC). At the same time, it was still the Eurasian bridge of cultural, commercial and traffic routes.

The Caspian Lake is located between Europe and Asia and its northwestern part forms the boundary between the two continents. The Caspian Sea coast divides five countries: Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is the largest state in the region of the South Caucasus and is located at the crossing between south-west Asia and Eastern Europe and can be considered as a Eurasian country. The state territory extends between 38 ° and 42 ° north latitude and 44 ° and 51 ° east longitude on an area of 86,600 km². It extends in the north-south direction in the length of 400 km, and from the west to the east 500 km. The total length of international borders is 2,648 km. In the north, it borders with Russia (Dagestan - 390 km), in the northwest with Georgia (480 km), in west Armenia (1,007 km), in the south of Iran (765 km) and the far northwest of Nahichevana the international border with Turkey km). In the east, Azerbaijan goes to the shores of the Caspian lake, and the length of the coastline is 850 km.

In physical-geographical terms, Azerbaijan can be divided into three parts:⁵

- The Caspian coast in the east,
- High mountains - the Great Caucasus in the north and northwest, the Little Caucasus in the west, the Taliska Mountains in the south,
- Nizi - Kursk-Araksin in the central part and Lenkoran in the south of the country.

The relief picture of Azerbaijan is very diverse and is dominated by two main forms of relief: the lower and the mountain. About 40% of the state territory is mountainous,

and the average altitude is about 400 m. The hypsometric lowest point is the Caspian Sea, which is 28 meters below the sea level, while the highest peak is Bazardjuz (4.466 m) in the far north. Thus, the difference between two hypsometric extremes is as high as 4,494 meters.

Azerbaijan is a republic of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region inhabited mainly by the Armenian population. Nagorno-Karabakh unilaterally seceded from Azerbaijan and today exists as a truly independent state, however internationally unrecognized. Azerbaijan is divided into 66 regions, 12 cities and 1 autonomous republic. The division into the regions comes from the time of the Azerbaijani SSR.

Iran is mainly a mountainous country and a partially desert highland with an area of 1,648,000 km². In the north it borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and has 740 km of coastline on the Caspian Sea. In the west it borders with Turkey in the north and Iraq in the south, where the border is Shat el Arab. In the south there is an exit to the Persian and Oman bays in the length of 1770 km. Iran has had a border dispute with the United Arab Emirates since the 1970s due to the Tunb and Abu Musu Island occupied by Iran. In the east it borders Afghanistan, in the north and Pakistan in the south. The distance between Azerbaijan in the northwest and Sistan and Baluchistan in the southeast is about 2330 km.

By creating an Islamic republic in Iran, a unique government system in the world has been created. Iran is the only official Shiite state in the Muslim world. The Islamic Republic of Iran is practically the only theocracy in the world, believing that power comes from God, the power lies in the hands of the clergy. This form of theocracy rests on the principle of velayat faqih, described in the 1960s by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the first leader of the Revolution.

Also in this system there is a representative dimension, since the rule of the people is recognized, and the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, deputies and members of the Assembly of Experts are directly elected. Although there is a democratic system, there is no political pluralism, deputies mostly belong to various Islamic factions.

The political system of the Islamic Republic is based on the 1979 constitution, which is called Qānun-e Asasi ("Basic Law"). There are several state bodies closely connected in the system, and most members elect a leader, while the president of the republic, MPs and members of the Assembly of experts are elected in the general election. The minimum age for voting was set at 15 years.

In addition to the institutional structure, the Iranian state has many other policy features. Many structures of the state apparatus are doubled. These structures, which are called revolutionary structures, are directly responsible to the leader of the revolution. The Iranian army in this respect is doubled by the Islamic Revolution Defenders, and courts with revolutionary courts. In each ministry and each province, a representative of the leader is appointed.

The Republic of Kazakhstan is a state in Central Asia. The surface is the ninth country in the world, but much of the territory makes a poorly populated step. In the west it is entering the Caspian Sea. It borders to the north with Russia, to the east with China and the south with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

With an area of 2.7 million km², Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world. The surface area is approximately equal to Western Europe. The largest cities are

4 Jeftić, N., GEOPOLITICS OF THE BLACK SEA REGION, International problems, vol LIX, No. 2-3, 2007, p. 311.

5 Nešković, Š., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, CROSS - BORDER COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 27.

Almaty, Astana, Karaganda, Shimkent, Atyrau, Oskemen and others. Although most of Kazakhstan is located in Asia, its territory west of the Ural River belongs to the European continent.

Kazakhstan is predominantly lowland, roughly inclined from east to west. In the west, it belongs to the parts of the Priscapian and Turan lowlands. A large part of the central space makes the broken hills of Kazakh high between 300 and 900 m above sea level. The hills and a large part of the west of the earth were built of old crystalline walls. The crystalline walls are covered in thickness by a thick coat, which is caused by mechanical wall-scattering.

Along the south-eastern border, the high regions dominate the mountain ranges of Tien Shan, Altai, Alatau, Karatau and others. The highest peak of Kazakhstan, Han Tengiri (7,010 m), is located in Tien Shan, on the border with Kyrgyzstan. Tjan Shan Mountain abounds with other imposing relief forms. One of these is the Charin canyon in the valley of the river with the same name, between 150 and 300 m deep. These mountains are well built of volcanic rock, which means they are very ruddy.

Most of the history of present-day Kazakhstan was settled by nomadic tribes. By the 16th century, Kazasi was formed as a separate group, composed of three hordes. The Russians came to this area for the first time in the 18th century, and by the middle of the 19th century, the whole of Kazakhstan became part of the Russian Empire. After the October Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent Russian Civil War, the territory of Kazakhstan has been reorganized several times to establish the Kazak SSR within the Soviet Union in 1936. During the 20th century, Kazakhstan was the site of many Soviet projects, such as the Khrushchev Devil's Field, the Baikonur Cosmodrome and the Semipalatinsk Polygon, the primary Soviet location for testing nuclear weapons.⁶

Kazakhstan declared independence on December 16, 1991, as the last Soviet republic that did it. The then communist leader Nursultan Nazarbayev became the first and so far the only president of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a member of the UN, the OSCE, the WHO, the Turkish State Council, the Partnership for Peace, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the ODKB, the Commonwealth of the Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Kazakhstan is a unitary republic. Nursultan Nazarbayev led the country from 1991 to 2019. He was succeeded by Kasim-Jomart Tokaiev as a temporary president. The president can veto the laws passed by Parliament, and is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. The prime minister chairs the Cabinet of Ministers and serves as the head of the government in Kazakhstan. The Cabinet has three Deputy Prime Ministers and sixteen ministers. Kazakhstan has a bicameral parliament consisting of Majilis (lower house) and Senate (upper house).

Russia is a federal semi-presidential republic that extends to Eastern Europe and North Asia. With an area of 17,125,187 km², Russia is the largest country in the world with almost twice the size of its territory from Canada. It borders with 18 countries.

Russia borders to the west (from north to south): Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Russian exile The Kaliningrad region borders

⁶ Nešković, S., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, CROSS - BORDER COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 30.

with Lithuania and Poland. In the south it borders with (from west to east): Abkhazia, Georgia, South Ossetia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, Mongolia, North Korea and Japan (sea border). It borders the United States (the sea border) in the east.

Russia has a stretched coastline of more than 37,000 km long along the Northern Ice and the Pacific, along the Baltic Sea, the Azov Sea and the Caspian Sea. The Barents Sea, the White Sea, the Carso Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the Bering Sea, the Sea of Ohotland and the Sea of Japan are the edge of the Northern Ice and the Pacific Ocean. The largest islands and archipelagos of Russia are the New Earth, the Land of Franz Josef, the Northern Land, the Novosibirsk Islands, the Vrangeli, the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Diomedes Islands (one owned by Russia and the other by the United States) are only 3 km away, and Kunashir Island is about 20 km away from the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

Russia is usually divided into Western European (about 3.5 million km²) and the eastern Asian part - Siber (13.500.000 km²). The natural border of these two parts is the Ural Mountains, which extends north-south in the length of about 2,100 km from the Northern Ice Ocean to the border with Kazakhstan.

Most parts of Russia are plains, which are in the south of the steppe, while in the north they are wooded. In the far north are the tundra regions. In addition to the Ural Mountains, Russia's mountains are Caucasus (Elbrus peaks with 5,642 m highest peaks of Russia and Europe), Altay and volcanoes on Kamchatka.

In Russia, the largest freshwater lake in the world is Lake Baikal. The largest rivers of Russia are Volga and Don in European, and Ob, Irtysh, Yenisey, Lena and Amur in the Asian region.

Russia is a federal republic with a semi-presidential system of government. State regulation is based on the Constitution, confirmed in a referendum dated December 12, 1993.

The head of state is the president of the Russian Federation, who is elected for 6 years in direct elections. According to the current Constitution, he has the following powers: he determines foreign policy, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, appoints and dismisses, with the approval of the State Duma, the Prime Minister appoints and dismisses the Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Ministers on the proposal of the Prime Minister, appoints the Secretary of the Council the Federation Council proposes a candidate for the post of Central Bank Governor in the event of a war or immediate war danger has the right to pass laws for the whole territory of the state or an individual part thereof, but must inform the Federal Assembly about such acts, it has the right to pass decrees that apply in the entire territory of the whole states (they must be in accordance with the constitution and federal laws. In addition to this president has many other powers.

The Republic of Turkmenistan is a state in Central Asia, on the border with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the Caspian Sea in the West. The territory of the country is 491,210 km². 90% of the land covers the Karakum Desert. Depression Turan and Karakum deserts are mostly dominated by the country, which is mostly flatland. Kopet Dag Mountain Range along the south-western border reaches 2.912 m. The Turkmen Balkan Mountains in the Far West and the Kugitang Wreath in the Far East are the only other notable elevations.

Turkmenistan has been for centuries a crossroads of civilizations. In the Middle

Ages, Merv was one of the great cities of the Islamic world and an important station on the Silk Road, the wagon road used to trade with China until the mid-15th century. Annexed by the Russian Empire in 1881, Turkmenistan later had a prominent place in the anti-Bolshevik movement in Central Asia. In 1925, Turkmenistan became the constituent republic of the Soviet Union, the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. It became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

According to Human Rights Watch, "Turkmenistan remains one of the most repressive countries in the world. The country is practically closed to independent control, media and religious freedom are subject to draconian restrictions, and human rights defenders and other activists face a constant threat of government retaliation."⁷

After 69 years as a part of the Soviet Union (including 67 years as trade unions), Turkmenistan declared its independence in 1991. Turkmenistan's policy takes place within the presidential republic, with the president and head of state and the head of government. No real opposition party is allowed. Each registered political party supports the second and current President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.

Most of Turkmenistan's citizens are ethnic Turkmens with significant minorities of Uzbeks and the Russians. The fewer minorities are Kazakhs, Tatars, Ukrainians, Kurds, Armenians, Azeri, Balochis and Pashtuns. The ethnic composition of Turkmenistan is 85% of Turkmen, 5% of Uzbekistan, 4% of Russians and 6%. According to data published in Ashkhabad in February 2001, 91% of the population are Turkmen, 3% Uzbeks, and 2% are Russians. Between 1989 and 2001, the number of Turkmen in Turkmenistan doubled (from 2.5 to 4.9 million), while the number of Russians fell by two-thirds (from 334,000 to just over 100,000).

The influence of christian communities on political and religious processes

Throughout history, the Black Sea has been regarded as a hub connecting the economies of the Mediterranean, it played an important role especially between the 9th and 13th centuries in linking the Islamic world and northeastern Europe. Also, within the region, important trade leverage between the Aegean and the Black Sea was created, through which the goods were exchanged. The northern part of the region exported primarily grain, meat and fish while the southern region together with Aegean was specialized in the production of wine, olive oil, dried fruit and other goods. After the collapse of Byzantium, the main word when it came to trade was occupied by Italian merchants backed by the Genoese Empire, which took the lead role in this area. However, the Genovian Empire was a short period. Already at the end of the 13th century, the beginning of the small states began with extremely expansive tendencies, but at the very end of the empire, which became the legitimate successor of Byzantium. By the constant conquest and expansion of its territory, by the end of the 16th century the Ottoman Empire managed to conquer the entire area of the Black Sea-Caspian region and, in turn, transform the Black Sea into the Ottoman Lake. The Ottoman conquest of this region and the termination of Italian dominance lead to significant changes in the status of Christian traders. Up to that moment, their role was primarily the role of trade mediators, however, with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, many Christian communities leaning

⁷ Nešković, S., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, CROSS - BORDER COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 32.

on the Black Sea coast play an important role. At the very beginning, Greek merchants pointed out, they controlled a significant part of the trade in the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula. In the middle of the 16th century, Greek merchants began to lose their dominance and their positions were shaken. Instead of Greece, Jewish bankers and tax collectors spilled out. By the end of the 16th century, they completely broke into the foreground and became the leading link of the non-Muslim trading world in this area. It is believed that the Jews just introduced the principle of European capitalism to this territory. Even the Jewish domination did not last long, but in the middle of the 17th century their influence was reduced and became less active in this segment. The main reason for this is primarily the mass migration of Jews to the West, while for the second reason, the restoration of the activities and influence of Greek traders is taken. Of the rest of the non-Muslim world, a significant trade role was also lost to Armenian traders who had established themselves in this branch very well before the Ottoman Empire arrived. Their influence and trading network continued to expand after the Ottoman conquests, Armenians used their Christian religion for easier access to the markets of the countries of Christian Europe, extending their network to Venice and central Europe. They played an important role in the trade between big rivals, the Russians and Ottoman, as some of the most prominent Armenian traders were well-listed at the court of the Russian ruler Ivan the Terrible.⁸

An interesting segment may also be the characteristics and skills that were adorned by the traders of that time. Traders who moved between two or more cultures had to master the knowledge that was unknown to the ordinary world that did not abandon their mother culture, so that these merchants did not possess only a different kind of commodity but also carried various other knowledge, information and technology. With all these novelties, transformations within domestic communities had to be inevitable. In general, the role of traders primarily for Christian communities was important, and they also enabled them to be better quoted in Turkish society. Ottoman Jews and Greeks played a crucial role in banking during the 15th and 16th centuries, and even a little later. They were the main factor in the collection of taxes, which allowed them to create, and in time, the accumulation of capital. The Ottoman authorities gave them some of the more important positions like a court physician or imperial treasurer as a loyalty award, while the Greeks received the positions of the rulers of Moldova and Wallachia.

Even despite all these privileges, non-Muslim traders did not dare to go beyond some borders because they believed that excessive assimilation would counterproductively affect their future existence. They also believed that the potential of receiving Muslim faith would improve the situation in the Ottoman Empire, but would, on the other hand, close many doors and disable former business in international trade. If they had not already gone to believe in learning Turkish, it could not have harmed, and even more, all the better-known traders knew him more than good, especially those who had even a home-grown accent were emphasized. Like the Ottoman Jews, the straps had the same characteristics and served similar rituals, continuing to use their native ancient Armenian language in their communities, but they also served the commercial waters exclusively in Turkish. The most interesting is certainly a Greek example. Many Greeks settled in the Andalusian Plateau served in Turkish, while the Greeks from Syria and Egypt spoke Arabic, the Balkan Greeks used to serve the Bulgarian, Vlach-Romanian, Albanian, etc. What concerns Bulgarians among them is the dominant Ecumenical Patriarchate in cultural life, the dominion of the Greek eclipse. Almost all the transcripts, archives,

⁸ Jeftić, Šarčević, N., GEOPOLITICS OF THE BLACK SEA, Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade, 2017, p. 32.

liturgies, everything was in Greek, the situation became even more noticeable in the middle of the 18th century because Greek merchants at that time were at the height of power.⁹

It is important, however, to emphasize that traders among all these peoples make up a very small number of the total population, so that the largest masses remained in their communities, using exclusively domestic technologies and knowledge, using their mother tongue exclusively and without using any custom to their own. Traders, although a minority component of their communities, because of the aforementioned knowledge and skills they used to have always lived in the leading structures of their communities.¹⁰

The constant growth of trade, as well as the communication with the west and the expansion of Ottoman Christians, leads to far-reaching changes in life within Christian communities. As the contact with the West progressed more and more, for merchants one thing became inevitable, reading and writing in foreign languages became imperative for traders from this area. With the advancement in relations with the West and the acquisition of basic knowledge about how Western cultures and skills, such as mathematics, accounting, history, philosophy, political geography as well as foreign languages, have brought good changes to the frameworks of their communities. All of these aspects of the novelty that came to domicile communities from the West have influenced the emergence of modern writers, the opening of secular schools, the emergence of contemporary literature and the beginnings of journalism, and ultimately the most important segment of the secularization of the religious structure of their communities.

Newspapers that brought secularization with them necessarily produced a conflict with religious authorities. The split began in the field of culture, but quickly expanded to other areas, primarily in the field of general affairs management. All Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire traditionally were controlled by religious structures, religious leaders were enabled to control judicial processes through church institutions, collect taxes, control school teachings, and so on. Since secularization has become increasingly massive, there have been several misunderstandings about court procedures, tax collection and schooling. All of these conflicts resulted in the initial development and, with time, the massive spread of various movements that required greater involvement of councilors in general issues.

The first noticed case is related to the status of the Ottoman Ottoman population. It is a population that lived in big cities and was made up of small craftsmen and merchants. Thanks to their commercial growth, some of them became more and more wealthy, so they began to finance more and more general affairs, and therefore they felt that increasing their contributions should be more important. With their struggle and the action of the Armenian artisan from Istanbul, they managed to win a committee that would continuously take care of matters related to hospitals, schools and other organizations important for the Armenian population. A similar scenario was also seen in the example of Russian Jews. With secularisation, a new generation of Jewish intellectuals was created, which at the very beginning confronted the traditional leadership of Russian

⁹ Nešković, S., RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF WAR IN SYRIA, "Religion, Values and Social Conflicts, International Scientific Conference of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, in the Czech, Slovak, Romanian and Polish Academies Sciences, the Universities of Liege Belgium, of Varna, Bulgaria, 28.08 - 02.09.2017, Bucuresti: Institutul de Stiinte Politice si Relatii Internationale "Ion I. C. Bratianu", Romania, 2018, p. 89.

¹⁰ Nešković, S., Nešković, M., BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION WARRAN-TY IN A MODERN GLOBAL AMBIENT, 6. International Scientific Conference "Power of Commu-nication 2017", Proceedings, Banja Luka: Pan-European University Apeiron, 2017, p. 98.

Jewry. Although contrary to some of the basic postulates of their struggle, the upcoming Jewish generation supported the idea of russification.¹¹

All these conflicts caused by secularization have led to political awakening and the great ambitions of some nations. Thus, for example, the Armenians living in Russia, Empress Katarina, presented the plan for the liberation and re-creation of the independent Armenian state. State-generated ideas did not bypass the Ottoman Jews who had the ambition to re-create their state in Palestine. The most extreme political ideas were reported among Greek Orthodox Christians. From the middle of the 17th century to the beginning of the 18th century their position became stronger and by it began to crystallize certain political ideas.

As the close of the 18th century approached, various political leaders of this corps began to appear, among them the most famous one was Riga from Fera. Riga proclaimed the idea of an Orthodox revolution among the Balkan peoples, which would result in the rejection of the Ottoman authorities and the formation of a Greek state in that area. Although fascinated by the European notion of a political nation, Riga was deeply aware of the demographic images of this region from the end of the 18th century, so the idea was to create a multi-ethnic Hellenic state in which the co-existence of the Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Vlachs, Armenians, Turks and other nations. He was convinced that the existing order could very easily be transformed into a political nation and suggested that the common language should be Greek because it is the easiest for all people in the country to learn. On this wave, Hetheri (1814) was created as a secret nationalistic organization inspired by the French Revolution. Their ideas were exactly the basis for the Greek Revolution of 1821. This revolution was taken widespread across the Balkans and was joined by Romanian liberals, and Bulgarian and Serbian fighters also took part. Heterie even had an idea about the return of the exiled Serbian leader Vozd Karadjordje. Heterie experienced a complete debacle, the army of Alexander Ypsilanti did not even manage to enter the territory of the Ottoman territory while fearing for its domination, the new Serbian ruler, Miloš Obrenović, swore to the sultan's faithfulness and executed Karadjordje.¹²

The relationship between the Greeks and other peoples from this region may best testify the case of young Bulgarian intellectual Vasil Aprilov. It's about a young man educated in Vienna and Moscow who settled in Odessa. Until the moment he met Russian linguist Yuri Venelin, he was a Greek personality who supported the heterogeneous movement, and often supported him financially. However, Venelin's teaching completely changed the views of the young Bulgarian who became deeply aware of their Bulgarian feelings. Vasil Aprilov considered that education is the best way to prevent assimilation. By the middle of the 19th century, almost all secular schools among Bulgarian Orthodox were of Hellenic type, and pupils were teaching in Greek while teaching some of the subjects in foreign languages, such as French. For this reason, in 1835, he founded a school that cultivated the Bulgarian method of teaching and which will bring forth a great number of young people who will in the future play an important role in education and nationalist movements.

In the mid-19th century, Greek merchants residing in large Ottoman cities were a very important factor in the overall functioning of Ottoman trade. On the other hand,

¹¹ Tetsu, S., IN SEARCH OF DISCONNECTED RELATIONSHIPS, Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media, 2010, p. 19.

¹² Đelic, T. A., Neskovic, S., Ketin, S., Lutovac, M., ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CON-TEXT OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND FARMS IN SERBIA - CASE STUDY, Fresenius Environmental Bulletin - FEB, Volume 28 - No. 1 / 2019, p. 87.

the newly formed Greek state was trying in every way to influence the Greek Ottomans. The Kingdom of Greece offered its compatriots in the Ottoman Empire citizenship and thus tried to establish a connection with them. But most often they encountered negative answers for the reason that the Greek Ottomans were afraid that any "positive signals" would jeopardize their position and their wealth so that the general attitude of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire was very negative towards the kingdom and they were trying to distance themselves from it. The situation was further exacerbated by the Greek-Turkish War of 1897, in which their position was undermined by a failure to provide support to the home state, The Ottoman side.

Anti-Semitism represents intolerance, hatred or prejudice against the Jews as a religious group or nation. The phenomenon itself has drawn its roots since the 16th century, and peaked in the mid-20th century when about 6 million Jews were killed in the genocide of Hitler's Nazi Germany. In its basic meaning, anti-Semitism does not hate the Semites, but only to one Semitic people, the Jews. For hatred towards the Arabs, also Semitic ethnicity, it will be said that someone is racist, but never anti-Semitic, so a more precise name for this term would be anti-Jewish. Today, under the Semites, the modern Arabs, Jews and Maltese people are generally considered. Antisemitism as a phenomenon was not observed in the Ottoman society until the beginning of the 19th century. Ottoman Jews enjoyed greater privileges than Jews from any other European country. As long as they were loyal to the Ottoman authorities, the Jews were recognized as an equal member of society, and they also cultivated relatively good relations with Christian communities, although occasionally there were certain tensions but no serious conflicts. At the end of the 19th century, there was a tremendous turnaround in the attitude of Christians towards the Jews, and often the Jews were accused of "blood curse" and ritual murders. What astonishes these accusations is that the "blood curse" was a practice in the Catholic countries of Western Europe during the Crusades. The very story of the "blood curse" requires an added question from where all these stories came from and who stands behind these accusations at the expense of the Jews. Many potential responses to these accusations are automatically imposed, so the examples from Izmir and Damascus are cited. What is common in both cases is that they are both orchestrated by the channels of the Catholic Church, with the role of the French consul in the latter case. The stories of the "blood count" are not only related to the Catholic Church and among the Greek Orthodox people circulated this theory, it is even considered to have been founded even before the incident in Damascus, and accordingly, there are numerous examples: Alep (1810), Beirut (1824), Antioch (1826), Tripoli (1834), and Jerusalem (1838). Some authors believe that stories of Jewish ritual killings originate in Poland, which used these stories during the 17th and 18th centuries to continue the pogrom of Jewish life. If anti-Semitism is a normal phenomenon on both shores of the Black Sea, an example from Odesa is also testified. Odessa, one of the major ports of grain transport, was the place of the great rivalry between the Greeks and the Jews.

The first serious incident came in 1821, when the Ottoman authorities executed Greek Patriarch Grigory the Fifth for participating in the Greek uprising. The Greek population found out that many Jews were involved in his liquidation, after which a group of Greeks attacked Jewish shops and houses. After this unfortunate incident, anti-Jewish outbursts became a regular phenomenon in Odessa. Tensions peaked at the time of the Crimean war, as a handful of Greek merchants bankrupted and their places in the chain of trade were occupied by the Jews. As the Jewish traders took over the primacy, they massively fired Greek workers and employed Jewish workers, which led to a large number of Greek workers losing their jobs. When a Greek sailor's story is added to this,

in which they claim that the Jews in Galati (Moldova) have killed a Christian child, there is a massive crime against the Jewish population. All these events from Odesa, from Crimea and other places were considered as some kind of the backbone of what happened later, these were the pogroms of the Jews from the end of the 19th century, more precisely in 1881 in the regions of southern Russia. This pogrom was only a continuation of the massive pogroms that plagued the Middle East and the territory of the Balkans. As a result of all these developments, there is a complete milestone in the relations between the Russian Jews and the Russian government. They considered that the process of emancipation did not bear fruit and that secularization itself did not fulfill its original purpose, and many of them became prominent Jewish nationalists and Zionists. These events also affected the awareness of the Ottoman Jews who are also becoming aware of and begin to play an important role in the Zionist movement.

Zionism is the political movement of the Jews to return to the "State of Israel". The word Zion is a biblical term related to Jerusalem. Modern Zionism grew out of the collapse of Jewish emancipation and the revival of anti-Semitism in the 19th century Europe. Israel, as we know our independence today, got it from the Society of Nations in 1948. In this way, the Palestinian territory was divided into the Jewish and Arab states, which the Arab League did not accept and automatically began the war that ended in 1949. Even today, this area is affected by war and there is no prospect of a common coexistence between the Palestinian and the Jewish people. The main stumbling block in mutual relations is the old Jerusalem which both sides consider sacred.

It seems that the beginning of the 19th century is the moment in which the Ottoman Empire reached the lowest point. It seemed that the Emperor was facing constant internal and external problems completely on his knees. The Ottoman state lost a large part of its empire; in the north of Africa, Egypt and Sudan, under the patronage of Mehmed, created their kingdom, the Christian population on the periphery of the Empire, primarily the Serbs and the Greeks with constant insurrections, demanded political independence. The situation was bad and the alarmist is also saying that in the empire itself, areas like Rumelia and Anatolia, led by local authorities, began to separate and defy the central government. All of this Ottoman Empire had to face another problem in the north of the country, with the Russian Empire. Continued growth in power and the constant expansion of the Russian Empire's borders have worried many countries from the west of Europe, primarily the UK. The British thought that the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire would lead to the takeover of territories by imperial Russia, which would have an uneasy influence on the balance of forces. Accordingly, the British state has taken several measures to support the empire in the pursuit of trying to uphold its undermined system of functioning.¹³

In that period, the stereotyped awareness of Islam prevailed in the west. Westerners in Islam saw the religion of violence, polygamy, discrimination, etc. Traditional beliefs are consistently corroborating the testimonies of Christian missionaries who were most often frustrated by poor experience because they did not succeed in turning Muslims into Christian faith. Also, the position of the Eastern Christians is seen as additional proof of Islam as a religion of discrimination and pogrom with which he constantly lives and from which he constantly fears the eastern Christian world. Deep-rooted consciousness

¹³ Nešković, S., INCORPORATION OF INFORMATION - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, 8 the International Conference "Economics and Management - Based on New Technologies" EMoNT - 2018, Proceedings, SaTCIP and Donbass State Engineering Academy Kramatorsk Ukraine, and Odessa National Polytechnic University Ukraine, Vrnjačka Banja, Serbia, 2018, p. 49.

was so strong that Western diplomats and politicians were convinced that no form of reform was possible in this area. They even considered that occasional Christian uprisings were not a form of political adventure or revolutionary work but a natural aspiration for freedom that was abolished by the rigorous laws of the Muslim authorities. Only the seemingly accidental and intolerable outbursts of the British government's top, who in the background had hidden objectives related to this space, were only nuts. The interests of Western countries and Britain as the perimeters of that world were related to the context of obtaining European economic and political spheres of influence in which the area controlled by the Ottoman Empire in the eyes of the West was considered one of the most important territories. European forces considered that Ottoman countries are an important source of raw materials and a market for their growing industrial sectors, as well as a springboard for the decline in the wider region of Africa and South-West Asia.

The Eastern Crisis of 1876 brought new riots, the Russo-Turkish war in which Russia broke the Ottomans ultimately resulted in the creation of a Bulgarian state that became a protectorate of Imperial Russia. What is absurd is the attitude of the Bulgarians themselves towards the new events, they were very grateful to the Ottoman authorities for allowing them an independent Orthodox Church, which played an important role in getting rid of the Greek yoke as well as the role of Bulgarian merchants who were often in a better position from the Muslims themselves. This outrage encouraged other Christian ethnic groups to fight for their independence. First of all, the Armenians, who until then had very little success in the nationalist propaganda that came from Russia. Like the Bulgarians, the position of the Armenian merchants was stable, the bustle of the empire was so favorable that there was no room for the spread of revolutionary thoughts. The Berlin Agreement was the moment that triggered the Armenian political independence idea. The tactics they tried to make their ideas did not differ significantly from previous attempts of this character. The only important difference was that in the field of propaganda the main goal was to gain Western affection and sympathy. One of the main consequences of the war was the mass exodus from the territories that were under Russian occupation. The movement of the Russian army to the Balkans looked like a new crusade because it ended too often with the mass murders of Muslims while many were fleeing from the rushing Russians. All of those concerns were also worried by the Muslims in Anatolia who were afraid that they could be the next target.¹⁴

The attitude of the West required the necessary and adequate response from the Ottoman bureaucracy. Reforms that inevitably had to be pursued had the goal of the loyalty of non-Muslim ethnic groups to the central government. A large number of laws were passed that guaranteed equal rights to all nations in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The adopted laws did not provoke the expected reactions, primarily because the non-Muslim elements considered that the entire process of equalizing their rights with Muslim rights was imposed by the West and not as a result of the iron desire of the Ottoman to provide equality.

Almost the same problem was encountered by the Romans, the imperial dynasty at the head of the Russian state. The Romans tried to solve their problem with a series of

moves that were physical, so you played on the map:¹⁵

- Numerous imbalances between the Russians and other peoples,
- The willingness of some NE-Russians to accept the Russian authorities,
- The economic benefit that was the result of inclusion in the imperial community,
- The commitment of St. Petersburg's idea of expanding Russian culture.

These elements are also important for the controversial Rusification term. The scientists who studied this period consider that there was no doubt the idea of russification and that the Russian state worked devotedly on it. It is believed that a series of aggressive procedures directed at NE-Russians is precisely the procedure of russification, it is thought of the plague of NE-Rus, the settlement of border territories to ethnic Russians, as well as the natural language, culture, education, administration etc. The conclusion is that this is nothing else but the implementation of the plan of russification. Those who negate the very term and the postures that he carries with them as the main argument indicate that the Russian Empire managed to preserve its religious and ethnic diversity, is also considered to have suffered the empress because of the lack of nationalism, which also invalidates a possible phenomenon called Rusifikacii. Some conditionally speaking, neutral researchers in Russia see an attempt to assimilate all peoples into a common imperial state, while at the same time great respect for local customs and several other benefits remains.

Similar attempts at the reforms that were already discussed followed on the other side of the coast. The Crimean War in which they were defeated as if he had cut off the Ottoman authorities and acted disenchanted because they realized the seriousness of the problems surrounding them. It can be seen in parallel a series of processes that took place in the 1960s and 1970s of the 19th century on the territories of the two great empires. Though seemingly a completely contrary reform, a closer look at the leads to the conclusion that reforms on the Black Sea coast have been reformed quite similarly.

Demographic change and mass migration are an important segment of the history of this region. At one time, demography was at the heart of the Russian government's interest as its priority. At the end of the 18th century, the Russian government led the project of colonization of the southern authorities. The main goal was to attract as many Christian residents living in the Ottoman Empire. The singles that were received from imperial Russia by the Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and most of all the Greeks used and settled the spaces in the south of the empire. The creation of the Russian Protectorate on the Ionian Sea has further accelerated and increased the migration of the Greek population to the south of Russia.

The end of the 19th century brought a counter-effect of these efforts, as there were mass migrations of the Muslim population from the area under the Russian command to the Ottoman Empire. The first was migrated with the Tatars, and soon they joined Cherkees and Nogai. As an excuse for migration, the forced persecution of Muslims has become official political Russian states. The attitude of the Russians and Tatars was all

¹⁴ Jeftić, Šarčević, N., THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE PROJECTION OF TURKEY'S STRATEGIC VISION 2023, The Ministry of Science and Technology Development of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 2010, p. 29.

¹⁵ Nešković, S., DIHOTOMY OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND SPIEGELING FROM ANGLE OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, Topic Proceedings of National Importance, Security Edition in the Post-modern Environment of Books 27, Proceedings, International Conference "Socio-Economic Development and Community Safety with an Emphasis on the City of Valjevo and the Kolubara District" 18 - 20 April 2019, Belgrade: Center for Strategic national security research - CESNA B, Belgrade and Travnik International University, BiH, 2019, p. 45.

bad, the Russians accuse them of their disloyalty to the motherland, while the Tatars were apprehensive of the “russification” and violent movements and pogroms. According to some surveys, close to two million Tatars left the borders of the Russian state and fled to the Ottoman territory. In addition to the Tartar exodus Cerkez and the abandonment of the territory of Kazan and Ural by the Muslims, it was continued with the removal of the Jew, a figure of 120,000 Jews who fled to the Ottoman territory drastically influenced the demography of the region. The sudden inflow of a large number of non-autochthonous population was an alarm for the Ottoman state. The authorities resorted to displacement, primarily in regions that were deserted by the migration of Christians to the Russian state, to solve this problem. The largest number is inhabited by the Danube and parts of the Balkans. A large number of Cherkesses were settled in Dobrudzha and around Varna, and also a number was settled in Macedonia and Thrace, while some settled in various eastern provinces like Alep, Damascus, Maradin, etc. The reaction of the motherland to the newcomers has caused tensions in many places. Strong anti-Russian feelings, although it can be freely said, and the hatred they brought with them also affected another Muslim population. There were other demographic changes, first and foremost, the emergence of migrations was that more than 70 percent of the population in the Ottoman Empire were Muslims, so many laws that equated Muslims with other nations were simply forgotten and put to the test. The important thing is that the Ottoman state could not compensate the displaced, so many of them lost their property as homeless people, spending their lives wandering in Anatolia and other regions. And this segment additionally warmed up and such a bad relationship between Muslims and Christians exposed him through the open hatred of the two ethnic groups.¹⁶

Contemporary crisis trends in the region

In the previous part of the text, it was tried through a short historical cross-section or a summary of events that were crucial for the region of the observed region, to approximate or clarify today’s order of forces and geopolitical games that are being conducted in this area. The actors who once played an important role are still present on a smaller or larger scale, there are some new ones, everyone is in common with them, through a diplomatic game, often backed up by the arson, trying to fight for their influence. In addition to the old conflict, some new hot spots have been opened, so that despite the longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestine, the war in Syria and Ukraine is only a temporary slash.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in the following lines, we will pay the greatest attention to the century-old predecessor to the leadership position in this region, of course, to Turkey.

For almost a century, in the geopolitical sense, Turkey was exclusively tied to the United States and NATO. The military participated in numerous wars led by the United States, from the Korean War to the present. In the latest wars that had taken place in the

Gulf region, it gave its territory logistical support and often dispatched its military contingents to war-affected areas. Lately, when its entry into the European Union is a big sign of the issue, it is believed that this will never happen primarily because of France’s decisive position on this issue, and when it is more than evident that both the economic and military power of the United States is weakening, Turkey is striving to lead an independent, own policy in the role of a regional leader. Turkey is currently undergoing radical changes both on the internal and the foreign policy plan, and the project “Turkey’s Strategic Vision by 2023” is very prominent, which envisages overcoming the regional framework and acquiring the status of a world superpower on the military and economic plane.

Changes in the foreign policy character are also foreseen that will have their reflection on the territory of our country whose current state summit has extremely developed diplomatic relations with the state summit of the Republic of Turkey, which was not the case in some earlier years. Turkey sees the importance of the Balkans in the fact that it is a Balkan country in a geographical, historical and cultural sense and that it immigrated a large number of immigrants from the Balkans. In Turkey at the end of the 19th century, due to changes and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, about seven million Turks migrated from the Balkans to Anatolia. Also, in the late 80s of the 20th century Bulgaria emigrated about 300,000 Turks. He immigrated to Turkey several Bosniaks during the Yugoslav conflict in 1991-1995 and the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. Between the parts of these people and peoples in the Balkans there are still very strong relatives, social and cultural ties. The links between Turkey and the Balkans, therefore, are about five centuries long, but they are still present. They are, inter alia, critically evaluated and evaluated differently. Serbian historiography portrays Ottoman rule as slavery and hegemony, and Turkey, on the contrary - as an empire that brought stability and unity to the Balkans, improved the standard of living of the people in the region and provided protection from outside invaders. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Republic of Turkey represents an economically developed and very important regional force on the connection between three very closely related continents: Asia, Europe and Africa, which due to its important geographical position gives it additional importance.

The Israeli-Arab conflict phenomenon is a multidimensional character whose conflict dates from the beginning of the new era, is particularly intensified in the 20th century and additionally gets in importance in 2017 by the decision of US President Donald Trampe to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Given the length of the conflict and the involvement of a religious and political factor, it is necessary that the problem is placed in a wider context. This phenomenon is also called the “Palestinian question”, although the first term is better because Israel is involved in the conflict with one and several Arab countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and of course Palestine) on the other.¹⁸ Both sides are pretenders to the so-called “Holy Land,” and neither of them is prepared to leave it at all costs. Give it to the other side. It is the Israeli capital that is the key point of the conflicts, the Jervrei want to restore the Temple of Solomon at that place while the Muslims do not consent to surrender their two shrines (Al Aqsa and the Dome on the Wall) that were made at the site of Solomon’s Temple. Religious

¹⁶ Nešković, S., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION TROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series “New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans” Vol. 5, Cross - Border Cooperation, Security and Development Perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Region, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 13.

¹⁷ Todorova, B., CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION, Cross - Border Book Series “New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans” Vol. 5, Cross - Border Cooperation, Security and Development Perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Region, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 130.

¹⁸ Nešković, S., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION TROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series “New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans” Vol. 5, CROSS - BORDER COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 13.

and political movements, although formed to jointly find solutions, did not contribute to the improvement of the situation, and were most often an additional stumbling block in both the contested relations of the two sides. The mentioned religious, political and historical context will be the principle through which this topic will be analyzed in the upcoming lines.¹⁹

Inadequate in a deeper history, it would be necessary to mention a series of events from a relatively close past that was important for the relations between the Jews and the Arabs. The Sinai War (1956), the Six-Day War (1967), the Jom Kippur War (1973) and the War in Lebanon (1982) resulted in the conclusion of a series of agreements at the end of the 20th century and a series of conferences that did not have much success in calming warring parties. Conflicts tend to have a tendency of growth and decline, but without greater looks for reconciliation and finally finding the problem.²⁰

Jerusalem remains an insurmountable obstacle in the mutual relations of the two sides. Today Jerusalem is divided into four parts, Armenian, Christian, Jewish and Arabic. Christians, apart from religious reasons, have no other binding points with this city, but for the Jewish and Arab world, this is a city of both religious and political epicenters. Both sides as the goal of their efforts want Jerusalem for the capital. Many of the world's and regional actors are involved in these events, so it is considered that the US is sympathetic to Israel, and regional Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are in favor of the Palestinian side. Perhaps the best indicator of how important Jerusalem is for Jews is also the testimony of Israel's representatives in the Security Council, Deni Danon, where he says: "People around the world must understand that there will be no peace without Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel." For centuries, Jews have been trying to take full control over the "Holy Place" for centuries, this is supported by information from the end of the 19th century when French Jewish Baron Edmond Rothschild (a member of one of the most influential families in the world that can be found more in the famous books of John Kolman "The Rothschild Dynasty" and the "Committee 300" that I would recommend to everyone) tried to buy a wall that once surrounded Solomon's temple but failed to find a common language with the Muslim community and the leading mufti. Jerusalem is the third holy place of Islam, next to the mosque in Mecca and Muhamed's tomb in Medina (these two sacred places are in Saudi Arabia). From there, Muhammad rose to the sky on his winged horse Burak. At that place, the Al-Aqsa Mosque was erected, which is now politically controlled by the Israelis. Professor Doctor Miroljub Jevtic writes: "To refrain from returning Jerusalem to Muslim sovereignty means being condemned to hellish torments. No Kosmet or Bosnia can substitute Jerusalem. You can give Muslims New York, they will again, and this is quite legitimate from Islam, be dissatisfied".

To speak or to write about this topic, and not to mention the political factors that influence various regions of the region in this region, it would be frivolous, and it is also very important to handle the phenomenon that got its name in 1885 by Nathan

19 Nešković, S. CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA AND THE ISLAMIC STATE AS MISCELLANEOUS MIGRANT CRISIS - DEVELOPMENT STUDY, Scientific Conference "Legal and Security Aspects of Migration and Consequences of the Migration Crisis - Constantin Magnus, Naisus 2017", Proceedings, Thematic Proceedings, Niš: Faculty of Law, Security and Management "Konstantin Veliki" University "Union - Nikola Tesla" in Belgrade, 2017, p. 35.

20 Nešković, S., MODERN ARMED CONFLICTS AS THE MAIN CAUSE OF MIGRATION PROCESS, Thematic Proceedings of the Leading National Importance, Scientific Conferences with International Participation "Southeastern Europe and Post-Modern Challenges", Proceedings, Edition SAFETY IN THE POSTMODERN AMBIENT, books 23 and 24, Belgrade: Center for Strategic Research on National Security - CESNA B Belgrade and Faculty of Law, Security and Management "Konstantin Veliki" University "Union - Nikola Tesla" in Belgrade, 2018, p. 57.

Birnbaum, and that is Zionism. Zionism is a political movement of the Jews based on the thesis that the Jews should return to the land of Israel. From a historical point of view, he appeared as a reaction to anti-Semitism. Some of the generals of Zionism are Todor Hercl, Leon Pinsker and Mozes Hes. The very last mentioned Hes is regarded as the creator of political Zionism, it is about a man who was a member of the German Social Democratic Party, and in 1862 he published the book "Rome and Jerusalem" in which he formulated his views on political Zionism. His ideas were largely influenced by the process of nation-building and the rise of nationalism that made the real reality of Western Europe of the 19th century. As parallel processes with these processes led to the consolidation of European colonial expansion towards Asia and Africa, Hes saw a chance for his people.²¹ The difference between political and religious Zionism is also important, so it is considered that political Zionism is largely a reflection of European trends and ideologies, among which probably the most important enlightenment, and religious Zionism refers to Zionist people, and they are also religious.²²

The bulk of the population could be classified in this group, as it were to abide by most of the laws of the Hebrew, at least occasionally go to the synagogue and celebrate the most important religious holidays. Probably the most important figure in the history of Zionism is Theodore Hercules, a man who has merged different Zionist currents and formed a unique political movement. Otherwise, Hercl is a Hungarian Jewish (today probably the most famous Hungarian Jewish is George Soros), who worked as a publicist and journalist. Interestingly, in some of his views expressed in various texts and books he wrote, he never insistently insisted on Palestine, and he suggests that the state be created in the territory of Argentina. However, the first Zionist Assembly held in Basel in 1897 outlined Palestine as a place where a Jewish state would be created. On the other hand, Hadzi Amin al-Husseini was the first and most important actor of the Arab-Jewish conflict, it is a very controversial figure who was the driving force of the Arabs in the struggle with the Jews, about a man who worked closely with the top of the third Reich primarily Adolf Hitler and the commander The SS Division and the Gestapo Heinrich Himmler met him several times and one of the sight was Sarajevo when he called on all Muslims to join the Nazi fight, claiming that Germany was a great nation that never attacked any Arab country.

Perhaps the best way to end this unsustainable subject is to quote the famous American politician Samuel Huntington and his work The Conflict of Civilizations: "It is unlikely that an open territorial issue will easily be solved between Albanian Muslims and Orthodox Serbs in terms of Kosovo or between Jews and the Arabs in regard to Jerusalem, since both of them have a deep historical, cultural and emotional meaning for these peoples."²³

21 Lunić, T., RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THE ARAB-ISREAL CONFLICT, Faculty of Security, Belgrade, 2018, p. 25.

22 Nešković, S., GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION AND SECURITY SYNERGIES OF THE BLACK SEA REGION TROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, CROSS - BORDER COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 15.

23 Nešković, S., RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF WAR IN SYRIA, "Religion, Values and Social Conflicts, International Scientific Conference of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, in the Czech, Slovak, Romanian and Polish Academies Sciences, the Universities of Liege Belgium, of Varna, Bulgaria, 28.08 - 02.09.2017, Bucuresti: Institutul de Stiinte Politice si Relatii Internationale "Ion I. C. Bratianu", Romania, 2018, p. 95.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region has been significant in the regional and world frameworks since the classical period up to the present times. It is essentially important for the roads and transfer of goods and people from Europe to Asia and vice versa. At the same time, the civilizations and cultures of Europe, the Orient and Asia meet in this region. The peoples have moved along the Black Sea roads during their migrations, campaigns, conquests and flights. Since ancient times up to the present, the region itself has been an interesting sphere of states and conquerors, and the main reason for that is its geographic position. Another reason is the fact that on the coast of the Black Sea no powerful state has been established that would take and keep its territory.

For decades, the Black Sea region was a border zone between the Warsaw pact and NATO, reflecting an ideological division between the West and the East. At that time, states from that region made attempts to establish their mutual multilateral co-operation by establishing treaty organizations (eg CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization), but only for the short term. So far, the Black Sea Regional Organization - Black Sea Economic Cooperation is the only one that has remained and it operates today. It was created by taking EEC as a model, tending to grow into an organization similar to the European Union. The Great Powers, Great Britain and the United States, have their long-term interests in the Black Sea region, exerting their influence on its political and economic shaping. The oil and gas paths from Russia and Asia pass through the Black Sea region, putting it in the focus of interest spheres of the states of the world, and especially the great powers. Today, most of the states of the Black Sea region are economically poor, have unstable political systems and are burdened with constant and potential explosive problems.

Within the new post-bipolar conditions of world order, regionalization has been seen as a positive and promising response to contemporary problems and challenges. Regional cooperation has been suggested to be particularly valuable in the regions that undergo fundamental political and economic transformations, as well as in areas that might initially lack mutual trust and confidence. Moreover, the regions are also built and their identities can develop around the framework of political and economic cooperation. Original common identity can be advantageous but does not seem to be a necessary precondition of a successful institutionalization of regional cooperation.

Today, this region holds the keys of some of the most important ones, so it's free to say civilizational issues, it is transporting oil from the Middle East, and when it comes to oil, there are always inevitable diplomatic, economic and security games. Turkish President Rexhep Tayyip Erdogan, whose authority has been seriously shaken in the latest elections, is conditionally controlling the migrant crisis, millions of people are currently on the Turkish-Syrian border and depend on his decisions. It could also enter into some dark corridors that transport various types of narcotics that are destined for the European market via same Turkey from Afghanistan.²⁴

The Ukrainian crisis that led to the war (officially started on April 6, 2014) between the fraternal peoples of the Russians and Ukrainians can only be viewed through another geopolitical game instructed by Western power centers whose only goal is the destruction

²⁴ Neškovic, S. CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA AND THE ISLAMIC STATE AS MISCELLANEOUS MIGRANT CRISIS - DEVELOPMENT STUDY, Scientific Conference "Legal and Security Aspects of Migration and Consequences of the Migration Crisis - Constantin Magnus, Naisus 2017", Proceedings, Thematic Proceedings, Niš: Faculty of Law, Security and Management "Konstantin Veliki" University "Union - Nikola Tesla" in Belgrade, 2017, p. 50.

of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, they broke a series of binding agreements that they had signed with the Russian side in which they guaranteed that there would be no spread of the NATO Pact to the east. Both this and many other events must be interpreted exclusively as opposed and directed against the Russian state.

Referring to the story of the attitude of the West and Russia, the Syrian example about which has already been said is best illustrated. It is precisely on this place that the West has been made clear that the world that existed after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union no longer exists, the planet is no longer unipolar with one world supercell, one world policeman, but the Russian Federation returned to its big scene.

Some of these examples just seem not to be related to a region that is primarily accentuated, the Black Sea-Caspian region, but geopolitics and diplomacy can not separate events by geography simply globalism as a phenomenon built by a world in which the borders do not mean anything else, there are only the interests of countries and the implementation of policies according to them, in those endeavors most often suffer those small ones, so that geopolitics can also be defined as the appearance of force.

Unfortunately, the culture and contemporary civilization that has emerged in this territory is a subject rarely spoken, television stories, newspaper articles, various publications, books, and so on about this region exclusively reporting on war events, constant turmoil and turbulence, which seem to be became the everyday life of the people who inhabited this territory. Anyone who has had the opportunity to visit one or more countries from this region knows that these are beautiful countries with exceptional natural beauties, buildings, full of beautiful scenery and most importantly inhabited by exceptional peoples who only have not the happiness to live on to some less turbulent space.

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THE WIDER BLACK SEA ZONE – DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVES IN A PLURALIST WORLD

Abstract

In this paper I am trying to analyze some significant aspects of security relationships in the Wider Black Sea zone and the perspectives to consider it as a specific security complex in the context of the theory of regional security complexes developed by the Copenhagen School in International Security Studies. Some arguments will be justified that the more intensive cooperation between the countries from the wider Black Sea Zone may become a basis for building a regional alliance that would defend the idea for the development of our region as a whole in favor of our peoples. We cannot agree with turning it into a battlefield, conquered territory from the Western corporations or a 'cordon sanitaire' for the illegal migration flows. Such a regional union would have more chance to boldly say its word in the EU and in the world, and to oppose of the expansion of the superpowers and other aggressive regional powers. It could follow the good pattern of political cooperation of the countries from the Visegrad Four.

Keywords: Wider Black Sea Zone, security, regional alliance

The Wider Black Sea Zone in Security Perspectives

In this paper I am trying to analyze some significant aspects of security relationships in the Wider Black Sea zone and the perspectives to consider it as a specific security complex in the context of the theory of regional security complexes developed by the Copenhagen School in International Security Studies (ISS). (Buzan, Weaver, 2003). Two traditional security regions – the Balkan sub-region of the European region (associated with the EU) and the Post-Soviet Space, are intertwined in this zone and they are the next (after Syria and Ukraine) most important and wider area of the intensive global confrontation between the West and Russia. The term 'Wider Black Sea Zone' is considered as a 'a new strategic frontier for Europe, Russia and the United States in terms of energy security, frozen and festering conflicts, trade links, migration, and other key policy areas' and a prediction has been grounded that its security prospects 'in the 21st century will be shaped by the interaction between major external actors, the ambitions of states and peoples in the region, and the region's role as a crossroads of civilizations.' (Hamilton, Mangott, 2008, v) Its political boundaries include the whole the EU through its members on the Balkans – Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, and much of the Post-Soviet Space – from Russia and Ukraine to the Caucasus and even the Caspian Region. To the superpowers with interests of penetration in the region, we need to add China with its new strategic infrastructural and cultural projects. For this reason the Central Asian Security Complex could be considered as an important factor determining the security relationships of the Wider Black Sea Zone. In this new security region we

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have a superpower – Russia, one regional power in a process of establishment as a great power, the EU as a great power and some influential regional powers – Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia.

In this paper will be formulated some arguments that the more intensive cooperation between the countries from the wider Black Sea Zone may become a basis for building a regional alliance that would defend the idea for the development and growth of our region as a whole in favor of our peoples. We cannot agree with turning it into a battlefield, conquered territory from the Western corporations or a ‘cordon sanitaire’ for the illegal migration flows.

Such a regional union would have more chance to boldly say its word in the EU and in the world, and to oppose of the expansion of the superpowers and other aggressive regional powers. It could follow the good pattern of political cooperation of the countries from the Visegrad Four. It may be not based on the membership in military organizations. Together they can defend the position of the weaker countries and the interests of their citizens!

It will be very important to attract Turkey to the new process of active regional cooperation in order to conclude an agreement to close the door on illegal migrants from the Middle East and to boost the peace process in this region destroyed by the Western invasions and internal aggressions. Our countries can use their experience in the struggle for emancipation and balanced policy between the West and the East; especially after the unsuccessful coup from July 2016... Turkey can be seen as a good example of defending its own intellectual interests as a topical priority and an adequate assessment of the changing geopolitical circumstances on a global scale in order to take its policy into line with them. Turkey is on the road to establish itself from regional to a great power – it has a successful impact on security decisions and actions in different regional complexes of security. The new role of Turkey as a regional power with multilateral ambitions and the confrontation about the new energy projects question the balance of powers in our region. It could be a dominant and constructive factor for enlarging the regional cooperation and for domination of economic factors relating to political ones.

The Regional Security Complexes Theory as a Methodological Tool

The Theory of regional security complexes of the Copenhagen’s School is a good methodological tool for analysis of the security perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Zone. The theoretical approach of B. Buzan and O. Weaver tries to reveal the relative autonomy of regional security, which constitutes a pattern of international relations radically different from the established structure of superpowers bipolarity that defined the Cold War Era. It provides theoretical instruments for analysis of the world order and for studying specific regions. The Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT) enables us to understand the world system structure in depth and to evaluate the relative balance of power and mutual relationships within it, between the regionalizing and globalizing trends. It distinguishes between the system level interplay of the global superpowers, and the subsystem level interplay between the lesser powers, whose security environment is limited to their local region. The central idea of the RSCT is that security interdependence is normally patterned and studied into regionally based clusters: regional security complexes. (Buzan, Weaver, 2003, 27-29)

The theory is focused on the conflicts of nation states and the impact of superpowers in the aspects of regions, not of the international system. It is very important in the context of the deepening tensions between the globalist elite of the main superpower and the nation states in some dominant conflict zones.

In the RSCT, superpowers and great powers define the global level of polarity, and the line between them and regional powers is the one that marks the difference between global and regional security dynamics. Superpowers, in the RCST perspective, are countries with broad-spectrum capabilities demonstrated across the whole international system – first class military capabilities exercised in global context, political power and economic potentialities to support them. The discursive aspect of their position is extremely important – ‘they need to see themselves, and be accepted by others in rhetoric and behaviour, as having this rank’ and ‘must be active players in the processes of securitization and desecuritization in all, or nearly all, of the regions in the system, whether as threats, guarantors, allies, or interveners’ (Buzan, Weaver, 2003, 34-35). We would be justified to expand the circle of superpowers, besides the U.S., adding Russia and China, which meet these characteristics today, indeed!

It is true that achieving a ‘great power’ status is less demanding in terms of capability and behaviour. They need not necessarily have such enormous capabilities in all sectors and be actively present in the process of securitization in all direction of the international system. What is the difference between them and superpowers? The ‘single key’ for differentiation is “that a great power is treated in the calculations of other major powers as if it has a clear economic, military and political potential to bid for superpower status in the short or medium term” (Buzan, Weaver, 2003, 35). The EU is a specific applicant for this position, but it is on the road of division of two great powers after the Brexit vote in 2016: the U.K. and the EU, managed by Germany. The present elite of the EU has led this organization to a deepening crisis and it is in danger of losing its great power status. It has become a bureaucratic corporation of elites, subjected to the global ambitions of the U.S. neoconservatives. We can attribute the position of great powers also to India and Japan, especially in economic and political context. At the Black Sea region very close to this position is Turkey – let us take into account its leading role in the Balkans and Europe as an energy-distributing center and at the Middle East as a stabilizing factor. At present this country has overtaken Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Regional powers are able to determine the polarity of any given regional security complex – unipolar as in South Africa, bipolar as in South Asia and multipolar in the Middle East. Their capabilities are large in their regions, but they do not register great achievements in a broad-spectrum way at the global level. (Buzan, Weaver, 2003, 37). Regional powers are very important participants in the global conflicts as allies or as a resource of proxy-soldiers for the great and superpowers. A good example in the Middle East is Israel.

We could justify the thesis that global security, in any holistic sense, refers to an aspiration of the globalist approach, not a reality. The global opposition of superpowers and great powers is expressed more definitely in regional context. Our planet is not tightly integrated, in security terms, and except for the special cases of crises boosted by the superpowers or some great powers, only a limited amount of security threats, can be considered at this level of generality as related to most countries. The region refers to a lower level, where states and other units link together sufficiently closely that their security status cannot be considered separate from each other.

The regional level encounters the extremes of the national and the global security relations and it is the territory where most of the action occurs. It is also a place of blending regional conflicts. The general picture of security relationships is a conjunction of two levels: the interplay of the global players at the system level, and clusters of close security interdependence of states and coalitions at the regional level.

Regional security complex is not a perspective which can be spread over any group of countries. In order to qualify in such a way a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient to accept them as a linked set and to differentiate them from the surrounding security regions.

The regional security dynamics is made up of the fears, friendly relations and aspirations of the separate units – states and coalitions. The security of separate units, their relationships and the process of global power intervention can be considered through understanding the regional security dynamics. Regional security complexes can be defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity of the included participants – they take forms of geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.

The mechanism of penetration links the pattern of distribution of power among the global players to the regional dynamics of the security complex. Penetration occurs when outside powers – super or great powers - develop conflicts or make security alignments with states within the complex. Foreign players can penetrate to seize natural resources of weak states, to conquer territories or to push their rivals by the respective region of interest. Some regional rivalries, as between Israel and Arabs or Saudi Arabia and Iran, provide opportunities or demands for the great players to penetrate the region.

In 2017 in Craiova Barry Buzan presented a revised version of their theory. The present-day world is not monocentric or polycentric: superpowers no longer exist. The falling down of the old security order leads to a pluralist world: a world without powers capable to be responsible for the world system.

I think in all other aspects the position of superpower remains up to date: penetration in all regions of interests, domination in the securitization process, a leading role in military technology and the arms race. We would be justified to expand the circle of superpowers, besides the U.S., adding Russia and China, which meet these characteristics today, indeed! I think that the abdication of the Trump Presidency from warfare is not an argument that the U.S. ceases to be a superpower: we can talk about a shifting of a form of defense of the American domination. It could be more effective against the increasing economic and military power of China, and the return of military capabilities and global impact of Russia!

Regional Alliance or a Battlefield for Global Confrontation – Analysis of Security Perspectives

Today 20 years after the Western aggression against Yugoslavia and seeing the end of the proxy-war in Syria we hope we are living in a new situation. The humankind is facing up to creation of a new multipolar world based on a balance of power. Three superpowers – the U.S., Russia and China and some great powers are in global confrontation for distribution of natural resources, money, territories and influence. Global opposition of superpowers and great powers is expressed more definitely in regional context.

The Balkan Region, or the South-Eastern Europe, has never been more insecure as a result of intervention of the most powerful countries in its affairs and their fervent wars in the neighboring region of the Middle East. Rather, such interventions have accounted for the drawing of new dividing lines bringing contradictions and stand-off, as well as for the creation of more favorable conditions for the spread of international terrorism, organized crime and corruption. The countries in transition in Eastern Europe were forcibly blocked on their way to modernization in favour of an undeveloped capitalist model. For our countries, it was a huge historical failure in the economic and human development.

The new role of Turkey as a regional power with multilateral ambitions and the confrontation about the new energy projects question the balance of powers in our region. (Bouzov 2016) In an ambitious and aggressive way Turkey is trying to occupy a dominant position in two, even three security regions – the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Its support for the “Islamic arc” (Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia) and its ambition to become a regional centre for gas distribution to Europe are crucial in the first direction.

Turkey gave a crucial example for a flexible national politics – it quickly has restored the cooperation with Russia and received its support for an action in Syria. Turkey has economic and military ability to become a great power, but the main obstacles are the Kurdish separatism and the existing multidirectional conflicting relationships. The example of Turkey for emancipation from the US obsessive external policy, based on expansionism and confrontation, especially after the coup from 15 July 2016 could be very useful for the Balkan countries!

The clash about energy projects reveals the geostrategic aspect of the relations in the Balkan region – it can channel the gas route through the Middle East and Iran, as well as an alternative route from Russia, which could include Bulgaria or Turkey. The West tried to prevent the devaluation of Ukraine as a transit country and blocked the Russian South Stream. The EU again showed its policy of double standards by supporting the North Stream and blocking Russian energy projects in Southern Europe. This explains its transformation into a major confrontation scene around new energy projects, along with the Middle East. Bulgaria, Greece and the countries from the Western Balkans are the obvious losers in this situation; Turkey is an active candidate for winner.

At present the major superpowers recognize each other as leading competitors in the distribution of markets, especially arms markets, natural resources and worldwide influence – we are entering a new era of global confrontation without ideological prejudices, illusions and masks. The main battlefields of this confrontation are the regions of the Middle East, the Post-Soviet scope and the Balkans – all parts of the Wider Black Sea Region. The US strategy includes closure of Russia with its military bases and forces, enlargement of NATO to its borders and detention in the Asian space. The threat from Russia is a major incentive for the arms industry, transfer of arms and soldiers worldwide.

No less important are the ambitions of the US and the EU to remove the Russian energy projects to import gas to Europe and to build nuclear factories. There are similar plans for the Chinese projects for economic and transport corridors. The Russian strategy is to break the unity of the Western countries for aggressive plans against it, to exert influence and to achieve important economic and political benefits.

The penetration of the global forces in our region is clear enough for identification and predictions. Bulgaria and Romania are the EU members closely linked to the US plans for a new rearrangement of interests and forces in Europe and neighboring regions. For more than 20 years Albania is also staging of the US policy in the region. Croatia coordinates its actions with Germany and Greece - with the EU, but it has special relations with Russia. The latter circumstance and high debts justify its subjugation under an economic protectorate.

Serbia is also stretched between the expectations for the EU-membership and the traditional good relations with Russia. The deepening of the confrontation of the EU-elite with Russia will probably lead to its acceptance in the Community. This perspective could turn the national crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina into a trigger for a new global conflict on the Balkans.

The first response of the countries in our region is regional collaboration against common threats. As a result of the Great Forces policy the dividing lines between the Balkan countries have become all too deep. We need a new communitarian strategy for the understanding of common interests. It should be based on the idea of domination of the multi-polar world. The Balkan countries should look for new types of economic and political cooperation with new global players – the BRIC-S countries or Shanghai Organization. A closer alliance of the Balkan states could be based on the institutionalization of the Black sea economic cooperation. These forms of cooperation could be mutually complementary. We need to work for the emancipation from the irrational political decisions of the EU following the Visegrad Four.

The countries of our region need to develop new relations with the countries from the Post-Soviet scope – especially with Azerbaijan, from which we will receive gas after 2019, with Georgia and Armenia, Moldova and Kazakhstan. They are part from the great Chinese trade and transportation projects which opens a new perspective for boosting our economic growth. There is no rational reasons to impose ideological and political limitations on these relations following a misunderstood EU-solidarity!

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ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF TOLERANCE

The problem of tolerance in the modern epoch has become one of the urgency in public and political life. In different regions of the world much violence, many wars occur and that is why its actuality is recognized by most social scientists at all variety of estimations as far as a phenomenon itself. Some researchers perceive tolerance as a political phenomenon, standard of political and legal life. At the same time this standard, in our opinion, includes clearly expressed ethical aspect which is treated also as an individual's attitude to the standard, and also that why he observes or breaks it, taking in himself relation to the other as criterion of morals and morality as well. It is also clear that the positions and motives of those who demand and substantiate the necessity of submitting to it are differed from those of the ones who infringe this standard. Naturally, the whole of this theme forms a part of philosophy and ethics of tolerance. As it seems to us, comprehension of the problems of its philosophy will be useful not only for philosophy, but also for the experts in other disciplines, for public and political men. It is clear that their researches, reflections, experience in this sphere are of interest for philosophers.

In the beginning on that what forms a field of philosophy and ethics of tolerance. Philosophers very often consider that content of this notion was formulated in the Age of Enlightenment, while was tolerance itself treated as toleration between various sects of Christianity in Europe(it will be to the point to mention two treatises by J.Locke “Message on toleration ”, “An experience of tolerance”). Note that in such case one shouldn't also ignore that tolerance between sects was established for quite long period and took in manifestation of intolerance as well. The same M.Luther (reformation) in most points was exclusively intolerant in relation to the Catholics, Jews and so on.

Reflecting on tolerance one must not also leave behind that tolerance as non-admittance of violation was known long before the age of the enlighteners. Its traces may be found in the world religions, affirmations of the Prophets and great moralists, in the ancient Greek philosophy and etc. Socrates called to restricting passions, Aristotle wrote on “golden mean”. In principle “the golden rule of morals”, later on formulated by Kant as a categorical imperative, just so sounded: “Don't do the other what you don't wish the others do for you”. In such case, like some dissonance appears the assertion of the biologists on that tolerance-patience as a term has become actual for designation of lack or weakening immunological response to the grafted alien tissues (introduced by the English immunologist P.Medawar in 1953). Certainly, tolerance is an ethical, philosophical category having its prehistory, history of philosophy and, perhaps, the representatives of the natural sciences shouldn't feel shy to confess that they use the notions from philosophy and ethics, attaching to them a new content. At least, this fact, alongside with that an old notion acquired actuality in a new century, once again conditions for us the necessity of addressing to philosophy of this notion. As well to the interdisciplinary investigations of this question, and to that philosophy is significant for

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similar researches, if only so it was historically interdisciplinary one by fact of its birth as science.

It includes several discussion subjects or issues, namely, first of all, what is behind changeability of the notion's content, in our case, of tolerance. Is philosophical response to the problem, somewhat influencing upon understanding itself of phenomenon, making clear the content and significance of the notions? And what do we lose when ignoring the historical and philosophic and ethical context and the concepts of this notion. Secondly, in our opinion, at all times an individual, how tolerant he would be, possesses a freedom to break consciously this standard, protecting himself, his relatives, own country. There most depends on that how much consciously he determines the bounds of the admissible violation action. The situation for estimation turns to be more complicated, when the point is the defenders of a country during conflicts, wars, collective opposing to violation, but even at that time individual attitude is significant for a personality. There exists a problem also in how scientist defends his position in a debate, discussions, competition and struggle for the projects. The conflicts are possible between responsibility and ethics of scientist and his interest, scientist and collective and so on. In the third place, it becomes theoretically necessary to analyze the links between notions adjacent to tolerance. For instance tolerance and intolerance, tolerance and freedom, violation, the same and law and etc. Let's pay attention to that tolerance as philosophical and ethical notion strongly differs from tolerance as political and legal phenomenon. Along with this, morality and individuality always and now manifest themselves in the cultural, political and legal area, that is, one cannot neglect morality, individual morals in these spheres. The question we rise in such case, acquires also such a ring, not disciplinary approach of a scientist should be of priority but how much these or those disciplines can ignore information from the other sphere, how much the representatives of different disciplines are competent in information from the other discipline. In the fourth place, contemporaneity demonstrates many socio-cultural, philosophic and moral, political and legal traditions and orders, their number being more and more increased. How much tolerance as morals of the ordinary people to live in harmony with those who have the other way of thinking, values can be effective. Attention to it has increased, but there are factors which weaken its influence. In different practices, languages it is understood differently. There is philosophy and ethics of tolerance in the Moslem world, it is not so known to the European consciousness, it exists in the Christian tradition, they don't know or have poor knowledge of it in the rest part of the world and etc. In the world, as we think, comprehension of the opposite between globalization and national identity has been affirmed what complicates an attitude and bringing up tolerance. The latter, in our opinion, should, therefore, include spreading knowledge on other cultures, ideals and value too. Fifthly, in our epoch, tolerance as a value, way of thinking has become dominating one, but how much our confidence may be in that it won't lead to degeneration of human community that lives and develops in conditions of choice between violation and no violation. If there only tolerance is, what man and society will be without freedom of choice? In this context idea of tolerance in relation to the near and distant people, how they correlate their relations, presents interest. Then theoretical necessity emerges to find one's position on differences between tolerance as reconciling and recognition of values of the other, different and so on. In the sixth place, in Azerbaijan the problem of tolerance has become urgent alongside with the issues of multiculturalism and dialogue of cultures. In our opinion, these problems are, in fact, interdependent. Most researchers think justly that moral practice of tolerant relation, dialogue of cultural laid the basis of multiculturalism. The joint book by the Azerbaijani, Russian, Kazakhstan scientists on

tolerance as constituent culture of dialogue of cultures, is dedicated to these issues¹. This interdependence gives an impetus to investigations and comprehension of opposites in this sphere. For instance, if aggression is committed against Azerbaijan on side of Armenia, the territorial integrity is infringed, then how is tolerance to be understood in these conditions, where is its bound during wars, conflicts. How to cultivate tolerance among those who turned to be refugees in own country, lost the relatives, dwell and great deal of the other. This question, to the point, worries today not only us, but also the most living beyond the borders of Europe. It appears that tolerance, multiculturalism, dialogue are not possible or won't be effective without similar ethical notions as consciousness, guilt, punishment and tolerance. And, at the same time when the matter is collisions, competitions of communities, how much it is possible to preserve humanity. I. Kant, for instance, preceded from that human consciousness is not blameless. Hegel wrote about it as well. The French philosopher A. Glucksmann, on the contrary, determined the longing for murder and violation as guiding anthropological feature of a man. J. Delez wrote on "loathsome mercy", J. Bordrier considered that prohibition of violation causes an increase in hatred². (Glucksmann A, Philosophy of hatred. M., 2006, p.30, J. Bordrier "City and hatred" end etc.) Not agreeing with these theses, in some absolute sense of the word, nevertheless we'd like, to admit that they are to be understood. These ideas clash us with metaphysics of morals and philosophy, complexity of valuations of not only modern world, but a modern man too. With search for answer to the questions, and not estimating the question how human morals and consciousness have formed in nature, how the radical turn took place in the development of the living, how publicity and morals correlate in different communities and times, are there in reality, mega culture and morals. In the seventh place, in the age of globalization the role of humanitarian factor has increased in the international relations, and, simultaneously, an impact of tolerance level on individual morals of man in the international relations. Its negative role in this influence plays also that information wars are waged (a notion of information safety is being actualized, the "double standards" are being used and in ordinary man an idea of international relations and international law as intolerant and unjust spheres, takes shape and this exerts, naturally, an influence negatively on his personality directives. In public consciousness of most countries a steady opinion has emerged that a "mild force" is used, first of all, for mean political purposes).

In conclusion tolerance is a value both for the world and a man. However, the ideas of tolerance differ in consciousness and societies; tolerance is estimated differently in relation to near and remote civilizations, neighbors, people. But there "a secret" lies in that knowledge on others lacks. At all debatableness of the given assertion, our morality, to a great extent, depends on reason, our rationality and hence, on our knowledge of the world, ourselves, much depends on us in confirmation of the principles and standard of tolerance. In our epoch of globalization it, surely, acquires the new shades, sounding, and that is why knowledge of tolerance should be spread in different civilizations and cultures, as well of that without tolerance the dialogue between peoples, societies and cultures, as well of that without tolerance the dialogue between peoples, societies and cultures is not possible. And, therefore, there is no alternative to tolerance as the principle and standard.

The philosophy of tolerance in Azerbaijan is connected with knowledge, enlightenment and reinterpretation of their spiritual heritage³. The epoch of modern in conditions of globalization makes for a need in comprehension of what was enlightenment in past and what it is now, what phenomenon of the enlighteners of the past lies in, what are differences and relations between modern, tolerance and enlightenment. This

question makes also ponder over that how a phenomenon born in Europe in the certain and concrete geographical area, then becomes a part of entire world culture, how much our Azerbaijani culture, having preserved its links with the past, can be modernized and what is constituent of enlightenment in modernization. Taking into account that following the Age of Enlightenment, any renewal, bringing up to date, one way or another is related with comprehensibility and reinterpreting what is called Enlightenment, philosophy of that Age, it becomes clear that here the sense of this process is just hidden. This is not repealed also by that some ideologists of the western and Moslem civilizations write on «the conflict of civilizations», the others criticize the Age of the Enlightenment, proclaim the end of progress and history.

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CULTURAL INTERFERENCES IN THE BLACK SEA AREA. A HISTORY OF LONG DURATION

Abstract

*My paper highlights the contemporary cultural and political significance of historical facts in long duration. Thus, starting from some sequences of history in Gheorghe Brătianu's book *La mer Noire (The Black Sea)*, we can say that this work, though written many decades ago (published in 1969), provides a valid and effective working tool for contemporary researchers and observers in the field of history, philosophy, geostrategy and geopolitics, in deciphering the interests of the great powers of the world, implicitly, of the riparian of the Pontic basin, but also of the elaboration of the strategies needed to control this space, at a time when the disputes of the influence zones became more and more acute.*

Key words: Black Sea, La mer Noire, Gheorghe Brătianu, long duration, universalism.

A brief introduction

Although my paper is more about the interferences that have taken place in the past as presented in a reference book in historiography, I'll try to highlight its philosophical meaning for the present, the actuality of Gheorghe Brătianu's synthesis regarding the Black Sea, which is particularly exposed in the work *La Mer noire: des origines à la conquête ottomane (The Black Sea. From the beginnings to the Ottoman conquest)*, a book first printed in 1969, in München, sixteen years after the death of the author and more than two decades after the work was written (Brătianu 1969).

The book is based on more extensive researches conducted by the author, of which the most important are : the doctoral thesis of Gheorghe I. Brătianu, sustained at Sorbonne in 1929 and published in Paris the same year; the university course sustained at the University of Bucharest during the academic years 1941-1942, respectively 1942-1943, bearing the title "Black Sea Question", which deals with events related to the Black Sea starting with antiquity, until the Second World War. The seven chapters of the Sorbona main thesis refers to the Black Sea trade from Antiquity to the early Middle Ages, to the Genoese expansion in the Levant and the trade of the Italian city with the Byzantine Empire, to the Genoese colonies to the Crimea and the war with Venice, to the new conditions around the Ottoman intrusion in the region (14th century). Here are mentioned "all the events that have kept the attention of historians (recorded by diplomatic, commercial, linguistic, archaeological sources), starting with the first Greek colonies, the Romanian hegemony, the Germanic, Iranian, Turkic, Slavic migrations, the hegemony of the Byzantine Empire and the relations, not always harmonious, with the

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populations that settled in the area (Chazara, Varega, Cumana)” (Popa 2012, 111).

From Brătianu’s perspective, the reconstruction of the past meant not only an evocation of political events, but also the “deciphering of the mechanisms of economic, institutional and cultural development” (Spinei 1988, 11), the method by which, we can say, this work is related to the historiography proposed by the School of Annals. As shown by the author of the introductory study at the Romanian edition published in Bucharest in 1988 (re-printed in 1999), by “treating a topic of great historiographical interest, the monograph of Gheorghe I. Brătianu benefited from an excellent reception by the specialized critic”, and among those who have spoken about its virtues were highly qualified medievalists such as well M. Bloch, E. Byrne, L. Halphen, N. Iorga, K. Kretschmer, R.S. Iopez, S. Nyberg, P. Pelliot, S. Reinach, M. Ruffini, W. Silberschmidt, V. Vitale, etc. (Spinei 1988, 11).

History of long duration and geopolitics in the Black Sea Area

The principle on which this book is built, as asserted the Romanian historian himself and his interpreters, is the universalism, treating the history of the Euxin Pont as a whole. As can be observed, by comparison, in a manner close to the understanding of history starting from the small facts of life which is finalized to the French historians of the School of Annals group in a “universalist” vision that integrates the concept of civilization and that of culture, Gheorghe Brătianu starting from data provided by historical documents on cultural and political interferences in the Black Sea area “endeavored not only to objectively present the events and phenomena in their spatial and temporal extension, but also to decipher their roots and establish their similarities and parallels”. Much more, “At the same time, he was concerned with revealing the specific and particular situations, the metamorphosis of the ethno-cultural phenomena, but also the traditional elements or the continuity of some tendencies” (Spinei 1988, 47). For example, if Fernand Braudel, who conceives a history “in the language of long duration”, states that “the economic history of the world is the entire history of the world, viewed from a single point of view, that of the economy” (Braudel 1984, 8), we could say that Gheorghe Brătianu conceives an universal history viewed from the perspective of the Black Sea and at the same time offers a theoretical model from which can be made inferences regarding the current geopolitical aspect in this space.

Thus, for example, “In the historian’s vision - which will be defined soon, when he realizes the strategic, political and cultural importance of the Euxin Pont in the history of South-Eastern and Central Europe and beyond - the movement of centers of gravity from the West to the East, from Rome to Constantinople later, and in other medieval political and economic centers, Moscow, Kiev, as well as in the Romanian cities and trade fairs, especially the Wallachian and Moldovan ones, will place the Black Sea in a the demographic-political conjuncture that will attract the interest not only of Europe but also of oriental civilizations” (Popa 2012, 108).

Concerning the Romanian Coast “Brătianu sees the tendency of the Wallachian and Moldovan rulers to reach, conquer and preserve the Pontic territories, as a natural, geostrategic and economic inclination, which impressed and coordinated the policy of the two states during the entire Middle Ages, up to the present time”. On the other hand, “it is not possible to define an area of political, economic and military interest, as well as the capacity to reunite spiritually the territories and communities near the Black Sea, without this headlamp located on the pontic shores from prehistory to modernity”. In this

respect, “it is enough to think of Greek counters and fortresses founded on the western shore of the Pontus and of all that represented the history of this perimeter, to see the economic and cultural importance of the vicinity of the sea, in order to understand the importance of the synthesis provided by the Romanian historian in the first part of his monograph” (Popa 2012, 109).

In addition, “The value of the synthesis made by the Romanian scholar, besides the ideas of content, consists also in the method he uses when he integrates the different plans of the historical life”, because “The world is not enclosed within a geographical space, it manifests itself as a permanent opening (...) to diversity” consisting in “the relationship between cultures, the exchange of values, cultural significances” made “in synchronous, spatial connections”, but “the links made over time represent the true life worthy of being expressed” (Popa 2012, 110; 112). These issues highlight the importance of work created by Roman historian of the Black Sea.

We reproduce a remark of the historian still valid today: “Whatever the point of view taken by the various publications, universalism is obviously a fundamental character of research in the history. This has always happened in moments of serious crisis in the political or social order, but this direction of research has never been more pronounced than it is today” and “It is a tendency to consider the history of mankind as a single body, a unique body with multiple aspects, which, in its last years of life, inspires Nicolae Iorga to write the ‘Permanents’ and ‘Historiology’” (Brătianu 1988, I, 73”).

In his book the Romanian scholar presents the geopolitical area of Black Sea from the perspective of long duration, in the sense of F. Braudel, the philosopher of history who in *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II*, defined “the conditions in which the event is configured”, i.e. as a result of “structural factors that are related to mentalities, customs and cultural values, indispensable for the understanding and actual realization of the historical fact” (Popa 2012, 63-64), in other words, as a result of a “serial history”.

So, “Long duration are not the historical Hegelian periods, nor the Marxist periodisation of economic and social history, but are temporal-cultural-historical ‘sectioning’ determined by a problem around which an event is created”, and “The model changes according to the cultural perspective (religious, philosophical, scientific)”, in other words, it is about “structural synthesis or series of historical development” (H. Berr, A.D. Xenopol) (Popa 2012, 65).

In the interpretation of Reinhart Kosellek, a concept such as “long duration” attempts to capture the “repetitive conditions” of transformations: “Given its temporality, this *longue durée* should not be conceived as an always linear course of identical events, but as a continuous repetition of similar conditions for various events”. Even if events differ from one another, “their structures and conditions are repeated more or less identically” (Kosellek 2009, 55-56).

And this also applies to the history of the Black Sea written by Brătianu because “Historical synthesis is, in fact, a cultural perspective on the facts of the past, integrating the way of perception and understanding of present generations” (Popa 2012, 106), and “Gh. I. Brătianu is the promoter of a historiographical model through which the multiple spiritual valences of historical experience can be integrated with contemporary knowledge and experience” as the expression of a historical discourse which “must acquire the model and means of other socio-human sciences” (Popa 2012, 107).

From the old trends and challenges to new trends and challenges

The Romanian historian's monograph *Black Sea: from origins to Ottoman conquest* is a synthesis work in which are treated, among others, aspects such as: "The Sea in universal history; The Black Sea at the crossroads of Europe and Asia; The name of the Black Sea over the years; Black Sea Geography: Key features of the seaside and the climate; Terrestrial and river roads: "the law of the isthmus"; The great phases of historical development".

Comprehensive and meaningful to a wide cultural context, Brătianu's conception on this area, is based on the assumption that "through all the problems it puts to the spirit and through all the possibilities offered to the material development of peoples and civilizations, the sea is a very appropriate framework to speak about the great currents of universal history" (Brătianu 1988, I, 84).

The historian bases this assertion on the fact that "in the absence of other chronological limits, history can be divided into stages, the determinant criterion of which may be the geographic framework of any sea or any ocean". Using the arguments from the political and cultural history, G. Brătianu emphasizes that ancient history - at least in Europe and the Near East - focuses around the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, "the very name of this sea, which places it in the center of the inhabited world, is an evidence". The Mediterranean is the one linked with the Egyptian, Phoenician and Cretan civilization, then the classical Elade and the Hellenistic world, in order to wake up "settled in the center of territories" by the Roman Empire. In the Middle Ages, Byzantium succeeds Rome first, in order to divide the "inner sea" with Islam, on the one hand, and with the merchant republics serving the Crusades, on the other (Brătianu 1988, I, 85).

Concerning modern history, this is, on the contrary, "above all a problem of the Atlantic". Summarily, in the last world war, the "Atlantic Battle" followed that of Pacific, so that "World War II and the advances of technical inventions, whose consequences can hardly be foreseen, open the world to planetary perspectives" (Brătianu 1988, I, 86).

Returning to the geopolitical concept of "sea", Gh. I. Brătianu shows that, for example, in Polish history there is a "Baltic problem", which concerns not less Sweden or Denmark, Russia or Prussia, all of these powers of the modern epoch. Or, another example, "The Adriatic Problem" has always influenced the historical development of Italy, from the Roman Empire to the present day.

But, thinks Brătianu, "The Pontic problem" is more complex because "It is indeed a sea almost closed, communicating with the Mediterranean only through the narrow exit of the Straits; however, due to the large rivers flowing into it from the depths of the steppe or the masses of Central Europe, due to the multiple network of commercial roads that reach its ports, it deserves as much as other large openings to offshore, the name of the 'turntable' of great traffic and international exchanges" (Brătianu 1988, I, 87).

The historian considers that this character of the transition and crossing area between Europe and Asia is transferred to the peoples and states established on its coast. In particular, the Romanian history owes to this fact that it is something other than the countries left far from the great commercial roads and into the shelter of war, which may therefore be happier in times of crisis, because they do not attract their attention too sustained by diplomats and strategists. But also, "We have to do here, of course, with the inevitable reversal of the medal: the historical interest that a geographic region awakens

is a privilege that is expensive to pay. In any case, the Romanian history could not be understood without taking into account the roads and influences that crossed the territory where it evolved, so that it made a real crossroads of civilizations and of the trade, but unfortunately, also of invasions and wars. In this set of circumstances, on which the new and ambitious science of geopolitics was built, the Black Sea is by the force of things at the forefront of interest and of the researchers" (Brătianu 1988, I, 87).

It should not be neglected, according to the vision of this book that "the transition between two different worlds has been marked even by physical relief" (Brătianu 1988, I, 92). Especially as a center of traffic and roads, the Pontic basin best realizes the image of a crossroads open to all influences. Two great roads are from the Black Sea to Central Asia: the oldest one has the Crimean harbor as its starting point and it goes along the Sea of Azov, follows the Don's course, it steps through the step towards the Volga and, passing between the Ural and the Caspian Sea, heads toward Turkestan, to find the mysterious margins of countryside of the ancestors of the present Chinese, in the heart of the great massive mountains of Asia. It is about the "silk road" that came from the Far East, which was traversed by the merchant caravans of the farthest antiquity. The other way, though less frequented in the ancient age, is no less important than other transit ways in the Middle Ages. It leaves Central Asia, crosses the Iranian plateau and reaches from Tebriz to Trapezunt on the Black Sea. It connects another road network linking the same coastline to the Persian Gulf and Syria (Brătianu 1988, I, 94).

The commercial importance of this area is then presented from the antiquity to the Middle Ages, when "wheat, fish, wax and slaves in the Pontic lands found a good place in the trade of Greece and Italy; likewise, classical-era ceramics, Greek wines or Italian cloths found buyers in the merchant colonies on the Black Sea coast". Thus, beyond the opportunity to put into dialogue different cultures, countries and regions that area offered "a kind of complementary economy" which explains the interest of the meridian powers for the Pontic basin from the distant days of Athenian talassocracy to the Byzantine penetration, the colonial expansion of Genova and Venice and the Ottoman conquest, or, closer to us until the opening of the Straits for Western trade in the last years of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century" (Brătianu 1988, I, 96). However, "If the battle flag ever came after the merchandise, it happened during the Crimean War". But until such conflicting moments "The rhythm of trade does not only concern goods imported from the Orient or the Far East, or furs from the Far North. The regions around the Black Sea have always provided natural products much in demand on the Mediterranean market, which in turn export the products required by indigenous there" (Brătianu 1988, I, 96).

According to the author of the book *La Mer noire: des origines à la conquête ottoman*, these periodic movements from the south to the north, which make up a kind of cyclic flow and reflux, economically and politically, in a sea where the tide is lacking, also determine the chronological divisions of the subject. Thus, in the ancient age two main periods can be distinguished: one is characterized by the simultaneous activity of the Iranians and the Greeks, through the collaboration of the Scythian Empire, established on the northern coast of Euxin, with the Greek colonies, to which they provide the minimum security necessary for the trade. After the fall of the Iranian Empire, which succeeded the Hellenistic Monarchies of Pontus and the Cimerian Bosphorus, Rome is the one that imposes peace and order in the Pontic space through the presence of its garrisons and its squadrons. In the Middle Ages, according to the traditional chronology, Black Sea is subject of the hegemony of Byzantium and of agreement with Chazarii,

and in the late tenth century, of the repeated attacks of Varangians (Normans), which arrive in same time in Western Europe. Finally, peaceful relations are established, which marks with their good influence the development of the Russo-Byzantine civilization of the eleventh century. But the double Turkish invasion, the Seljuks in Asia and the Pechenegs, the Cumans then, in Southern Russia comes to end this flowering. The big commercial roads are closed by this new invasion of the nomads and anarchy is set up on the Black Sea coast. However, in the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan's armies submit entire Asia to their laws, from China to the Danube. On the other hand, immediately, as the Iranian Empire once attracted the Greeks and favored their trade, the Mongol Empire granted protection to Italian merchants and facilitated their colonization and "a new era of prosperity opens for international trade in the Black Sea basin" because "despite the depressions and crises, the volume of trade remains considerable until the fall of the Venetian and Genoese settlements" (Brătianu 1988, I, 97).

But the situation changes in the middle of the 15th century, when the Ottoman conquest defeats all obstacles, acquires Constantinople and extends its control over the Black Sea shores, from Trapezunt to Crimea and Moldova. In this way, "Kara Deniz" becomes a Turkish lake for three centuries, whose resources constitute "the exclusive monopoly of supplying the Sultan's capital, the Serai and the Porte's army" (Brătianu 1988, I, 98).

The situation is improving at the end of the eighteenth century, when "the double pressure exerted by Russia on the one hand and Western powers on the other hand forced the Turkish barrage and reopened the Straits for a wider trade". The question of the East is now in the order of the day, and the regime of the Straits is one of its main elements. In this context, through the London conferences, for more than a century, these these acquire an international value. But, remarks Brătianu, the struggle is hooked up between the trends of Russian politics and the oppositions of other European powers: "from the Crimean War to the Balkan conflicts and the great world conflagrations of the last century, the issue of the Straits places the Pontic basin at the center of the events. The problems of peace and freedom of the seas and the rivers are no less closely related to it nowadays" (Brătianu 1988, I, 98).

The conclusion further expressed by the historian is useful in deciphering the interests of the great powers of the world concerning this area: "These alternations better outweigh the stability and balance factors in this thirty-century history, these 'permanent things' whose constant influence on the evolution of mankind attempts Iorga to prove it". These alternations would be sufficient to justify, from Brătianu point of view, the observation of American historian Gibbons from the beginning of the twentieth century that "as long as there is grain in Russia's fields and water in the Black Sea, there will be a matter for the Straits" (Brătianu 1988, I, 98).

And this rule applies equally to the Danube sector, which particularly concerns the history of Romania. Thus, for example, the policy of an independent Romanian state was interested in the issue of the Straits, the natural prolongation of the Danube Delta, as well as the existence of the naval and air bases that dominate the Pontic space, because "this is, beyond the political boundaries, a 'security space' often invoked by the great powers today, but much more indispensable, if one can say so, of the liberties and lives of states of lesser importance and of lesser extent. This is what the Congress of Paris in 1856 and, to a certain extent, the Congress of Lausanne in 1923 understood" (Brătianu 1988, I, 100).

The vicissitudes of Romanian history "confirm once more the fundamental importance of the problems of the Black Sea and the Danube for the development of an independent Romanian state in the full possession of of all its economic resources and able to freely use its legitimate aspirations in a national space" (Brătianu 1988, I, 101).

Conclusion

The sequences that I have selected from book *La Mer noire: des origines à la conquête ottoman* shows that during the history of humanity, finally the Black Sea proved to be a factor of closeness and unity, rather than a barrier separating peoples and civilizations. The author also highlights the need for historical knowledge to forecast the future, as well as the fact that national history becomes more relevant from a universal perspective.

According to Henri Irénée Marrou, the historian is the one who "knows how to get out of itself to meet the other one" (Marrou 1954, 92). The other, for the historian, is the past, that can be known only through a "sympathetic" attitude that puts beyond the scientific intentions of the scientist, the "befriending" with the object. In this regard, the document is not studied for himself, but "in order to achieve, through it, the past" (Marrou 1954, 117). Because of such intentionality, we could say that it is brought in the present the meaning of living into history. The return during the past of the historian provides some order of events. And this order concerns not only the facts recorded or taken into account from a complex reality from the past time, but it helps us to understand the present time, all the more when it is about a complex reality such as that of the cultural-political interference in the Black Sea region with its current challenges and tendencies.

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THE FORMATION OF THE IDEAL OF ETHICAL EDUCATION AMONG TURKIC PEOPLES (TURKISH AND KAZAKH PEOPLE) IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Abstract

In this paper, we would like to explain and discuss the formation of the ideal of ethical education among Turkic peoples (Turkish and Kazakh people) in the context of the dialogue of cultures. Because in the context of globalization, which has captured Turkey and Kazakhstan, the preservation of national identity, education and socio-cultural sovereignty is becoming an urgent task. Orientation to the future implies the need to address the history of the philosophical life of the people. Therefore we will refer to Al-Farabi, Mevlana and Yunus Emre to understand their doctrine of ethics, education, state and human being. In addition, it will be discussed how the changes in the Turkish education system and human life as a result of Atatürk's revolutions are reflected in education because the place and importance of Atatürk's ideas who is the founder of modern Turkish state is very important in today's Turkish education approach.

We will also explore that how they explained the meaning of ethical life in the society and state. After that we will discuss the importance role of dialogue of culture in education. So our problem will be what the formation of the ideal of ethical education is in general, especially in Turkic people but specifically Turkey and Kazakhstan. In conclusion we would like to offer how the ethical education will be succeed in the context of dialogue of cultures by referring the ideas or philosophies of Al-Farabi, Mevlana, Yunus Emre, Abay and Atatürk at the modern Turkic world.

Key Words: Ethics, education, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Al-Farabi, Mevlana, Yunus Emre, Abay and Atatürk

In the context of globalization, which has captured Kazakhstan, the preservation of national identity and socio-cultural sovereignty is becoming an urgent task. Today Kazakhstan is on the way of accelerated economic, social and spiritual modernization, which is impossible without the reform of public consciousness. Orientation to the future implies the need to address the history of the spiritual life of the people. The core of the spiritual life of the Kazakh people, the concentration of socio-cultural heritage is the history of Kazakh philosophy, as part of the world philosophical thought. The philosophical knowledge reflects the basic elements of the national idea and the ways of their cognition. Kazakh philosophy as the worldview of the Kazakh people is based on its own history, its development takes place in the format of socio-cultural and national identity.

The history of Kazakh philosophy is the content of the history of the people;

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the philosophical knowledge reflects the basic elements of national ideas and ways to achieve them. The historical wealth of the Kazakh people and national thought merged, mutually enriched, and formed the basis of national philosophy. The study of the history of Kazakh philosophy is a school that allows you to educate a culture of reasonable (rational) thinking, the ability to navigate in the modern culture of Kazakhstan freely.

The achievement of this goal is possible on the basis of mastering the methodology of historical and philosophical research by modern scientists. As well as the study of the processes of mutual enrichment and mutual influence of cultures of Turkic peoples.

To achieve this, it is necessary to form a type of worldview of young people, which would include traditions, customs, values of national harmony and patriotism. All this is concentrated in the public consciousness, which is a reflection of the living conditions of society, its material production, economic conditions, quality and standard of living.

The study of one of the actual philosophical problems of our time - the problem of correlation between ideal and reality - has its own history in both Arab-Muslim and Western European philosophy. Questions of social genesis, social functions of the ideal of education dynamics of the ratio of ideal and reality need further study, taking into account the achievements of the methodology of system analysis and comparative philosophy.

Abay's spiritual and moral views were formed in line with the socio-cultural traditions of Turkic philosophy. At the origins of this tradition is the ethical and philosophical doctrine of Al-Farabi, which reflected the humanistic orientation of Islam.

It should be noted that Turkic-speaking thinkers have always strived building a holistic philosophical image of man. The philosophical approach to man involves the identification of his essence, specifically the historical determination of the forms of its activity, the disclosure of various historically existing forms of its existence. The civil philosophy of Al-Farabi reveals the place of a man in the world and his attitude to the world, analyzes the questions of who a person can become, realizing their potential, what is the ratio of biological and social, what is a human as a person?

The most complete problem of the ideal of human education in the philosophy of Al-Farabi expressed in the search for ideological and cognitive position of people in determining the nature of man and the criteria of social ideal. A person, who has attained perfection should have the following qualities: to have a heart and a discerning mind, to love the truth, to hate lies, to have a proud soul to cherish honor, to strive for spiritual perfection, to despise material goods, to be fair, to be firm, to be brave, to take responsibility for the performance of due.

The world around people is not ideal and a person cannot completely overcome the chaos of his own passions, but he must embark on the path of moral perfection if he wants to achieve happiness. Happiness is self-sufficient benefit, the primary purpose of a person in his life. It is achievable for us since a man is the only being with intelligence who is able to know all things and receive truths.

It is safe to say that the ideal of the perfect man is the pinnacle of the ethical teachings of Al-Farabi, who embodied the best motives of philosophical reflection of the thinker, who consolidated the system of the moral code of the Islamic middle ages. The analysis of the "model" of a highly moral person in the understanding of the Second Teacher leads us to the following conclusions. On the one hand, the idea of the

perfect person appears as a concentrated expression of the ideal, due to the traditional worldview inherent in this particular society. On the other hand, it shows that in the dialectic of the individual and universal, the priority belongs to universal moral truths, the search for good, the timeless meaning of life, since the objective property of morality is the universality of its requirements, and its commandments act as universal laws of the universe.

The latter is very clearly seen when considering the "a perfect man" in the philosophical systems of Al-Farabi, when found common patterns of ethical reflection in different cultural communities in different historical epochs. Man himself, according to the scientist, by his nature is intended for good and perfection. All normal people have a natural tendency, inclinations to harmony, rhythm and beauty. However, they need to be developed: "All natural properties need education based on will and education to bring them to the highest or close to the highest perfection" (Al-Farabi. 171)

The peak of the ethical and philosophical teachings of Al-Farabi was the ideal of a perfect man, who also embodies the ideal of the ruler. The concept of human perfection as the achievement of happiness is based on the education of moral virtues. The doctrine of the virtues of Al-Farabi is revealed in line with the Aristotelian approach to the problem of education of a virtuous person.

Unlike Al-Farabi, Abay did not build a philosophical system, but concentrated his attention on the study of man, considered the meaning of human life, virtue, the manifestation of good and evil in society.

Important aspects of the philosophical works of Abay - the doctrine of man, in the basis of which lies the representation of a genuine person. The most important feature of the philosophical creativity of Abay is the fact that he formulated his understanding of man. Criticizing empirically existing man, Abay developed the idea of genuine and true man, which is fundamentally different from those distorted and abnormal forms that exist in empirical reality. A genuine man, according to Abay, enlightened, aspiring to knowledge, seeking to learn the science. He has a developed mind, thinking. He is a moral person, he developed a sense of duty, an ability to distinguish between good and evil. The real man in everything relies on his work, which is a condition of his well-being and freedom, he is alien to idleness, dependency, speculation with his age, has a developed sensuality, and understands beauty and harmony.

The ideal of Abay is harmony, when belief does not offend the mind, and the mind is ennobled by belief, but this is not enough. All the components of human consciousness must be reflected in an ethically perfect act.

Abay, asserting humanistic ideals, noted that the mind can be improved only through the love of boundless good deeds.

The human must be a good citizen. Hence the interest in the problem of education of the person. Abay wanted to organize education of the person to teach the person to live in society, strictly observing the general interests and rules of virtue, putting the general interests above personal benefits. He assumed that these personal qualities will be formed under the influence of circumstances and living conditions. Therefore, it is enough to protect a person from harmful influences and create a decent environment for him and you can easily get a good citizen and a highly moral person. Such a person should turn inside himself and thus look for a basis for choosing a line of behavior that would elevate the personal beginning of moral life, assuming conscious and responsible

human behavior in society.

Abay understands morality as the essence of man: in the understanding of the thinker to be a man is identical to be a moral person. Abay proves the need for the formation of a new worldview, new thinking, new ethical principles, criticizing the unfounded unfitness of the old traditional values, old way of life, traditional worldview and understanding of man (Abdildin Z., Abdildina R. Abay, 159)

Abay puts forward a new ideal of a person - enlightened, purposeful, seeing the reasons for his success or problems in himself, reflected in everything on his work. A new person is a creative person (Kunanbayeva A. 5)

Today, the need for philosophical understanding of those transformations in the context of spiritual revival, as well as many new problems that all human civilizations now face, is particularly acute. Kazakh philosophy has much in common with the personal philosophical thought, but at the same time it reflects the peculiarities of the spiritual life of the Kazakh people, its mentality.

Currently it is time of large-scale tasks and great achievements for Kazakhstan, it requires professionally trained, competitive professionals who are capable of effective work and have a broad spiritual outlook. The ability of reasonable orientation to what is happening in the modern world and in society as a whole is required. The ability to think rationally (the culture of thinking) is not innate – it needs to be taught.

The purpose of modernization is to create a society of maximum opportunities, where the individual and freedom of each person are respected, where the honor, dignity and reputation of each are valued, where high morality, ethical standards of behavior and spiritual values are existed.

Cultural heritage, philosophical thought and spiritual quest of outstanding figures of the Kazakh people are the guarantor of cultural and moral security of Kazakhstan in the context of inter-civilization contradictions of the modern world (Shaukenova Z.K. 232)

Ethical Education in the history of Turkish traditional culture

In this section, I will focus on the effects of our historical tradition on Turkish education. These influences will be Mevlana and Yunus Emre, two important figures of the Islamic World who contribute to Turkish culture. These Islamic scholars' human and educational views will be explained and then the educational views of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish state will be given. In the light of all these thoughts, it will be tried to come to a conclusion on what today's education concept is or should be.

According to Mevlana, one of the first aims of education is to mature one. Because knowledge and skills are useless without maturity. For him, the seed that is sown into human beings will grow through the preparation of the human spirit and mind before the seed is planted, and the seed is planted with good care and will grow, give new products and their good ones will be planted in the soul and mind of other people. (Ergun, 276-282).

It can be seen that Mevlana's education will continue with the development of more people, and not only by storing the information in his own mind, but by sharing,

that is, it will flourish by being transferred from generation to generation.

Mevlana advised people to be humble, righteous and good. He is a great widespread educator who has combined and articulated Islamic and humanitarian principles in poetry, music and raks against all kinds of lovelessness, evil and bigotry. (Akyuz, 54-56)

Education, which is an effort to uncover and develop the capabilities of human beings, is important in all stages of life, but is more meaningful in childhood and youth. The fact that the information given in the family and school takes the behavior and the person being knowledgeable, moral, honest and virtuous depends on the integration of the information with the inner feelings.

Rolling into the pit of frustration excavated by Western imitators from seven to seventy, our people who have lost their moral values can save the sultans like Mevlana who carry the whole spirit of the Muslim Turkish world (Topçu, 113)

The human being, the fruit of the tree of existence, can make mistakes at any moment because he is not an angel. It is a great virtue to accept human error. Mevlana wants to free the captive person from the bonds of self and to have a structure that dominates the goods. When a person recognizes himself and becomes aware of creative power, he learns to look at the enterprise rather than the work (Gölpınarlı, 345)

In order for a person to maintain his own existence and to come to a respectable place in society, S/he should pay close attention to the concept of ethics. Thus, Mevlana has shown the point that should be on the basis of respect, love and brotherhood among people.

According to Yunus Emre, man has been created as a great potential, and every newborn is immaculately entitled to rearrange his life and his environment. It is Allah, the Nurturer of the worlds, who matures all things by making them from the state, makes various works and multiplies them. Man is subject to his finishing power throughout. However, man has a difference from other beings. Other beings are equipped with knowledge and skills according to their work within a certain period of time and space. It is impossible for them to establish and develop a system of their own in this world. The beginning of human education is that he understands that he is not perfect, that he has many deficiencies (in need of education) and that he is in physical and spiritual preparation to accept education. In all levels of education, these are necessary, namely the need, ability and readiness. Apart from other living things, human nature is innate, raw; In addition to physical growth and maturation, mental-spiritual growth and maturation must also be achieved.

This growing and ripening does not happen spontaneously or by the person working alone. If one tries to do this work alone with the sensory organs alone, it falls into suspicion, lie, falsehood and depiction. It is extremely difficult for the truth behind events and beings to reach, to capture the meanings and secrets. In order for the education to take place, the student must have an appropriate nature, reason, ability and learning need. From this point of view, Yunus' poem explains his views on this subject very well: Advice is given to those who have reason, to those who have the will to hold the advice. Those who do not think, who cannot understand the ma'na coming from the counsel and do not show the will to hold are not given advice. (<http://sanaldanisman.blogspot.com/2009/05/yunus-emre-ksnin-egitimi-ve-gorusleri.html>)

At the request of Atatürk, the Education Congress was convened in Ankara on 16 July 1921. He showed to the Teachers gathered the following principles to be followed

when raising the new generation:

1. Education should be national.
2. In the national education program, the superstitions that are in the old education which has been hampered by the development of our nation and that are not suitable for us and foreign influences that are not suitable for us should not be found either from the east or from the west.
3. When raising our children and young people, they should be taught how to deal with foreign forces and ideas that attack their presence and unity, in particular. There is no right to life and independence for societies that do not have this information.
4. The children of the homeland prepared for the future should be taught not to give up in case of any difficulties.
5. Families should also avoid any sacrifice for the future of their children. (<http://nurdangolbek.blogspot.com/2012/08/mustafa-kemal-ataturkun-egitim.html>)

What should I draw from these views on Turkish education? Both Kazakhstan as well as in Turkey, we see that education in the forefront of the individual. the individual should receive education according to his / her abilities because he / she can only flourish above national values and rise to the level of contemporary. The individual should consider values, science, morality, and social responsibility when developing his own existence according to his own means. Maturation through the education process is only possible with an ideal ethical understanding, universal values and national unity. An ideal ethical education would then be possible only through values education. These values education must include both universal and national values, otherwise the development of the individual will be unilateral and incomplete. As a result, ideal ethical education can be given to people through values.

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10. <http://sanaldanisman.blogspot.com/2009/05/yunus-emre-ksnin-egitimi-ve-gorusleri.html>



Vihra Pavlova¹

TRANSATLANTIC „THREE SEAS“ INITIATIVE – CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BEIJING“

Summary

The objects of analysis in the report are two competing projects: the US-led Three Seas Initiative (Trimarium) and the concept of the PRC's co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in the sixteen-plus-one format (G16+1).

This problem usually being analyzed one-sided - the Russian-German relations, which the United States is trying to fail. But the Three Seas project has a deeper goals in the long run: Its to tear the countries of Central and Eastern Europe not only from Russia but also from the East as a whole. This is concerning and the Black Sea region, which appear an important link from the chein China - Central Asia - the Caspian Sea - Europe. It is important also, that Washington sees on the region from military-strategic, while Beijing - from a commercial-economic point of view.

The accent is on Poland, because the role of the country is significant. Both the US and China are lobbying for Poland to take part in their strategic projects aimed at building a trade advantage over their biggest rival. China has offered Poland participation in the New Silk Road project, the US, in the Transatlantic „Three Seas“ Initiative. It is in the US's strategic interest to block not only China, but also Russia and all potential attempts for economic integration between the Russian Federation and the EU, and and the Balkan countries.

„Aim minimum“ of the Three Seas Initiative is to block the Russian-German project Nord Stream II, using Polish ambitions for leadership in the region and turning its into a gas hub for the EU by importing US Liquefied Natural Gas. „Aim maximum“ is to obstruct of the G16+1 project and the growing investment activity of China.

The initiative platform „Three Seas“ not only does compete with the G16+1 in the CEE region but it also further subverts the EU's unity as to its SREB-related policies.

The initiative „Three Seas“ is not new. In the period between the two World Wars Polish leader Józef Piłsudski attempted to create union of states from the Black Sea to the Baltic to oppose both the Soviet Russian and the German empire under the name „Intermarium“ (Miedzymorze in Polish). But before him, the British geographer Halford Mackinder had proposed something similar: „Between the Baltic and the Mediterranean you have these seven non-German peoples, each on the scale of a European state of the second rank – the Poles, the Bohemians (Czechs and Slovaks), the Hungarians (Magyars), the South Slavs (Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes), the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks (...) First we have the Poles...“²; And „Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island

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² Mackinder, H., Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, National Defense University Press. 1996, p. 112

commands the World.”³

Since the new millennium and the turnaround of Russian foreign policy toward the EU, the Intermarium concept regained its relevance in the Polish foreign policy discourse and was clearly promoted by Lech Kaczynski, Poland's President from 2005-2010. This was visible in its attempt to diversify energy suppliers as part of his energy security strategy that aimed at cooperating with Azeri producers and later with Kazakh energy elites. After Lech Kaczynski's death in 2010, Intermarium faded away from Polish foreign policy and has become more of a slogan for right-wing politicians, presented as a better alternative than European integration to contain the “Russian threat”. But in November 2015, the Polish President Andrzej Duda again turned to this initiative, welcoming at the same time expanding NATO bases in Central and Eastern Europe.

Today it is claimed⁴ that Intermarium is an historical project of regional integration, while the Three Seas Initiative is a project of regional cooperation. But if we superimpose the states geographically from the various configurations of Intermarium with that of today's US-led Three Seas Initiative we see a clear resemblance: it includes twelve central and eastern European states. Member countries span the space between the Baltic, the Adria and the Black Seas, hence the name. In addition to Poland and Croatia, members presently include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia. That is, we again have a kind of demarcation line between Germany in the west and the Russian Federation in the east (known from Mackinder's theories as „Anaconda Strategy“).

The real driver of the initiative, Washington, is clearly opposed to the German-Russian Nord Stream II gas pipeline. Poland's interest in the Initiative is in the opportunity to transform it into a gas hub for the EU by importing US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), although transporting LNG with tankers is a much more expensive process than the transit of conventional natural gas through pipelines. On July 6, 2017 en route to the Hamburg G20 Summit, US President Donald Trump made a high-profile stop in Warsaw to attend the second meeting of the Three Seas Initiative. Commenting on the Polish ambitions, Trump declared⁵ that “many more” US LNG shipments will be coming to Poland, but added that the price might rise. The aim is to deepen US control over Germany, while supporting Poland's regional leadership aspirations. Whereas Germany is publicly in favor of retaining Iranian nuclear deal that the US unilaterally withdrew from in May, Poland is taking a non-partisan stance by largely refusing to take a side and instead offering up its possible services to mediate between the US and the EU.

However, the idea of Three Seas Initiative was not born in Warsaw. It came from the geopolitical strategists of the Atlantic Council, created by Washington during the height of the Cold War, today a major think tank of NATO policy financed by the Pentagon and US intelligence agencies, US Department of the Air Force; Department of the Army; Department of the Navy and the US National Intelligence Council...Atlantic Council is committed to realizing the interests of its donors⁶, among which large arms and oil corporations, as well foreign governments like United Arab Emirates (which gives the

3 Ibid. pp. 106

4 Masson, F. The three-seas-initiative: European regionalism of supranational nature. *Nouvelle Europe*, 20. 03. 2018. <http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/three-seas-initiative-european-regionalism-supranational-nature>

5 Gocłowski, M. Rampton, R. UPDATE 1-Poland expects long term deal for U.S. LNG supplies. *Reuters*, 06. 07. 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-poland-lng/update-1-poland-expects-long-term-deal-for-u-s-lng-supplies-idUSL8N1JX1X7>

6 Think Tank Watch: Updated List of Atlantic Council Donors, 11.11.2015. <http://www.thinktankwatch.com/2015/11/the-donors-of-atlantic-council.html>

think tank at least 1 million dollars), Kingdom of Bahrain, etc. It is logical that these powerful corporations pursuing their goals, proclaiming energy „independence“ from Russia, making the countries of CEE dependent on US liquefied gas at a much higher price. The situation is similar in the sphere of defense. The Atlantic Council insists to be replaced the major arms systems and equipment (which are Russian) with American, such as the Patriot missiles; to increase in defense spending of 2% of GDP by 2020 instead of 2024, but those for defense research to reach 20% of the military budget, etc.

Robert D. Kaplan (Chief Geopolitical Analyst, Stratfor) frankly recognizes⁷ this: „High-level meetings between the Intermarium countries have intensified, as the Pentagon and State Department act as hubs for all these countries' militaries, intelligence services and diplomatic corps to interact. Stronger US support to Eastern and Central Europe must be matched by stronger bilateral ties between the countries themselves – to say nothing of increased defense expenditures in the region. This is all a function of geography that Mackinder and especially Pilsudski were the first to address“ - he writes, also acknowledging that the European Union's (and NATO) eastern expansion, „has represented the partial institutionalization of Pilsudski's idea...“⁸

In April, 2017 the Atlantic Council held a conference in Istanbul on theme “Making the Three Seas Initiative a Priority for Trump.” General James L. Jones, chairman of the Atlantic Council, and former Obama National Security Advisor, remarked: „This is a truly transatlantic project that has enormous geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic ramifications” and aims to “alleviate the Kremlin's strong hand in the European energy sector.”⁹

But that's just one side of transatlantic „Three Seas“ Initiative. The strategic goal is in obstruction of the G16+1 project.

Thanks to the world's biggest military fleet, the US controls the main sea routes needed by China for its international trade. Therefore the Chinese are seeking ways to level the playing field by consolidating and expanding land-based trade routes to Europe lying beyond American's capabilities to project power. Hence the idea of the New Silk Road. Among the road's possible routes, the northern path via Poland is the easiest to implement and potentially the most stable. Poland (and by consequence the European Union) is separated from China by a mere three national borders (China-Russia, Russia-Belarus, Belarus-Poland) and the route's most basic infrastructure is already in place.

Thus Poland emerges as an important element of two clashing power plays driven by the two global super-powers. On economic grounds participation in the Chinese project appears much more lucrative. China, as the world's biggest exporter and one of its leading importers, plans to limit its share in seaborne trade and turn Poland, centrally located in the middle of Europe (and on EU's eastern border), into its „dry port“, serving trade with Europe.

The concept of the PRC's co-operation with the CEECs in the sixteen-plus-one format (G16+1) first emerged in December 2011 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Poland signed the strategic-partnership declaration, later formalised in April 2012. The obvious purpose of the G16+1 is to pave the way for the development of the

7 Kaplan, R. Pilsudski's Europe. *Stratfor*, 06.08. 2014. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pilsudskis-europe>

8 Ibid.

9 Ansley, R. Making the Three Seas Initiative a Priority for Trump. *Atlantic Council*, 03. 05. 2017. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/making-the-three-seas-initiative-a-priority-for-trump>

land component of the One Belt, One Road Project (OBOR) known as the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). Poland, thanks to its geographical situation, is predestined to be the SREB's hub bridging land transportation routes coming to Europe via Eurasian Economic Union and from the South via Balkans.

In November 2015 three Polish-Chinese memorandums were signed. „I strongly hope that the strategic partnership between Poland and China that was established in 2011 will be continued“, President Duda said¹⁰ in Beijing.

In May 2016 Poland joins the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).¹¹ The decision was made despite strong opposition from the US government. Joining the AIIB is an investment in the future, because European Union cohesion funds will at some point run out. Polish MPs were in no doubt that President Andrej Duda should ratify the agreement on the establishment of the AIIB. The Sejm voted unanimously – which is a rare occurrence these days – in support of Poland's accession to the Chinese alternative to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

President Andrzej Duda's visit to Beijing and Suzhou in November 2015 within the framework of the G16+1 have led to president Xi Jinping's visit to Warsaw¹² in June 2016 (at the invitation by Duda). Before your visit, Chinese President has published an article¹³ on the leading Polish newspaper „Rzeczpospolita“ under the title of „Setting Sail for Full Speed Progress of China-Poland Friendship“, within which it confirmed Poland's central role for the SREB project by stating that:

“Poland is at the heartland of Europe,”

“[i]t is also where the Amber Road and the Silk Road meet”,

“[s]everal China Railway Express trains to Europe pass through Poland or are bound for Poland,”

“[b]ased on the MOU signed between the two governments on joint building of the Belt and Road, the two sides should speed up the formulation of cooperation plans, identify and prepare for major projects and work for early harvest.”

Perhaps it wasn't by accident that President Xi Jinping's visit to Poland occurred only two weeks before July's NATO summit in Warsaw, at which it was agreed to set up a permanent US military presence on Polish soil. That is far more than Poland has secured in its previous 17 years of NATO membership.

In 20 June 2016 in Warsaw, Poland and China signed¹⁴ strategic partnership declaration. The joint declaration also refers, among others, to the deepening of cooperation

in the areas of economy and trade, finances, transport and logistics, infrastructure, civil aviation, energy, agriculture and commerce, technology and environmental protection. Poland and PRC also declared their cooperation in the fields of culture, education, sports, tourism, health and between research centres and signal the promotion of „friendly exchanges between young people from both countries.“ Representatives of the Polish and Chinese government and institutions of the two countries also signed a number of bilateral documents.

On 24-26 May 2017, the first Balkans and Black Sea Cooperation Forum took place¹⁵ in Serres, Greece. The forum aims to strengthen cooperation throughout this region in various regards, including in terms of transport and infrastructure. One of the topics debated at the forum related to the role of China's Belt and Road. It is in the Balkans and Black Sea region that the contemporary equivalents of the silk road on land (via Central Asia) and the maritime silk road (via the Indian Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean Sea) meet each other and connect to Europe. A land route via the Black Sea region provides China with a treatories to Europe that avoids areas, militarily controlled by Russia or the United States. The Chinese government preferred a transport corridor to Southeast Europe from China via Iran and Turkey rather than via Georgia or Ukraine, due to Washington's influence on them and their tense relations with Russia. (Here we can add Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO and the Three Seas Initiative members).

The two key countries in the region are Greece and Serbia. They provide China with footholds within the region from where it can build up its OBOR activities by way of a step-by-step approach. But the first is a NATO member, and the second hesitates between the EU and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), with according to Xi Jinping's idea, was interacted with OBOR.

Nevertheless, the Sixth Summit of the Heads of Government of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and China took place¹⁶ in one of the countries participating in the Three Seas Initiative on 27 November 2017. Its host was Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who gathered in Budapest 12 countries from the Three Seas block well as non-EU states Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania. The China-CEE countries discussed participation in China's vast One Belt – one Road infrastructure to increase European-Eurasian trade flows. They discussed creation of new infrastructure funds, of currency cooperation and much more.

But on June 29, 2018 in Warsaw at a meeting of the so-called Consultation and Dialogue Platform „Bucharest 9“ (the group of NATO members forming the East European Flank), the Presidents of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria and the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, adopted and signed a declaration on enhancing the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Alliance in the CEE region (Warsaw Declaration). „The increase in NATO's military power and military mobility is of great importance for the defense of NATO's eastern flank,“¹⁷ said the Warsaw Declaration, which explicitly mentions the still unresolved conflict in Ukraine and the threats stemming from Russia.

15 BBSF2017 Declaration: “Cultural Tourism, a key to Sustainable Development”. Balkans & Black Sea Cooperation Forum, Serres, Greece - May 25-26, 2017. <http://balkansblackseaforum.org/bbsf2017/announcements/bbsf2017-declaration-cultural-tourism-key-sustainable-development/>

16 6TH summit of Heads of Government of CEECs and China. Budapest, Hungary, 27. 11. 2017. <http://budapest.16plus1summit.com>

17 The Warsaw declaration on Transatlantic Security. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm

10 President hopes for continued partnership with China. The official website of the President of the Republic of Poland, 25. 11. 2015. <http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,70,president-hopes-for-continued-partnership-with-china.html>

11 Kaliński, A. Poland joins the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and hopes for benefits. Central European Financial Observer, 11.05.2016. <https://financialobserver.eu/poland/poland-joins-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-and-hopes-for-benefits/>

12 Xi Jinping Arrives in Warsaw for State Visit to the Republic of Poland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 20. 06. 2016. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdswyblwzbxstjxgswbexshzzcygyslshdschy/t1374297.shtml

13 Full text of Chinese president's signed article on Polish newspaper. Xinhua, 17. 06. 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/17/c_135445947.htm

14 Poland and China sign strategic partnership declaration. The official website of the President of the Republic of Poland, 20. 06. 2016. <http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,190,poland-and-china-sign-strategic-partnership-declaration.html>

Just a week after that, on July 7, 2018 Seventh 16+1 Summit was held in Sofia.¹⁸ Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borissov held talks with Hungarian head of government Orbán, saying that they had discussed Cohesion Policy, and the Eastern Partnership. A number of agreements were signed. Among them the start of construction of a 150-kilometer high-speed railway in Serbia to the border with Hungary funded by China.

That's in fact the dual policy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, resembling the movement of a pendulum between the West and the East.

Conclusion

The CEE region had in recent years become increasingly important to PRC. The formation of the 16+1 framework was a carefully designed maneuver to build a stronger presence of China both in a "soft diplomatic" aspect as well as providing a platform for extended economical cooperation. Chinese efforts in the region already started to bear first benefits with trade and investment increasing year by year. According to President of the State Council of PRC Li Keqiang, in the first 5 months of 2018, trade between China and the CEECs has increased by 24%.¹⁹ In the coming years the CEE region will gain even more significance as the Belt and Road Initiative sees it as a crucial hub for its land and sea routes towards western Europe. The BRI can play a vital role in the region's development. Eleven of the 16 countries in the 16+1 framework are EU members and Chinese investments in infrastructure and energy projects will considerably ease the EU's financial involvement and spending needs, especially with a shrinking budget after Brexit. At the same time, Chinese capital will improve the infrastructure needed to enhance the integration and economical development of CEE. It's a win-win situation. (Moreover, EU structural funds will stop in 2020, and CEECs should look for alternative investment means. There is a huge investment in infrastructure (especially in the railways and in the energy sector). These countries therefore need a long-term political strategy towards China and the BRI.

Right now, protectionism is on the rise and it's not just in the US, especially in the field of the high-tech branch. In recent months, Germany, France, Britain, the European Union, Australia, Japan and Canada have all joined an unprecedented global backlash against Chinese capital, citing national security concerns. „Down the road, Chinese money will probably find a way to come out – and the world knows it needs China money” – said Edward Mermelstein, a foreign investment adviser based in New York.²⁰ Many investors and advisers are confident that China will find opportunities elsewhere.

This „elsewhere“ also includes the Balkans and the Black Sea states, the interest in which will grow even more when Trump finally closes US markets to China.

The potential of the Balkans and Black Sea region is promising, but the Chinese government and Chinese investors hesitant to commit to major projects in the region apart from the current flagship projects in Greece (Piraeus port) and Serbia (railway to Hungary). To realize this potential, local governments, regional organizations and the

¹⁸ Seventh 16+1 Summit takes place in Sofia. CGTN America, 07.07. 2018. <https://america.cgtn.com/2018/07/07/seventh-161-summit-takes-place-in-sofia>

¹⁹ Ли Кэцян: Само за 5 месеца търговията между Китай и страните от ЦИЕ се е увеличила с 24%. OFFNEWS, 07. 07. 2018. <https://offnews.bg/sviat/li-katcian-samo-za-5-mesetca-targoviata-mezhdu-kitaj-i-stranite-ot-tc-683944.html>

²⁰ Klein, J. It's not just the US: around the world, doors are shutting on Chinese investment. South China Morning Post, 13. 09. 2018. https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2163974/its-not-just-us-around-world-doors-are-shutting-chinese?utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#Echobox=1536856569

private sector could take the initiative. By investing in infrastructure and facilitating east-west (across the Black Sea) and north-south (across the Balkans) corridors, regional actors must also enhance their role in OBOR and stimulate engagement by China. If they do not stand up for their interests decisively and competently, will probably reinforce their current peripheral position.

The new silk road will increase China's influence in the Black Sea region. This may complicate the unstable relations between Russia and the West. The Sino-US and/or US-Russian geopolitical competition could destabilize the region. However, China is careful to avoid this outcome, and its growing influence also provides new opportunities for Russia, the EU and the US to work with China towards regional stability. But Washington's pressure will increase, because no OBOR's/SREB's scenario might good for the US. Like admits George Friedman, „That the Intermarium has only recently begun to coalesce hasn't stopped it from conceptually expanding. The bloc runs from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, but its logical extension goes southwest to the Adriatic Sea. The Three Seas model would add Austria, Slovenia and Croatia to the Intermarium's ranks... The bloc can separate Turkey (which will become a major regional power) from the rest of Europe, but it also encourages Serbia, which is already close to Russia, to move closer to Turkey.”²¹

This means that tensions in the Black Sea region will increase. The demand a formula of Russia's weakening in the Black Sea remains an important geopolitical task for Washington. But America itself does not intend to use its armed forces on a serious scale. Its goals are going to be achieved by changing the regional balance of power, arming the Allies, key among them (according Friedman), Turkey and Romania. But Turkey controls and observes Montreux Conventions and has its own interests in the Black Sea region and the Middle East, over which Ankara regularly confronts with Washington. Furthermore, the pro- Eurasianist vector of Turkey is becoming increasingly serious. Her relations with Russia, Serbia and Hungary are deepening. After the Bulgarian Prime Minister Borissov's government overturned the South Stream agreement, Russia began negotiations with Turkey, Serbia and Hungary on „Turkish Stream“ the construction of which has accelerated after the announcement of the sanctions against „Nord Stream 2.“ In 2012, Turkey became a dialogue partner of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. „The Eurasianist perspective now seems to go beyond ephemeral discussions, gaining intellectual and institutional depth. The trend is likely to further intensify if Erdoğan's highly critical meeting with Trump and the May 25 NATO summit in Brussels, 2017 result in great disappointment for Ankara. It is important to keep in mind that the Eurasianist visions in Ankara do not originate solely from Erdoğan. Over the years, they have gained prominence in the state bureaucracy, the security sector, think tanks and academia. This rising trend is more apparent in terms of foreign policy, defense and security rather than economic and social life. Turkish think tanks have come to increasingly articulate the idea that the West is getting broken and it is time for Turkey to turn East.“ – Turkish political scientist wrote.²²

As for Serbia, after the Montenegro's accession to NATO, the US has secured control of the Adriatic Sea. In response, Russia is increasingly restoring its relations with Belgrade. In the near future, the country may be included in the Collective Security Treaty

²¹ Friedman, G. From the Intermarium to the Three Seas. Geopolitical Futures, 07. 07. 2017 <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/intermarium-three-seas/>

²² Gurcan, M. The rise of the Eurasianist vision in Turkey. Al-monitor, 17.05.2017. <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/turkey-rise-of-euroasianist-vision>

Organization (CSTO). Serbian MP calls²³ parliament to discuss country's membership in CSTO. Now it has observer status (since 2013). In May 2016, negotiations began on Serbia's integration into Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).²⁴

The realization of the Sino-Russian Initiative for the integration Eurasian Economic Union with One Belt, One Road opens up opportunities for sustainable economic development in Eurasia as well, as the CEE countries.

This is an irreversible trend, despite the strong resistance of the falling hegemon. Apparently Austria and Hungary are better aware of this. At the last meeting of states in the Three Seas Initiative (September 17 and 18, 2018), Victor Orban did not go to Bucharest, but went to Moscow. During the talks with Putin, Orban proposed to continue the Turkish Stream gas pipeline to Hungary. Budapest, like Vienna, is striving for a real diversification of the supply of energy carriers, so it is also quite likely that the participation of Hungary and Austria in the Trimorie project will be of a limited nature. After a government meeting at the beginning of October, 2018, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz said, that it was almost impossible to ensure EU energy security without supplies from Russia - whether one likes it or not. „It is important to simultaneously seek dialogue, seek contact, because, in the long term, peace on our continent is possible only together with Russia and not against it,“ he noted.²⁵

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²³ Serbian MP calls parliament to discuss country's membership in CSTO. Eurasia Daily, 28. 03. 2018. <https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/03/28/serbian-mp-calls-parliament-to-discuss-countrys-membership-in-csto>

²⁴ Сербия – ЕАЭС: перспективы интеграции в рамках зоны свободной торговли. Рабочая тетрадь № 37. М.: РСМД. 2016, с. 4

²⁵ EU Energy Security Inconceivable Without Russian Supplies – Kurz. Sputnik, 03. 10. 2018. https://sputniknews.com/europe/201810031068556086-eu-energy-sector-russia-supplies/?utm_source=https://www.facebook.com/&utm_medium=short_url&utm_content=jFj4&utm_campaign=URL_shortening

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СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ НЫНЕШНЕЙ ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ СИТУАЦИИ В АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНЕ И БОЛГАРИИ

Резюме

Развитие двусторонних отношений очень важно. Поэтому в качестве основы следует занять подписание соглашений и создание большего числа возможностей в разных сферах взаимной деятельности между Болгарией и Азербайджаном, а также осуществление более активного политического диалога и поддержки между двумя странами. Обе страны имеют потенциал для развития двустороннего сотрудничества в области культуры, туризма и образования. Это также будет способствовать дальнейшему укреплению традиционных дружеских отношений между болгарским и азербайджанским народами. Важным шагом в направлении сближения народа Болгарии и Азербайджана является расширение активных отношений между двумя странами в сферах культуры, науки, образования, спорта и других областях.

Ключевые слова: анализ, геополитика, черное море, наука, мультикультурализм

Крепкие Дружеские отношения между Азербайджаном и Болгарией начились с 14 января 1992 года когда Болгария признала Азербайджан независимой государственной. Посольство Болгарии в Азербайджане начало действовать в декабре 1999 года.

После восстановления государственной независимости Азербайджана болгаро-азербайджанские отношения неуклонно и активно развивались в течение всего периода времени. Твердый фундамент взаимоотношений был заложен «Соглашением о дружбе и сотрудничестве», подписанным между двумя странами во время официального визита Президента Азербайджанской Республики Гейдара Алиева в Софию 19-30 июня 1995 года по приглашению Президента Республики Болгарии г-на Желю Желева (1990-1997 годы).²

В соответствии с решением Совета Министров Республики Болгарии от 19 февраля 1998 года посольство Республики Болгарии в Баку было открыт в декабре 1999 года. Болгария является одной из первых стран, признавших государственную независимость Азербайджана.

По приглашению Президента Республики Болгария г-на Розена Плевнелиева президент Азербайджанской Республики Ильхам Алиев совершил официальный визит в Болгарию в марте 2015 года. В ходе визита была подписана Совместная декларация о стратегическом сотрудничестве между Республикой Болгария

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² Əli Həsənov. Azərbaycan Respublikasının milli inkişaf və təhlükəsizlik siyasəti. Bakı 2011 səh 113

и Азербайджанской Республикой, которая будет иметь большое значение для дальнейшего углубления отношений между двумя странами, включая политическую, экономическую, образование, науку и культурное сотрудничество между двумя странами, Декларация является документом, который является идеальным выражением сотрудничества между Болгарией и Азербайджаном с обеих сторон, что является прочной основой для дальнейшего расширения отношений и добавления новых областей, представляющих взаимный интерес.³

В 2016 году Президенту Республики Болгария г-ну Розен Плевнелиев был удостоен звания почетного доктора Бакинского государственного университета во время своего визита в Азербайджан.

Центр болгарского языка и культуры работает в Бакинском славянском университете с октября 2014 года. Деятельность Центра направлена на развитие двусторонних культурных связей и распространение болгарского языка, а также болгарской культуры и истории среди азербайджанской молодежи. Центр способствует совершенствованию области «болгарских исследований» в университете, а с 1996 года болгарский язык преподается в Бакинском славянском университете. С сентября 2013 года в часть классического и современного филологического факультета Софийского государственного университета им. Сен-Климона Оксридского распахнул Центр азербайджанского языка и культуры.⁴

Развитие двусторонних отношений очень важно. Поэтому в качестве основы следует занять подписание соглашений и создание большего числа возможностей в разных сферах взаимной деятельности между Болгарией и Азербайджаном, а также осуществление более активного политического диалога и поддержки между двумя странами.

В энергетическом секторе в контексте реализации Южного газового коридора Азербайджан придает особое значение развитию двусторонних отношений в области диверсификации энергетики, связанных с газоснабжением. Азербайджан является стратегическим и важным партнером в усилиях Болгарии по продвижению поставок природного газа и диверсификации энергетики в Болгарии.

Болгарию можно назвать катализатором транспортировки природного газа на европейский рынок. Греция, Болгария и Турция - как неотъемлемая часть инфраструктуры Южного газового коридора.

Болгарская сторона придает большое значение строительству Южного газового коридора. Участие президента Республики Болгарии г-на Розена Плевнелиева в церемонии открытия этого стратегического проекта в Баку 20 сентября 2014 года это доказывает.

Обе страны имеют потенциал для развития двустороннего сотрудничества в области культуры, туризма и образования. Это также будет способствовать дальнейшему укреплению традиционных дружеских отношений между болгарским и азербайджанским народами. Важным шагом в направлении сближения народа Болгарии и Азербайджана является расширение активных отношений между двумя странами в сферах культуры, науки, образования, спорта и других областях.⁵

Болгария и Организация Объединенных Наций, Организация Черноморского экономического сотрудничества и другие. они успешно сотрудничают в рамках таких международных организаций, как взаимная поддержка кандидатов. Болгария активно поддерживает события и дебаты в Азербайджане в этих организациях.

С уверенностью и оптимизмом говорить о перспективах азербайджано-болгарских отношений можно. Дружеские отношения между болгарским и азербайджанским народами, будущее расширение и углубление отношений между Республикой Болгария и Азербайджанской Республикой являются общими интересами обеих стран и обоих государств.

Азербайджанская национальная академия наук и Болгарская академия наук подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве 29 ноября 2011 года в Баку.

Документы, подписанные между соответствующими учреждениями во время визита академика Акифа Ализаде в Болгарию в 2017 году, станут примером для других научных учреждений.

Между академиями в этом направлении проводится важная работа. Презентация книги «Страна огня на Шелковом пути - история Азербайджана», переведенная на болгарский язык австрийским историком, ученым и писателем Эриком Файглом, состоялась в Софии в прошлом году, совместно организованной НАНА, посольством Азербайджана в Болгарии и Центром азербайджанского языка и культуры в Софийском университете. Эта книга является первой фундаментальной работой на болгарском языке

Эта книга посвящена историческим сходствам между балканским и кавказским регионами, разделенными на Черном море - разнообразием этнической и религиозной среды коренного населения и сосуществованием мусульманского и христианского населения в мирной обстановке. В то же время презентация такой книги в рамках 25-летия установления дипломатических отношений между двумя странами примечательна болгарскими читателями и историками.

В 2018 году в Болгарии состоялась встреча во главе с вице-президентом НАНА академиком Исой Хабиббейли.

В ходе визита он провел встречи в Институте экспериментальной морфологии, патологии и антропологии, литературы и национальной археологии Болгарской академии наук (БЭА). Институт литературы НАНА и Институт литературы Академии наук Болгарии, Институт археологии и этнографии НАНА и Национальный археологический институт Болгарской академии наук подписали соглашения о сотрудничестве и перспективы сотрудничества.

В рамках визита в столице Болгарии Софии состоялась фотовыставка «Археологическое наследие Азербайджана». В выставке приняли участие также представители Общества дружбы Болгария-Азербайджан.

Продвижение азербайджанской науки, культуры в Болгарии имеет большое значение. Последнее время сотрудничество между академиями еще более укрепилось.

Мы сможем частично изучить прошлое, настоящее и будущее социально-гуманитарное и культурное наследие на основе междисциплинарной методологии и академического стиля азербайджано-болгарских отношений.

3 Öli Həsənov. Azərbaycan Respublikası və xarici ölkələrin siyasi sistemləri. Bakı 2007 səh 207

4 Elşən Nəsimov. Beynəlxalq münasibətlər və dövlətlərin güclərinə görə təsnif olunmalarının əsasları Bakı 2013 səh 93

5 Niyaz Niftiyev. Azərbaycanda birgəyaşayış və multikulturalizm. Bakı 2015 səh 247

Если говорить о взаимных выгодах и результатах этого сотрудничества, то мы должны проанализировать и изучить социокультурные реалии обеих стран. В частности, мы должны изучить терпимость, солидарность и солидарность с точки зрения перспектив обеих стран. 2016 год в Азербайджане объявлен Годом мультикультурализма а в 2017 годом Исламской солидарности. Все это показывает, что Азербайджан понимает, что в обществе, а также в достижении экономического и культурного развития возможность мира и сотрудничества в обществе основана на понимании этих концепций.



Dragan Kolev¹, Branko Jotev²

THE EURASIAN BALKANS AND THE VACUUM OF THE GEOPOLITICAL POWER: THE NEW GREAT GAME?

Abstract

The Eurasian Balkans (the Caspian region) once again became the scene of a new great geopolitical game to fill “the vacuum of power” that arose after the dissolution of the USSR and the formation of a number of independent states. Although the metaphor “balkanization” or the suffix “Balkans” is associated with many spheres, it is often referred to as the Caspian region precisely because of many similarities: chronic instability, eternal interethnic and religious conflicts, political fragmentation, strong influence of the Great powers on these processes and alike, Having this in mind this name was given to it by the American geopolitician Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The past and present of the Caspian region neither can be explained nor predicted its future without understanding Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder and the Rimland Theory of Nicholas John Spykman. It is only in this wider theoretical geopolitical context that we can grasp the roots of the new great game in the wider Eurasian space, but also in the Caspian region. The work is aimed at trying to offer answers to the current “the new great game” in the Eurasian Balkans in order to fill a geopolitical vacuum after the dissolution of the USSR.

Key words: Heartland, Rimland, Eurasian Balkan, the vacuum of power, geopolitics, the new great game

Introduction

“... the Eurasian Balkans are truly reminiscent of the older, more familiar Balkans of southeastern Europe: not only are its political entities unstable but they tempt and invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbors, each of whom is determined to oppose the region's domination by another. It is this familiar combination of a power vacuum and power suction that justifies the appellation ‘Eurasian Balkans’ ”

Zbigniew Brzezinski³

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3 Brzezinski Zbigniew (2001). The Grand chessboard (second edition), Podgorica / Banja Luka CID / Romanov, p. 117th

Motives of choice of our discourse on the contemporary geopolitical challenges of the Caspian region (Eurasian Balkans) as important and actual topic are numerous. The Caspian region and the geopolitical vacuum in its current location can not be seen as an isolated phenomenon, as local and specific phenomenon that stems only from the historical, ethnic, religious heritage, or just from the standpoint of disturbed global geopolitical balance. From this complex, we emphasize in this paper the one for whom we think is very important - geopolitical. From this premise we start to build our basic thesis that is called: the current geopolitical vacuum and security of the Eurasian Balkans are primarily geopolitical issues. Therefore, identification of the main reasons for the increased geopolitical importance of this region means plunge into the essence of modern global geopolitical tendencies. In doing so, we do not lose sight of the fact that the combination of factors and complex circumstances has made the Eurasian Balkans a space for global confrontation of the great powers.

This is the time of transgression of the geopolitical power and profound changes in the world of the geopolitical system. Center of power but also the focus of confrontation between thalassocracy and tellurocracy is shifted to the East, to Central Asia and the Far East. This is the time of the beginning of the end of the global unipolar hegemony thalassocracy (USA) and the establishment of a multi-polar world order. Caspian region is an important link in the dominant geopolitical process. Thalassocracy seeks to "restrain", reduces its power, introduced in "crushed-decay" process and thus make compatible with its objectives. Tellurocracy (Russia) looking for reliable partners to this vector in order to protect its geopolitical interests. In these circumstances, very strong pressures ("if you are not with us, then you are against us") occur in the countries of this region to give up their national interests and to resort to a particular geopolitical option.

Basically they are the dominant geopolitical character. And contemporary events in this region are manifested in a clear geopolitical matrix. Without intention to absolute supremacy importance of geopolitical discourse (without pretension to give it an exclusive character) for the understanding of contemporary challenges, risks and threats to the Caspian region, we believe that without geopolitical approaches its safety can not be objectively viewed. In geopolitical matrix of the region can be read various fragments of learning how the founders of geopolitics as a scientific discipline, as well as all modern geopoliticians.⁴ Therefore they can not be explained either contemporary challenge to its security. The practical realization of geopolitical objectives is based on the theoretical and methodological assumptions, ideas, recommendations and creations of numerous geopoliticians. Their handwriting is recognized in all the events pertaining to global 'geopolitical drama', as well as major new geopolitical games in the Caspian region.

For centuries takes place geopolitical transition in the region. The internationally recognized borders were violently changing and new states are established, formed international legal precedents, the great powers have directly been involved in all these events.⁵ This ignores the ambivalent position of the Caspian geographical region: it could be a space or merging and separating Eurasia from other geopolitical continent. There are five basic premises from which we went in search of responsibility on the

⁴ Without knowing the teachings of Carl Schmitt, Frederick Ratzel, Alfred Mahan, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, Nicholas Spykman, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Ivo Lakota, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Peter Nikolayevich Savicki, Alexander Dugin, Leonid Savin, Leonid Ivashov and other, you can not understand what has happened in this region so far, what is now happening or what might happen in the future.

⁵ From this is emerged the term "balkanization" which usually means the state of fragmentation and permanent confrontation of the states on some territory.

fundamental question of security of the Caspian region:

1. The necessity of geopolitical method in consideration of the contemporary reality of the region;
2. The thoughtful consideration of the geopolitical importance of the Caspian region;
3. Fundamental analysis of historical and contemporary processes in this region due to the multi-faceted impact of external factors on its geopolitical position;
4. Recognition of the geopolitical postulates: Caspian region is one of the most important parts of Eurasia and
5. Gradual moves the world's geopolitical center of gravity from West to East.

From this premise it follows the base thesis of this paper and therefore we will indicate some of them in short.

What would be the basic context of geopolitical vacuum at the Eurasian Balkans? From the Geopolitical point of view it is a true dualism East (Tellurocracy) and West (thalassocracy), or as modern Russian geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin (Александр Гельевич Дугин) claim "fundamental duality" that is "The Great War of continents" ("Великой войны континенты") as the main geopolitical law. As such, it reflects on the "geographical organization of the planet" and has an important place in the "historical pattern of civilization".⁶ It is global and temporal dominant confrontation "the power of land", East Tellurocracy, The Heartland, primarily the territory of Russia) on one side and "the power of sea" West thalassocracy (embodied in the United States) on the other.⁷

Many questions are asked when it comes to filling geopolitical vacuum in the region of the Caspian region. Here we recommend only those we believe to be the primary: What is the geopolitical importance of the Caspian region? Why this place in the geopolitical context is labeled as Eurasian Balkans? What does the term "Eurasian Balkans" mean? How and why the vacuum is formed of the geopolitical power in the territory of the Eurasian Balkans? Who participates in a new "great game" in the southern part of the Heartland? What is the connection between Heartland, Rimland and Caspian regions? What does the physical and geographic determinants the Caspian region mean? What is etiology of the new great games? What led this region on the front page of the newspaper world? What are the current (and if at all exist) geopolitical aspirations of the peoples of the region? What are the most important external factors that influenced the geopolitical processes in this part of the world? What are the basic coordinates of the geopolitical position of the Caucasian region? Can the foreseeable future of the geopolitical position of the Caucasian region change for the better? What is the contemporary geopolitical landscape of the region? To what extent is its geographical location a source of endangering of its security? Does the country of the Caucasian region only with their efforts and hard work can fix its geopolitical position? Does the country of the Caucasian region have a choice between Euroatlantism and Eurasianism? Is this dilemma reduced to "or" - "or" or has the possibility of "and / and"? What are the chances (consequences) of the region in the Eurasian integration? All these questions indicate to what extent the geopolitical paradigm Caspian region are complex and why it is has been living for centuries his kind of "geopolitical nightmare"

⁶ Rainbow Alexander (2004). Fundamentals of geopolitics, Paper1, Zrenjanin, Ekopres, p. 26th

⁷ These terms are theoretically justified in the Thalassocracy (Anglo-American) geopolitical conception of Alfred Mahan, Halford John Mackinder, and especially Nicholas Spykman and Karl Haushofer.

(Slavoljub Šušić)⁸. In the answers of these questions are hidden reasons for exploring the geopolitical importance of the Caucasian region. For them we will search in the context of centuries of global rivalry between the Thalassocracy (maritime forces) and the Tellurocracy (ground forces).

I AND SCOPE OF BASIC TERMS

Basic terms that are used in this paper: “Eurasian Balkans”, “Heartland” and “The Great Game”. According to the basic thesis of the paper here we will indicate them briefly.

The term “Eurasian Balkans”

The Eurasian Balkans, that is, the Caspian region is a part of Eurasia. At the beginning of the new millennium, this region has become a place of dramatic events which placed it in the focus of interest of the world public. But that does not mean that interest for this region didn't exist before and that it had no geopolitical importance. Historically, this region has been very dynamic. Through the turbulent history in this region the geopolitical balance of power between Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy was many time disturbed and reestablished. American geopolitician and geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928 - 2017) is the most explicit in his book “The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives” outlined the geopolitical importance of the Caspian space for global domination and called it the Eurasian Balkans.⁹ He claims that “Eurasia since nearly five hundred years, became the center of world power, in fact since the continents started to act politically to one another. In different ways, at different times, peoples who inhabited Eurasia - although, mainly those with extreme periphery of Western Europe - have penetrated other regions and dominated them as individual Eurasian country that received special status and privileges gained major world powers”.¹⁰ Similarly the Russian academician and Nobel Prize winner Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (Александр Исаевич Солженицын, 1918 - 2008) in his work “Russian question to the end of the twentieth century” (“Русский вопрос к концу XX век”) considered that there were “enough to create in the north regions of the Caucasian mountain strong defensive line of Cossack that would protect against permanent intrusion of band of mountaineers”.¹¹

The physical-geographical determinant “Caspian region” means a region that belongs to the southern part of the Heartland and therefore, for our work, is significant global geopolitical concept of the English geographer Helford Mackinder (Sir Halford John Mackinder, 1861 - 1947) and his world hierarchy of space. It is in the scientific literature is often used in a broader sense as a collective category which includes three geographical areas:

- Caspian Sea with the coast,
- space of the Caucasus and

- Central Asia.

Eurasian Balkan (Caspian Sea) includes the following nine states that have become independent after the dissolution of the USSR a) in Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and b) in the Caucasus - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Often to these countries we add and Afghanistan. (Map no. 1).

Map no. 1 geopolitical map of the Caspian region



Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus> (13. 6th 2019).

Mountain Caucasus is regarded as a natural border between Europe and Asia.¹² The climate differences are allowed the diverse agricultural production.¹³

Why the Caspian region are called The Eurasian Balkans? Geopolitical terminology is resorted to metaphor “Balkanization” or the suffix “Balkans” to indicate a region that is known for its chronic instability, permanent interethnic and religious conflicts, which follows the process of disintegration of the countries. While one can say that the proliferation of state, political fragmentation, ethnic and religious conflicts are a global phenomenon, the term “Balkanization” is most obviously linked precisely

⁸ Looks at: Šušić Slavoljub (2004). Geopolitical nightmare of the Balkans, Belgrade, Military Institute.

⁹ Brzezinski Zbigniew (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, BasicBooks, pp 117-142.

¹⁰ Brzezinski Zbigniew (2001). The Grand chessboard (second edition), Podgorica / Banja Luka CID / Romanov, p. 7th

¹¹ Solzhenitsyn Alexander (1995). Russian question at the end of the twentieth century, Matica Srbska, p. 38th

¹² In Greek mythology, the Caucasus is considered to be one of the pillars that supported the world. Zeus is the Caucasus nailed Prometheus. The Roman poet Ovid placed Caucasus in the Scythian and described it as cold and rocky mountain.

¹³ In Pre-Caucasus are sowed crops, in the valley of the Kure are succeeding cotton and industrial plants, and the Kolhidska valley are grown Mediterranean fruit and vegetables. On the mountain regions, the population engaged in cattle breeding. The region is rich in water and rivers which are constructed a number of power plant that are used to power agricultural crops.

to the Caspian region. The term “Balkanization” has emerged in Western Europe at the end of the First World War. Then be it marked the disappearance of four great empires and the emergence of new states. Neither the First nor the Second World War stopped the process of disintegration of the Balkans, which only in the western part of Europe further strengthened the notion of ‘Balkanization’ as synonymous with the process of dissolution and strengthened all its negative connotations (territorial fragmentation, political instability, violent ethnic and religious conflicts, ethnic cleansing etc.).

In his famous book “The Grand Chessboard” Zbigniew Brzezinski talks about the Eurasian space as a geo-strategic imperative for the status of the US as the global superpower and suggest that the United States must dominate the entire continent, using the stimulation of chaos, ethnic, religious and political divisions. He dedicated a special chapter to this with the iconic name - The Eurasian Balkans.¹⁴ Alluding to such a nature Balkans, he called the region “the Eurasian Balkans”: “In Europe, the word “Balkan” conjures up images of ethnic conflicts, rivalries between regional great powers. Eurasia has also its Balkans, but the Eurasian Balkans is much more spacious, more populated and religiously and ethnically heterogeneous. Balkan is located within the geographical spatial rectangles demarcate a central zone of global instability and includes parts of Southeast Europe, Central and South Asia, the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East”.¹⁵

He believes that for the space of the Eurasian Balkans after the separation from Russia common feature “of geopolitical power vacuum”. Noticed that something similar happens with traditional Balkans: countries are politically unstable, they often rely on powerful global force in order to realize their national interests or achieve dominance over the Balkan Peninsula. Until recently, the American power in the “inner center” of the Eurasian Balkans was the “final arbiter”.

Another similarity of the Eurasian Balkans, with the Balkans is reflected in the delayed process of state formation and nation because they take a long time on the Caspian Sea region the organizations of societies took place in tribal communities. On the Caspian region “tribal and ethnic identities are still strong, so that internal disputes are the main difficulties”.¹⁶ their state and economic strengthening. And the border of newly formed state did not follow the ethnic divisions as the “ethnic cauldron” turn into a potential source of internal and external conflicts over ethnic territories.¹⁷ This is a region where for the centuries are touching, permeating and meeting cultures, languages, religions (mostly Christianity and Islam) ethnicities (inhabited by Russians, Abkhazians, Azerbaijanis, Balkars, Greeks, Karaches, Kumic, Nogais, Turkmens, Kalmyks, Adyghe people, Circassians, Kabardians, Georgians, Agulla, Avars, Dargwa people, Laks, Lezgins, Rutuls, Tabasarans, Tsaburs, Ingushes, Armenians, Kurds, Ossetians, Talishes and others. All of them are parted in several groups: a) the peoples of the Caucasus (Abkhazian, Circassian, Georgian, Dagestanian and Nasks), b) a group of Indo-European (Armenian, Greek, Iranian, Slovenian nations), c) a group of Altaic (Turkic and Mongolian peoples) and other small groups. (Map no. 2).

Only for Armenia (Armenians) and Azerbaijan (Azerbaijanis) can be said to have been ethnically homogeneous (i) and resist to possible domination of more populated

Georgians. In political terms, parts of the Caucasus are located within the territory of Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition to these people, in this region we find nearly 40 other ethnic groups and different religions so that the region makes ethnically and linguistically very complex mosaic. It is precisely because of this considered one of the most turbulent and potentially the most burning region in the world. To mention only the Russian Republic Kabardian-Balkaria (where is Elbrus), which has historically been ruled by Mongolia, Persian and Turkish Empire and, eventually, USSR. Some ethnic groups are concurrence of a number of historical, political, geographical and long stayed circumstances and victims of ethnic engineering.¹⁸

Map no. 2. Second ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Caucasian region (2008).



Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus> (23. 6. 2019).

The term “Heartland”

In addition to the basic term the “Eurasian Balkans” it is essential that, in accordance with the theme of work, defined the term “Heartland” because without it, we

18 As an example of ethnic engineering can serve Elbuses whose significant part of people after the World War Two was deported to Siberia on charges of collaborating with the Nazis.

14 Brzezinski Zbigniew (2001). The Grand chessboard, Banja Luka / Podgorica: Romanov / CID, p. 117-142.

15 Ibid., p. 117th

16 Ibid., p. 119th

17 Only Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are formed to a great extent on the basis of historical nations and other ethos are in the process of national integration.

can not explain “the new great game” in the Eurasian Balkans. Seen from the geopolitical point of view the Caspian region is “soft belly” of the Heartland.

Global Millennium confrontation of Maritime (thalassocracy) and Land (tellurocracy) power for world domination consider many geopolitical theory. One of the classic teachings on this subject is the Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder who gave the bases of the geographical characteristics that have over time become the most important geopolitical phenomena. (Map no. 3). This theory in this bipolarity gives preferences to the powers (the states) of land, because they operate and control the strategically most important part of the Eurasian land mass. According to this theory, “the place of the world power”, “staff Region of Eurasia”, “central part of the European continent”, represents Heartland (“The Heart of the World”), which allows them with its potential domination of this region (continent) and accordingly to this, the global domination.¹⁹ According to Halford Mackinder Heartland owns geopolitical imperative for the global domination. In this sense, it can be seen and its often referred syllogism: “Who rules East Europe – rules with the region of the heart, who rules the region of the heart – rules the world island, who rules the world island - rule the world”.

Map no. 3 Heartland and the Eurasian Balkans



Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus> (23. 6. 2019).

It is a geopolitical confrontation of two global powers, and also the model of their operation. Thus, maritime forces (forces of the sea) try to disable the integration of the Eurasian space around the Heartland and its development into a geopolitical entity that would have the power of global domination, while land forces seek to use the potential of Heartland and make the integration of the Eurasian continent. Thalassocracy forces in Russia to “continental hegemony” see the greatest danger of integration of the Eurasian space. The historical experience directs them to it but also the fact that the largest part of the Heartland belongs to the territory of the Russian state. The dissolution of the USSR, the relationship of maritime and land power is changing in favor of maritime power. Russia loses control over a third of the territory of the Heartland which opens geopolitical vacuum and begins competition for the control. But within the central Asian

¹⁹ American geopolitician Nicholas Spykman held that the marginal regions of Eurasia, i. e. Rimland is military and strategically more significant from Heartland and that the control of this regions provides the world domination.

region, in the southern part of the Heartland between five states begins struggle for dominance. These developments in geopolitics receive the title of “The new great game”. The outcome of this conflict will largely determine the future of the Eurasia but also the future of the Eurasian Balkans. He will determine the possibilities of the recurrence of Russia as a superpower and its return to the world politics, but also the possibility of the forces of Thalassocracy to restrain the forces of Tellurocracy.

The term “The Great Game”


The term “The Great Game” was used in the labeling of geopolitical competition (rivalry, fighting), between Great Britain and Russia on the delimitation of spheres of interest and control spaces of the Central Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century. It is dominating the opinion that this fight was motivated by the efforts of preserving the status quo, In order to forestall the opposite force from the geopolitical advantages. Russia is trying to make a breakthrough in the Central Asia to curb the intention of England to rule the Black Sea, while the Anglo-Saxons sought to encircle Russia and thus protect overseas colonial possessions (in the first place in India). The Russian expansion in the Caspian region and decade of “Caucasian war (1817 - 1864) has ended in the merge of the Caucasian space to Russia. By entering Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Russian Empire it is made a kind of bridgehead in the northwest Caucasus to the Turkish and Iranian expansion. Later, Russia is due to interference, infiltration and expansion of England took the whole region of the Caucasus. A partial success in controlling the space of the Central Asia achieved England also. It was able from Persia from Afghanistan to establish a “sanitary corridor” (“buffer zone”) with which it is protected the Indian subcontinent and from Russian influence and intervention. Competition for the control of the Caspian Sea region, and beyond for the control of the regions of Central Asia is not interrupted and that continues even today with different intensity. Keeping in mind the geopolitical significance of the region we believe that the competition will continue in the future. The current moment of collision of interests of the different power centers in this region, the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics called “The new great game” and we believe that the prefix “new” can be questioned. That is, we are on the viewpoint that it is only a manifestation of enhanced continuity of the “Great Game” for the geopolitical dominance over this strategically important region.

II “THE NEW GREAT GAME”: FILLING THE VACUUM OF THE GEOPOLITICAL POWER IN THE EURASIAN BALKANS

By dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the several new independent states the Caspian region assumes greater geopolitical importance. By then it was in the West primarily viewed as part of the “empire of evil”, “red dragon”, “soft belly of Russia”, “energy reservoir of the USSR” and the like. This shows an increase of the geopolitical importance of the Caspian region. From which it follows? The most general answer that could be given is: the region is a land of border guards who are permanently located in the collision of East and West. Geographically it is the contact zone of the Western (mainly EU) and the South (Asia minor, Near and Middle East) macro-space that is currently under the dominant influence (control) of the thalassocracy (West). The West intended role to it (along with East macro-Eastern of the Far East region) to surround, “Moderate” and “balance” (John Kenan) Middle East (traditional Heartland, i. e. Russia). Zbigniew Brzezinski has determined that the most important geopolitical

orientation of the United States is to round up Heartland, and without control of Rimland in which it is located the Caspian region, this goal is not attainable.²⁰ The Caspian region has touch points with the Central European continentalism as significant Tellurocratic geopolitical concept. Some items arising from this concept is implemented in the form of the infrastructure corridors, but some countries of this region are from the point of continentalism still the “geographical enemies to one another” (Milorad Ekmedžić). Due to all these reasons and especially because of the disappearance of the Soviet Union on the territory of Central Asia has appeared “the geopolitical vacuum” to whom are directed numerous geopolitical vectors with the aim of restraining the powers of Tellurocracy (Heartland). (Fig. 4).

Map no. 4 The Eurasian Balkans and geopolitical vectors of the “the new great game”



Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski (2001). *The Grand chessboard*, Banja Luka / Podgorica: Romanov / CID, p. 117th

What is the geopolitical (geostrategic) role of the Caucasian part of the Caspian region? Historically this role as well as its impact to the Heartland has changed. In periods of increasing of the maritime power (Thalassocracy) or State in Rimland, Caucasus was the dam who stopped incursions from the southern Russian steppes. When the land forces (Tellurocracy) were on the offensive then the Caucasus was space of defense from the maritime forces, or space, whence came the influence of the Heartland (the heart of Eurasia). In the current geopolitical context Caucasian part of the Caspian

²⁰ Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997). *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, BasicBooks.

region in relation to the Heartland, especially in relation to the soft core, has the role of geostrategic “outposts” both for Russia and China and other forces of the thalassocracy.

In the early eighties of the twentieth century it is hindered the geopolitical balance between the maritime forces (thalassocracy) and the land force (Tellurocracy) on the territory of Central Asia, and therefore the geostrategic position of the countries of the Caspian region. As an introduction to a new phase of geopolitical competition for control of the Caspian areas called by the Anglo-Saxon doctrine the New Great Game is usually counted the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. This Soviet-Afghan war (1979 - 1989) was conducted in the last phase of the Cold War was also an introduction to the dissolution of the USSR. It is waged with the aim to cut Rimland and former Soviet empire as a representative of the land force of Eurasia (Tellurocracy) free from the geopolitical encirclement (“strategy of restraint”), that is, the geopolitical “cornering”. One of the most famous political scientist of the “RAND Corporation”.²¹ Graham Fuller claims that after this event, the Caspian region as “an obscure region of the world has become the subject of fundamental news, the topic of conversation of the most responsible statesmen of the world, which some time ago was unthinkable”.²²

Between the two phases of geopolitical processes (The Great game and the great new games) to the Caspian region can be seen and new elements (differences) and continuity (the similarities). The continuity is reflected in the maintenance of confrontation and continuing rivalry between two main global half: land forces (Tellurocracy) and maritime forces (thalassocracy). The subject of this new geopolitics strategy game is something changed in relation to the period of the Great Game.²³ New big game next to the previous somewhat altered includes new. Along with the Russian Federation (successor of Imperial Russia) and USA (successor of Great Britain) in the game now is included the new countries in the Caucasus. It should be noted that the strategic importance of the Caspian region in the XIX and XX, and especially XXI century is not the same, that is, it is substantially changed. In the XIX century the Caspian region is subject of the competition of the British and Russian empires for the sake of domination over this territory in order to protect their imperial interests. It had the status of the border region for these two powers, from which it is derived primarily the geo-strategic importance.

In the new circumstances of the Caspian region in addition to geo-strategic takes also and geo-economic importance. Namely, in this region were founded significant energy resources (oil and natural gas). (Map no. 5).

To this fact draws attention also Zbigniew Brzezinski and believes that this is a basic distinction between the traditional and the contemporary geopolitical position of the Caspian region. The concentration of these energy sources is often on politically turbulent areas. It is forced the industrial countries, as major energy consumers (demand for oil and natural gas is growing), to seek alternative suppliers also outside the Middle

²¹ “RAND” Corporation (Research and development) - is an American non-profit corporation or a global policy think tank organization established in the framework of the airline “Douglas” to deal with the analysis and research in favor of US military aviation. The main task of it is to make long-term predictions and scenarios, primarily for the US Army. Corporate office is in Santa Monica (Calif.). Funded by the US government and private donors.

²² Graham Fuller (1996). “The New Great Game”, *Caspian Crossroads Magazine*, Washington DC, Vol. 3, pp.14.

²³ The conflict in the great game played out between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain about the territory that, with the geopolitical point of view, can be called “no man’s land” (Central Asia) where they resided tribal community in pre-state creations. At that time the Ottoman and Persian Empire did not have a significant role in this because the game had been significantly weakened.

East.²⁴ As an economical alternative to these efforts, it is appeared the central-Asian region and the Caspian Sea basin.²⁵ Without this specific “geopolitical magnetism” can not be explained the place of the Caspian space in the global processes. He is also in the new international circumstances, as a result of the demolition of the bipolar system of power, remained the significant geopolitical point of the Planet.²⁶ Thus, the Caspian region was, is and will be the arena of geopolitical competition between the thalassocracy (maritime forces) and the tellurocracy (land forces).

Map no. 5 Strategic ellipse (70% world reserves of natural gas)



Source: <http://www.iea.org/> (13.6. 2019).

Which country on the Caspian region could set aside on the basis of their geopolitical importance? There is no consent about the answer to this question. So, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that it is possible to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan give primacy. For Azerbaijan claims that “a country that can be described as a ‘stopper’ that controls access to ‘bottle’, which contains a wealth of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia”.²⁷ This ensures position of Azerbaijan as the geopolitical pivot of the Caspian region. It is the largest country in the region of the Caucasus. Through Azerbaijan passes pipelines with Russian oil to Turkey that she is ethnically close (belongs to Turkophones community). That’s why it undergoes pressure by major Western powers. But Azerbaijan also has geographical borders with Russia and with Iran as its geopolitical position makes it very sensitive from the point of impact of the thalassocracy (maritime forces) but also the tellurocracy (land forces).

Kazakhstan, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, is in somewhat different geopolitical situation. He acts as a “shield” that prevents the influence of Russia in the Central Asian state. Uzbekistan has designed to have a position of ‘awakener’ of other ethnic communities. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have no important

geopolitical position in the Caspian region and therefore are dependent on the powers that will be in control of this region.

III THE GEOPOLITICAL PRETENSIONS TOWARD THE CASPIAN REGION

There are many pretenders (both regional and world) for domination and control of this region, or to fill the “vacuum of geopolitical power.” Numerous international bodies have tried in various ways to “jump” in this geo-strategically sensitive region. We will perceive existing geopolitical pretensions from the perspective of local actors but also from the standpoint of the global players (primarily the United States and Russia) of this new great game. Thus, the subject of our attention is directed to the time after the Cold War, when it is establishing a new global balance of power between Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy.

The Geopolitical pretensions of the local powers toward the Caspian region

Geopolitical pretensions toward the Caspian region have Turkey, Iran and China. Turkey’s influence is facilitated by ethno-cultural and linguistic closeness of the peoples of the Central Asia and the Caucasus. Until recently, Turkey, as a former ally of Great Britain and after the United States, served as a “buffer state” in centuries of preventing Russia to go out to the warm seas. The new geopolitical circumstances have opened up the possibility that modern Turkey redefine their geopolitical pretensions and realize its geopolitical interests in this region.²⁸ It does so, on the basis of neo-Ottomanism.²⁹ Turkish geopolitical interests are not more high compatible with the American.

Iran has no such geopolitical power and influence in the Caspian region despite the fact that the majority of the population accepted Islam as a religion. Muslims in the region are predominantly Sunnites of Turans ethnic origin. Exceptions are Azeri and Tajiks who are Shiites, but also with Turanian ethnic roots. Therefore, Iran is focused on the geopolitical cooperation with Russia.

And China with its economic, technological and military development shows the global pretensions and also to the region of the Caspian region. She makes subtle respecting the principle of pragmatic real politic in order to develop good neighborly relations with emerging countries. Specifically takes into account Russian interests in this region. Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that “History has identified the Chinese elite to think about China as the natural center of the world. In fact, the Chinese word for China - Chung-kuo, or “Central Empire” - expressed understanding about the central importance of China in the world affairs and reaffirm importance of the national unity. This perspective implies also a hierarchical meaning of the influence from the center to the periphery, and in that way China, as a center, expects submission by the other”.³⁰

China is interested in building a pipeline through these countries in order to put diversification of energy sources and increase its energy security. There is an evident influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the newly established countries of the Central Asia which encourages Muslim separatism in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang.

28 Davutoglu Ahmet (2014). Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position, Belgrade: Official Gazette.

29 Look at: Tanasković Darko (2010). Neo-Ottomanism: doctrine and the foreign policy practice, Belgrade: Official Gazette and Tanasković Darko (2015). The great return of Turkey?: Neo-Ottomanism or Islamism, Belgrade: Official Gazette.

30 Brzezinski Zbigniew (2001). The Grand chessboard (second edition), Podgorica / Banja Luka CID / Romanov, p. 149th

24 The demand for this energy is significantly increased with the economic growth of China, the EU, India and Japan.

25 Numerous sources are considered to be the world’s largest unexplored oil reserves are located precisely in this region.

26 Bipolar system is based on a “balance of fear” and developed later in the period after the World War II.

27 Brzezinski Zbigniew (2001). The Grand chessboard (second edition), Podgorica / Banja Luka: CID / Romanov, p. 122nd

For now, China manages to oppose it.

The Geopolitical pretensions of the United States toward the Caspian region

By ending of the Cold War begins a new phase in the geopolitical situation of the Caspian region. In it, the US and NATO came out as winners, while the Warsaw Pact was disbanded and the Soviet Union experience a dissolution and on its ruins have sprung up the new independent states. With this the Caspian region received the multiple geopolitical importance. That was, until then, the unprecedented opportunity for the forces of thalassocracy (maritime forces), led by the United States to realize their influence on this part of Eurasia. There were adopted comprehensive plans for the longer term “keying and anchoring” in the Eurasian land mass, which would allow a deep separation of two basic Eurasian region and prevent any kind of continental integration.³¹ In this part of Rimland China and Iran are main rivals of the USA. If USA succeeds in the strategic anchoring, then they would find in a half-surrounding, and the territory of Pakistan would become a strategic depth of thalassocracy. It explains the reasons for the support that Russia and China give to Iran in conflict with the West.

Of course the US interest in Caspian region has also an economic basis. With its control US would establish also control of the energy resources but also opened up the possibility of reducing its energy dependence on oil from the Middle East. Thereby the US are increasing their energy security. In the first stage of “keying” the US has invested significant funds in the energy sector of the Caspian region (new gas and oil pipelines, energy research sites). The main goal was to eliminate the energy network that had been built by Russia i.e. to build the new routes for transporting of energy that will not be controlled by Russia. This would reduce the energy, economic and political dependence of the region from the Russian influence. Along with the implementation of the energy infrastructure, it has worked on the project of forming the geopolitical community of Turans countries that are ethno-cultural and linguistically close and whose patron was Turkey. The realization of these projects was slowed because of the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, as a consequence we have a US military intervention in Afghanistan. Then, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan put its territory available to the military forces of the United States. It can be said that the United States use all of this for the geopolitical formatting of Central Asia to their own interests, which resulted in a radical change of the security configuration of the region. It is followed the wave of successful or unsuccessful and “color revolutions,” which is somewhat changed the balance of the power of thalassocracy and Tellurocracy, this time in favor of Tellurocracy.

The Geopolitical pretensions of Russia toward the Caspian region

The biggest part of the Heartland belongs to Russia and therefore its imperative foreign policy orientation is achieving influence on the space of Rimland to avoid geopolitical encirclement and “restraint”. That means the realization of the geopolitical pretensions toward the Caspian region. During its history, this objective is realized in different ways and with varying success. We are particularly interested in the period of the new great games.

³¹ Gajić Aleksandar (2008). The new great game: The geopolitical competition in the Caspian region, Belgrade: IIC New Serbian Political Thought, p. 173rd

As a result of dissolution of the USSR, Russia is necessary enter into a phase of geopolitical transformation but without clear national interests, geo-strategic defensive and without defined relations to the former USSR Republics. It could be said that, immediately after this event, Russia almost did not show interest to the Caspian region. Reduced to the borders of the seventeenth century, Russia's foreign policy's focus was on that that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) maintain in its geopolitical orbit. With this Russia is primarily endeavored to preserve the economic activity that has been associated with other emerging countries. This was followed by foreign policy activity in the reintegration of the former republics or the Slovenian-Christian similarities. This is primarily related to Belarus and Ukraine. A new phase in the foreign policy of Russia and therefore to the Caspian region appeared in 1998, in accordance with the Primakov's doctrine.³² At that time Russia expressed more open interest in its “near neighborhood” and therefore for Eurasia. The goal was to prevent the growing geopolitical influence of the US in the space that Russia views as its sphere of influence. In this regard, Russia revitalized network of diplomatic relations with the countries of the Caspian region.

The new phase of continental integration began with the cooperation of Shanghai Five (Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) which significantly improved geopolitical position of Russia in this region. This cooperation (primarily demilitarization of borders) led to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which acquired the security features too. From this cooperation has emerged the Russian-Chinese partnership too. Russia is, after a long time, managed to re-establish its influence in this region.

Conclusion

The Caspian region is located between the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea. This is one of the linguistically, ethnically and culturally the most diverse areas on the Earth. The Contemporary (current) events in this region can not be made out and explained without global processes and flows, and without a broader historical, ethnic, religious and geopolitical context.

The energy importance of the Caspian region (extensive exploration, exploitation and transport) is one of the factors that determined its geopolitics and therefore it gave the title of Eurasian Balkans.

The Caucasian region is in polycentric geopolitical position, that is, there is no power (individually) no matter what pole of power it belongs to (thalassocracy or tellurocracy) did not establish dominance which is the kind of “geopolitical vacuum”.

Both the thalassocracy forces and the tellurocracy forces have worked hard to master or at least to prevent others to control this space. If the thalassocracy (maritime forces) position themselves strategically in this part of Eurasia, they would acquired the geopolitical advantage that would strengthen the position for the global domination.

With the dissolution of the USSR there was a dramatic change of the geopolitical position of Russia: it was returned in the borders it had in early nineteenth century, in the geopolitical defensive but without strategy relations to the former republics of the USSR. This was what the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics made that the endeavors of the great

³² Thus western sources call the doctrine of the new Russian foreign policy during the mandate of Yevgeny Primakov (Евгений Максимович Примаков; 1929-2015) as a prime minister.

powers but also the local power centers to fill the “vacuum of power” and call it “the new great game”. We consider that this is not “the new great game” but a certain continuity of the current geopolitical game that takes considerable intensity, new forms but that the interests of the great powers and the geopolitical goals remain much the same as in the past. They are struggling to master the Caspian region and realize its national goals. Therefore, the title of the paper is in the form of a question – The Eurasian Balkans And The Vacuum Of The Geopolitical Power: The New Great Game?

So, the geopolitical interests of the thalassocracy and tellurocracy are long-term and opposed in the Caucasian region too. Therefore, the contemporary geopolitical position of this region in terms of security is still very sensitive.

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Bunyamin Seyidov¹

GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS OF SUPER POWERS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SITUATIONS IN THE REGION

Abstract

The political, economic and cultural processes taking place in the South Caucasus region have been analyzed and the interests of the Greater States in the region have been studied in this article. As a result of the surveys, political and economic outcomes of cross-cutting and clashing interests in the region have been presented and opinions on security, political stability, economic development and other issues in the South Caucasus region have been introduced. The cultural aspects of the region were assessed by noting the historical facts within the Azerbaijan and Armenia-Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

Key words: South Caucasus, political process, Black Sea, geopolitics, Super powers, energy.

It is a fact that, Caucasus region is subject of political processes and investigations. In this study, we will clarify particularly on the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, the interests of the superpower states in the region, economic and security issues, the interaction of the Caspian Sea with Black Sea region, and the processes taking place in this connection, as well as, processes which is happening cultural life of the South Caucasus.

The crossing and clashing interests of Super Powers in the South Caucasus are explained differently in modern political analysis, on the whole, the following factors can bind it:

- geographical location;
- military-political significance;
- geoeconomic importance;
- hydrocarbon resources of the region.

Turkey as a reliable partner of the region

As a powerful country, Turkey has a special geopolitical, geo-economic and military-strategic interests and these interests directly represent in the region of South Caucasus and Caspian basin. But experts believe that location of Turkey in the world's most important geopolitical space, to control the trans-national geo-economic and

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military corridors, as well as the sea routes reduce Russia activity in the Caspian-Black Sea basin and the South Caucasus are based on the following factors:

- Turkey plays an important role in order to maintain the stable situation in the Black Sea region;
- Keeps control the corridors from Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea;
- to impede strengthen interest of the Russia in the Caucasus;
- plays the role of a shield against Islamic fundamentalism;
- to support NATO's interest on the South.²

The last point is that NATO's factor is a crucial influence mechanism for Turkey in the Caspian-Black Sea basin and the South Caucasus. Official Ankara is constantly striving to boost its role in the Alliance toward to this direction, and it is expected that these factors will positive impact on Turkey reputation in the region automatically.

Ankara is strengthening its transit center position for transnational transportation of energy resources of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. These activity will increase chance of Turkey to join EU.

Ankara is currently trying to increase its chances to join the European Union by strengthening its transit center for the transportation of energy carriers in the Caspian basin and Central Asia.

Outside the coordination geopolitical activity policy within NATO and Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus, Turkey is considered an interesting country to provide security of energy infrastructure, transport and communications and transnational export routes geopolitical, energy production and to keep geo-economic and military-geostrategic stability of the region.

Azerbaijan is the main ally of Turkey in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan directly supports to Turkey in all regional issues such as a geopolitical, geo-economic and military. As the result of the above mentioned factors, Azerbaijan strengthen competition with other regional power centers such as Russia and Iran. It is no coincidence that when Azerbaijan realized "Contract of the Century", combined Turkey's energy interests in the region with its own interests, without hesitating the possibility of serious confrontation with Russia and with Iran. Demonstrating its will and diligence, Azerbaijan ensured Turkey's access to the rich energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin.³

In addition, the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project was launched on 12 June, 2018 to transport Azerbaijan's natural gas to the western border of Turkey and to provide stable transit across the country. The project will link the expanded South Caucasus pipeline from Azerbaijan to several EU pipelines. The project expected cost is \$ 7 billion US dollars over 5 years. Azerbaijan's gas, called the "Energy Silk Road", will be handed over to Turkey-Bulgaria or Turkey-Greece border.

Turkey is also active not only in the geopolitical, geo-economic and military-geostrategic processes in the Caspian and Black Sea basin and the South Caucasus, but also demonstrates active position in many regional issues of Eurasia - in the Iran-Western confrontation, in Syria, Egypt, Libya, Israel-Palestine conflict. Although Ankara has not been able to achieve significant results in establishing stability in the region, but is

gradually strengthening its leadership position in the region.

United States's global interests in the South Caucasus

As a global power in the geopolitical conditions that emerged after the end of the Cold War, the South Caucasus has been a competitive area for the two major powers. The main geopolitical goals of the United States in this region have been to fight against Russia and Iran and to access energy resources of the Caspian region. That is, in all cases, the US strategy for the region is intended to be used not for regional countries but for global fight. In this case, the national interests of the regional countries are going to the background. The warming of relations between Iran and the West, the political turmoil in Turkey, the decline in Georgia and other processes have led to the uncertainty of US geo-strategic targets in the South Caucasus policy.

The current geopolitical position of the United States in the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin is the integral part of the geopolitical program of the "New geopolitics", which the state adopted and implemented in 1992 and began its implementation. United States presented five main thesis of new geopolitics in the region. These are:

- not to allow Russia to return and strengthen military and strategic aspects of the South Caucasus;
- to prevent the strengthening of Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism in the region, to support the creation and development of civil society;
- to prevent and spread the weapons of mass destruction and unmanageable weapons;
- To form geopolitical, geo-economic and competitive environment required for full control of Caspian oil;
- To keep the region under geopolitical control by increasing democratic pressure on local authorities.⁴

Based on its superior financial and technical capabilities, the United States makes efforts to creating a stable competitive environment in the region, expanding economic cooperation between the two countries, regulate national and ethnic conflicts, and so on.

As Bjezinski pointed out, the US tries to increase its political influence in a region of geostrategic importance such as the South Caucasus. This region is rich with precious metals and oil and gas deposits. When the world's energy needs are rising, the importance of this region, rich in hydrocarbon reserves, is increasing. The demand for oil and gas is growing not only in the US and Western countries, but also in rapidly developing countries in Asia. This demand turns the Caspian Sea into a vital zone of giant states. Orientation of such an important region in world politics is undoubtedly crucial. Azerbaijan is the entrance door to the region for to gain the influence to all three states. Thus, it becomes apparent that geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan in the implementation of a global policy in the region.

² Əli Həsənov. Azərbaycanın geosiyasəti Bakı 2015 səh 328

³ Əli Həsənov. Azərbaycanın geosiyasəti Bakı 2015 səh 334

⁴ Crandall Maureen S. Energy, economics, and politics in the Caspian region: dreams and realities. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, 245 p.

Neighborhood relations with the region: Unchangable position of Russia

In the early years of the collapse of the USSR, Russia's Caspian policy was more closely linked to its geopolitical and geostrategic interests based on its traditional empire approach rather than its pragmatic geo-economic intentions. From the outset of the new millennium, Russia has largely denied its geo-economic interests in the Caspian policy and has made some modifications to its previous geopolitical activity. As a result of this adjustment, Russia has initially started to compete with the Caspian states in maintaining its monopoly position in the world energy market, strengthening the fight against the using and transit of existing energy resources in the region.

According to researchers, the collapse of the USSR, the mechanism of influence in the 20th century has already set several urgent tasks ahead of Russia's foreign policy. These are:

- to prevent the expansion of the US and Europe towards the South Caucasus by all methods;
- To prevent strengthening of Western states by economically and politically in this area, and becoming inferior of regional states to the West;
- To protect the integrity of the Russian Federation, to ensure its national security and state interests in all means, and so on.⁵

Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the early 1990s, is primarily aimed at protecting its geopolitical, geo-economic and military-geostrategic impacts on Russia's former USSR, ensuring its state and national interests, preventing centrifugal tendencies in this area, weakening the West's growing influence over neighboring countries, and coordinating the foreign policy of newly independent neighbors (creating alliances with different organizations, protecting borders, etc.).

Although the tendencies of development of the international relations system significantly reduced the role of Russia in the world politics, the 2008 military conflict with Georgia, Ukraine's military conflict in 2014, as well as ongoing processes in Nagorno-Karabakh showed that it was a very complicated to force out Russia from the Eurasian region. Russia, which is considered to be one of the world's largest geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics, has very rich natural resources, has a huge military potential (nuclear technology, nuclear weapons and strategic missile complexes), access to Europe and any air and water connections of the world.⁶

As it is known, after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow lost its former position and the United States' military and economic power became one of the key factors in the world today.

Azerbaijan has a special significance for Russia in the Caspian basin and South Caucasus for some aspects:

- Azerbaijan is important for access to the Muslim East and Turkey, as well as its impact on the processes taking place in the Middle East.
- Azerbaijan is located in the center of East-West transport communications

⁵ Вишняков В. Россия-Иран и региональная стабильность// Международная жизнь, 1998 № 11-12.

⁶ Cənubi Qafqaz regionu yeni geosiyasi reallıqlar kontekstində <http://a-r.az/article/10979>

and corridors, and in this regard is Russia's rival.

- There are rich hydrocarbon fields in Azerbaijan, that Russia can not remain indifferent to their exploitation, production and export. In this sphere, Azerbaijan is Russia's rival in the world market.
- Azerbaijan is a sales market for Russian goods and plays the role of provider in agricultural products.
- There are numerous Russian-speaking population in Azerbaijan, and many Azerbaijanians are living in Russia, which is also reflected in the interests of Russia.
- Azerbaijan's territory is very important for Russia's security.

European Union's interests in South Caucasus

The EU's geopolitical interests in the Caspian region and the South Caucasus have a significant impact on their governance systems, public-political circles and communities by establishing economic, political and social relations with more regional countries, finding solutions to the region's rich hydrocarbon deposits, their joint development and export to Europe to use the opportunities of the region in the West's growing energy, transport corridor and free trade security, and etc. Europe's energy and transport-corridor security issue is a priority for this policy.

As it is known, the EU has its own geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the region and the local countries have their own interests in cooperation with EU.⁷ For example, if the EU is looking for new sources of raw materials for the global and transnational industries, markets and export-import routes, such as the South Caucasus countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia try to involve the European Union to the of interstate conflicts and economical development of the region. Many experts who evaluate the regional geopolitics of the EU in the South Caucasus and Caspian Basin believe that the geopolitics of the EU, which has so far been geo-economic, have not yet yielded the expected benefits, reliable coverage, unified partnership system and could not turn into a serious ally.

Iran- one of the interested country of the region

After the collapse of the USSR, Iran has become one of the regional centers of power that has the greatest influence and pressure on the political, economic and spiritual life of the new independent states of the region, and has created a comprehensive relationship with local countries, local religious, ethnic and social societies. Unlike Russia, the United States and Turkey, Iran has always tried to demonstrate its impartial political position in the domestic political processes in the region. The Caspian Basin and the South Caucasus are one of the most important geopolitical processes in Iran, along with the Near and Middle East Persian Gulf. According to experts, Iran is considered as the main ally in all regional geopolitical and geoeconomic issues. Iran looks to Azerbaijan and Turkey as an opponent, striving to overcome the economic isolation of the US and Western countries around the region by using regional transport and energy corridors. The major

⁷ Energy and conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus /edited by Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, 267 p.

geopolitical and geo-economic tasks in this country's regional policy could be analyzed as follows:

- Not to allow the expansion of Western countries and their transnational companies in Caspian region, and to suppress Turkey as their main partner in the region;
- Alliance with Russia in regional geopolitical matters, but not to miss their own interests in areas that are competing with it;
- Organize various religious-ideological camps for religious influences in the region;
- To prevent economic, political, social and cultural development of rival countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, thereby reducing their attractiveness for the main Iranian population (Azerbaijanis).

Iran does not conceal its geostrategic goals in the South Caucasus region. These goals are:

- to limit the possible involvement of external forces (the US, NATO and the European Union, etc.) in the South Caucasus and to prevent them from approaching the Iranian borders;
- solving regional problems only with the joint efforts of states in the region;
- to minimize the steps of the Caspian basin and the South Caucasian countries beyond Iran and to find a mechanism achieve joint participation in processes;
- Establishment of relations with the countries of the region with a high level of Western-oriented policy and identifying mechanisms for their impact;
- Strengthen military-geostrategic interests in the field of security with the countries of the region which coinciding with Iran.

Black Sea

The geographical area of the Black Sea region has historically been a place of cooperation, arising from political, economic, military or common interests. The strategic significance of the Black Sea has been rising recently. After the collapse of the USSR, Black Sea and the Caspian regions are closely coincided with the geopolitical and economically. Even more recently, the term "Caspian and Black Sea Region" is used. Indeed, from the geopolitical point, the boundaries between these two regions are relative in modern times. The states in these territories cover the same issues and problems, both economically and in terms of global powers in the region. When the analysis is carried out on the Black Sea region, both region –Caspian Sea and Black sea are studied together.

The transport corridors, regional states, strategic powers of the great powers unites the Caspian Sea with the Black Sea. Traditionally, the geopolitical processes in the Black Sea region are interpreted by the Turkish-Russian relations as it is related to the straits. Without control over Bosphorus and Dardanelles, it is impossible to take the leading position in the geopolitical processes in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean basin.⁸

⁸ Гасанов А.М., Аббасбейли А. Азербайджан в системе международных и региональных отношений. Баку, «Азернешр», 1999, 255с

The Straits are not only a means of having geographical superiority, but also an important geopolitical, geo-economic factor. The location of the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea between Russia, Iran and Turkey transforms the South Caucasus into the East-West and North-South Corridor. This factor shows that the Caspian region, especially the South Caucasus, has an important position on the geopolitical map of the world.

At present, the Black Sea and the Caspian region are very important geopolitical areas both in terms of rich natural resources and strategic corridors. Following the collapse of the USSR, a number of cooperation organizations were established with the participation of regional states and with the support of global power centers.

Among them are the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Blackseafor. The main purpose of the organizations is to promote mutual economic, political cooperation among the region's states and to protect the security of the region through joint efforts. However, there are military conflicts between the region's states- Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, and the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014, have a negative impact on the development of cooperation in these organizations (especially on security) and makes a question of maintaining security in the basin with joint efforts falls underneath.⁹

It is important to analyze the geopolitical view of the region, and to analyze the existing and expected trends - the economic, political, security and military aspects of this view, which are closely interconnected.

Cultural aspects

As in other fields, Azerbaijan has a special place in the cultural aspect of the South Caucasus region. In recent years, the work done in the field of culture can be regarded as important cultural events. Thus, the Baku International Humanitarian Forums, the Eurovision Song Contest 2012, the First European Games in 2015, and Formula-1 in Azerbaijan in the past five years, have conditioned Azerbaijan to be the cultural center of the South Caucasus. Along with these global events, Azerbaijan is also a country of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism is the lifestyle of the Azerbaijani people. After restoration of independence, the state support for the strengthening of multiculturalism traditions has been formed in the country. Azerbaijan is implementing a policy of ensuring the coexistence of peoples and their religious beliefs in an atmosphere of friendship and good neighborliness. The model of multiculturalism is meant to have a peaceful coexistence within the borders of one state and to express and maintain its cultural characteristics, lifestyle. Multiculturalism is a necessary tool for dialogue between cultures and civilizations.

At present, there are more than 30 and ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan except of azerbaijanians. The culture of national minorities and ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan is protected and developed as part of the culture of the country. A purposeful work is being carried out to preserve the culture, art, traditions and language of national minorities and ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan. Today Azerbaijan is one of the first countries in the South Caucasus, where minority differences are not felt. In short, the national policy pursued by the Azerbaijani state shows that peoples can live together in a friendly manner, and in this respect our country is an example not only to the South

⁹ Nurlan Aliyev. The Black Sea region: current geopolitical situation. Article

Caucasus, but also to many other countries of the world.

I would like to draw your attention regarding with the one of essential issue that is part of the cultural processes in the South Caucasus. As a result of the military aggression to Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia, the famous Azikh and Taglar caves, Garakopek, Otarlaptapa mounds, which were the first human settlements in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, have now been deliberately destroyed by military purposes. Cemeteries, tombs, monuments, mosques, temples, monuments of Caucasian Albania, shrines and temples, stone sculptures, ancient monuments in the occupied territories of Shusha, Lachin, Kalbajar, Gubadli, Zangilan, Fuzuli, occupied with mounds of Khojali, Agdam, Agdere, Fuzuli and Jabrail regions. Also many graves, burial mounds, historical monuments and other national monuments were destroyed and material cultural monuments were transported to Armenia. Nearly 400 architectural and over 200 archeological monuments, 23 gardens, parks, monumental and memorial monuments, as well as many historical and cultural monuments remained in the ancient Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenian terrorists.¹⁰ In addition, 22 museums, more than 40,000 items 927 libraries with 4.6 million book fund, 808 clubs, 4 theaters and 2 concert halls, and other equipments were destroyed in occupied territories. The total damage to our country is 23 trillion 680 million AZN or 6 billion 71 million US dollars. (Damage was estimated approximate on the basis of evaluation documents of 1994). Destruction of historical and cultural monuments by Armenian aggressors in the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, is against to 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, the European Convention on the Protection of Archaeological Heritage and the World Cultural and the Convention of UNESCO on the Protection of Natural Heritage.

Conclusions

The analyzing processes in the South Caucasus region, cross-cutting and clashing interests of Super Powers, as well as the positions of the region countries it becomes clear that the national interests of the states are based on starting point of the processes.

This is undeniable fact that carbohydrogen deposits have become the region's headache. However, the use of alternative energy sources identifies that this tendency has been eliminated.

US uses the South Caucasus region as a means of pressure on Iran, Russia proves that it is not an interested party in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and protects its hegemony over Armenia. The European Union continues to pursue political pressure on the region under the protection of human rights and freedoms. The result of all this is that there are still remain issues in the South Caucasus, which are still unsustainable.

The interests of the great powers in the South Caucasus have always existed and have not lost their essence, though they have been partially changed on the basis of specific occasions. There are no steps taken to protect the territorial integrity of the countries (except for the Turkish-Azerbaijan friendly and fraternal relations) by the "Great Powers", which promotes their national interests and some parts of Azerbaijan and Georgia are actually under occupation today.

We hope that as a result of the unequivocal support of the world community the historical landscape and the stability in the South Caucasus region will be restored.

¹⁰ http://azerbaijan.az/portal/Karabakh/Social/socialEconomy_06_a.html?

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Iva Manova¹

IS THERE AN ECOLOGICAL TURN IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING? POPE FRANCIS AND HIS ENCYCLICAL LAUDATO SI'

Abstract

The article presents Pope Francis' environmental ethical teaching, as explained in his 2015 encyclical Laudato si', in a historical perspective. It traces the development of the Catholic social doctrine through the twentieth century and the way in which it has been both questioned and enriched by some ideas developed in the context of the liberation theology movement.

Keywords: Catholic social doctrine, liberation theology, Pope Francis, option for the poor, environmental problems, environmental justice.

Introduction

Laudato Si' ("Praise Be to You") is Pope Francis's second encyclical since the beginning of his pontificate in 2013. It was completed on 24 May, Pentecost, 2015 and published in June that year.² In this paper I will sketch, in very general terms, the new, ecological spirituality advocated in it and trace the historical roots of Francis's views. In conclusion, I will try to answer the question in what sense the encyclical Laudato Si' may be viewed as symptomatic of a current turn in Catholic social teaching.

The encyclical begins with the words, "Praise be to you, my Lord, through our Sister, Mother Earth, who sustains and governs us, and who produces various fruit with coloured flowers and herbs". They are taken from the famous Canticle of the Creatures by Saint Francis of Assisi.³ In it the great spiritual reformer and founder of the Franciscan Order successively praises the Earth, who is both Mother and Sister, Brother Sun and Sister Moon, Brother Wind and Sister Water, all creation and all living creatures – he praises them as a manifestation of God's omnipotence and mercy.

The saint's beautiful, moving words open the reader's heart to the encyclical and prepare him or her to accept its messages. Further on, illustrating the connection between exegesis, or more generally religion, and ecology, Pope Francis reminds his readers of the following important episode from the biblical story of the creation of the world. According to the Book of Genesis, after creation God gave the earth to man, assigning him a dual "mission": to "have dominion" over the earth (Gen 1:28) and

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² The text of the encyclical is accessible on the Website of the Vatican: http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html.

³ Francis of Assisi, Canticle, 113-114.

to “till it and keep it” (Gen 2:15).⁴ Today’s human beings, including many committed Christians, the Pope writes, have made the serious mistake of forgetting the second part of God’s bequest, while exaggerating the significance of the first. In other words, while humans have long been abusing natural resources, in the past two centuries this abuse has assumed the dimensions of a catastrophe. Uncontrolled use of natural resources leads to environmental problems, which, in turn, further exacerbate global inequality. “These situations have caused sister earth, along with all the abandoned of our world, to cry out, pleading that we take another course” (Laudato Si’, 53).

In Pope Francis’s encyclical, ecological and social injustice are two sides of the same coin. It is not enough, however, to criticize injustice; it is necessary to respond to it with a project for reform: “a true ecological approach always becomes a social approach”, Francis claims (Laudato Si’, 49).⁵ He underlines the need to adopt a new lifestyle that will reject the throwaway culture of consumerism and restore solidarity, love for our fellow human beings and care for the environment as essential values. Global problems affect, to one extent or another, all residents of this planet. That is why everyone must commit to the new lifestyle: “We need to strengthen the conviction that we are one single human family. There are no frontiers or barriers, political or social, behind which we can hide, still less is there room for the globalization of indifference” (Laudato Si’, 52).

Catholic Social Teaching from Rerum Novarum to the Second Vatican Council

The phrase “Catholic social teaching” or doctrine refers to the corpus of documents related to the social reality of the modern world, which have been promulgated by the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. The encyclical Rerum Novarum is the first document in this corpus. It was published by Pope Leo XIII in 1891. The history of Catholic social teaching, however, extends beyond the texts in which it is set forth and which are not intended to be purely theoretical but to regulate human practice and contribute to changing society. As early as at the end of the nineteenth century, and especially in the twentieth, there emerged and spread in the Catholic world groups and organizations which found inspiration in the social doctrine of the Church and which, by their actions, prompted new theoretical quests and results: for example, the tradition of the so-called Katholikentage in Germany, of the “Social Weeks” regularly held in France, Spain and Italy, and most of all, of the Christian trade unions.⁶ In the field of politics, Catholic social teaching is generally promoted by Christian Democratic parties.

Rerum Novarum is subtitled “Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor” and Leo XIII was undoubtedly motivated to write it by sincere compassion for the condition of workers at the end of the nineteenth century. At the same time, however, he did not attempt to analyze the causes for their condition, or to examine the structural problems of the emerging modern society. Today, with the hindsight of 130 years since the publication of Rerum Novarum, we can clearly see the limitations of Leo XIII’s analysis of the economic and social problems of that era. But it is also true that it was thanks to Leo XIII that the Catholic Church engaged with social and economic issues and joined in the

4 “The harmony between the Creator, humanity and creation as a whole was disrupted by our presuming to take the place of God and refusing to acknowledge our creaturely limitations. This in turn distorted our mandate to ‘have dominion’ over the earth (cf. Gen 1:28), to ‘till it and keep it’ (Gen 2:15)” (Laudato Si’, 66).

5 “Today, however, we have to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a social approach; it must integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to hear both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor” (Laudato Si’, 49).

6 Cfr. Chenu, “Introduzione,” 10-11.

discussions on them – a fact acknowledged to this day.⁷

In 1931, when Pope Pius XI published his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno marking the fortieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, the rapidly developing industrial society faced its first major economic crisis. The economic situation was completely different from that at the time of Leo XIII. That is why Quadragesimo Anno is not simply a sequel to Rerum Novarum; it represents a qualitatively new stage in the development of Catholic social thought. The subject of this encyclical is not just the condition of workers but also the social and economic order in modern societies in general. In this text, social problems are addressed not only from the perspective of morality but also, for the first time, from the perspective of the concept of social justice. In this new optic, the concept of evangelical love is synchronized with the idea of the common good.⁸ From that moment on, this idea would be part of Catholic social doctrine.

The next crucial moment in the development of Catholic social teaching was the pontificate of John XXIII. This pope was the first to undertake to develop a model for the Catholic Church’s relations with representatives of other Christian denominations and religions as well as with non-believers. Such a model was necessary so that Catholics and non-Catholics could work together in looking for solutions to the major social, economic, and political problems.⁹ Whereas the encyclical Mater et Magistra (1961) attracted the attention only of certain circles, Pacem in Terris (1963), in which Pope John XXIII addressed “all men of good will”, not only Catholics, generated worldwide interest. Many of the documents issued by the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) are in the same vein.

Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio (1967) is directly related to the legacy of John XXIII and of the Second Vatican Council. In it the issue of international justice, addressed for the first time in John XXIII’s encyclical Mater et Magistra, is further explored and elaborated upon. Populorum Progressio was written in response to the voice raised by the until-then silent half of humanity – the voice of the peoples from the Southern Hemisphere, from the former European colonies. The encyclical celebrates the raising of their voice because the latter testifies that the Church is truly universal. It was not until their voice was heard that the recognition came that the Catholic Church had hitherto been limited, in a sense, to Western civilization and had regarded the Catholic communities in the Southern Hemisphere exclusively as its “missions”. Thus, the early 1960s saw the beginning of the process of overcoming the Church’s “dualism”, which was an imprint of the European powers’ colonial past on its body.¹⁰ In those years human liberation began to be thought of comprehensively, introducing the concept that justice demands that liberation be not only individual – of the individual souls and bodies – but of the entire human race, that is to say, of all peoples.

Liberation Theology and the Preferential Option for the Poor

In the next decades Catholic social teaching continued to develop; after Paul VI, both John Paul II and Benedict XVI contributed to its development. However, it is precisely the period between 1961 and 1975 that marks the most significant growth in the history of the Catholic social tradition. In this period the latter was enriched by nine

7 Chenu, “Introduzione,” 12-13.

8 Chenu, “Introduzione,” 25-26.

9 Chenu, “Introduzione,” 31.

10 Chenu, “Introduzione,” 41.

major documents.¹¹ Moreover, “the most dramatic contribution in the last part of the twentieth century to the Catholic social tradition came from a most surprising location – Latin America”.¹²

The principle of a preferential option for the poor came precisely from the South American “school” in twentieth-century Catholic social thought. This is one of the main principles in Catholic social teaching to which Pope Francis assigns an important place in his messages. In his Apostolic Exhortation *Evangelii Gaudium* (2013), he writes: “For the Church, the option for the poor is primarily a theological category rather than a cultural, sociological, political or philosophical one.” This option must have consequences for the life of all believers who are called upon to follow the example of Jesus Christ who showed the poor his first mercy (*Evangelii Gaudium*, 198). Three years later, in *Laudato Si’* Francis continues his reflections as follows:

In the present condition of global society, where injustices abound and growing numbers of people are deprived of basic human rights and considered expendable, the principle of the common good immediately becomes, logically and inevitably, a summons to solidarity and a preferential option for the poorest of our brothers and sisters. This option entails recognizing the implications of the universal destination of the world’s goods, but, as I mentioned in the Apostolic Exhortation *Evangelii Gaudium*, it demands before all else an appreciation of the immense dignity of the poor in the light of our deepest convictions as believers. We need only look around us to see that, today, this option is in fact an ethical imperative essential for effectively attaining the common good. (*Laudato Si’*, 158)

The formulation of the principle of a preferential option for the poor is connected with the development of liberation theology, which emerged in Latin America around the mid-twentieth century. Liberation theology views social poverty as the fruit of sin and may be described as an attempt to return to the ideas of early Christianity. Its followers approach theology from the perspective of the poor and the oppressed, and hold the view that the clergy should engage in political activism in the struggle for social justice and human rights. In his famous book, *Teología de la liberación: Perspectivas* (1971),¹³ Gustavo Gutiérrez, for example, argues that helping the needy is the main human goal, and that political struggle is an immediate moral duty of the theologian. Gutiérrez rejects the possibility of individual salvation until the very last case of economic injustice in the world is resolved.

An important role in affirming liberation theology was played by the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), and more specifically, by its 1968 conference in Medellín (Colombia), whose resolutions were a direct continuation of the reformist spirit characteristic of the Second Vatican Council. At its next conference, in Puebla (Mexico) in 1979, CELAM adopted the definition of the “preferential option for the poor”. In 1987 Pope John Paul II referred to this principle in his encyclical *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, thereby confirming its adoption as part of official Catholic social teaching.

In the 1980s and 1990s Latin American Catholicism underwent a period of “normalization”, that is to say, a more moderate line gained the upper hand in theology. Pope Francis is a proponent of this moderate line. He has promoted it ever since he

¹¹ The encyclicals *Mater et Magistra* (1961) and *Pacem in Terris* (1963); the pastoral constitutions *Gaudium et Spes*, *Dignitatis Humanae* and *Nostra Aetate* (1965); the encyclicals *Populorum Progressio* (1967) and *Octogesima Advensis* (1971); the document *Justice in the World* issued in 1971 by the world Synod of Bishops; and the apostolic exhortation *Evangelii Nuntiandi* (1975).

¹² Brady, *Essential Catholic*, 147-148.

¹³ See Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation*.

was professor, and later, rector of the Colegio Máximo, the most important higher educational institution of the Jesuit Order in Argentina. He continued to pursue it after 1998, when he became the Archbishop of Buenos Aires. In those years the “Argentine” theology assumed the form of a “theology of the people”, proposing a “third way” for development of society free of the errors of neoliberalism and Marxism, and working for social unity.¹⁴ Pope Francis is critical of liberation theology, above all of the quest for ecclesiastical support for armed clashes and violence, but he accepts the principle of a preferential option for the poor. He claims that this principle has been part of the tradition of the Church ever since the first centuries of Christianity and that it is the gospel message itself.

The Place of Ecology in Catholic Social Teaching

Having traced the origin of the principle of a preferential option for the poor, let us also recall when the subject of environmental protection became part of Catholic social doctrine. Pope Paul VI was the first to approach ecological problems from a moral and theological perspective in 1971, in his Apostolic Letter *Octogesima Advensis* (dedicated to the eightieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*). The next two popes contributed to the development of the Church’s social doctrine in the same direction: John Paul II with his encyclical *Centesimus Annus* (1991), and Benedict XVI with *Caritas in Veritate* (“Love in Truth”) issued in 2009.

With *Centesimus Annus*, Pope John Paul II marked the centenary of *Rerum Novarum*.¹⁵ The main subject of this encyclical are the lessons from the collapse of communism and the challenges facing Europe and the world after this historic event. The encyclical, however, also discusses “the ecological question which accompanies the problem of consumerism” (*Centesimus Annus*, 37), and the need to defend “collective goods”:

It is the task of the State to provide for the defence and preservation of common goods such as the natural and human environments, which cannot be safeguarded simply by market forces. Just as in the time of primitive capitalism the State had the duty of defending the basic rights of workers, so now, with the new capitalism, the State and all of society have the duty of defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each individual. (*Centesimus Annus*, 40)

Our brief historical overview has shown that *Laudato Si’* fits into an already established tradition in Catholic social thought. Despite this, Pope Francis’s encyclical represents a new stage in the development of this tradition, for it is the first document wholly devoted to the problems related to climate change, the depletion of natural resources, their sustainable and proportionate use, pollution, and so on.

Conclusion: Is Ecology the New Spirituality?

In *Laudato Si’*, Pope Francis analyzes the current situation in “our common home” and reveals “the human roots” of the ecological crisis. At the same time, he develops a positive teaching, a form of ecological ethics. Pope Francis’s ecological

¹⁴ Cfr. Santagata, “Postfazione,” 117-118.

¹⁵ The text of the encyclical is accessible on the Website of the Vatican: http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html.

ethics is addressed to “every person living on this planet” – whether Catholic or not, Christian or not, believer or not. The Pope thinks that every inhabitant of our endangered planet, regardless of his or her religious views, should be concerned about the problems discussed in *Laudato Si'*.¹⁶ Nevertheless, in one of the chapters of this document Francis discusses environmental problems from the perspective of Christianity. The chapter is entitled “The Gospel of Creation”. In it, Francis writes that putting forward arguments from the sphere of religion can be beneficial for everyone:

Why should this document, addressed to all people of good will, include a chapter dealing with the convictions of believers? I am well aware that in the areas of politics and philosophy there are those who firmly reject the idea of a Creator, or consider it irrelevant, and consequently dismiss as irrational the rich contribution which religions can make towards an integral ecology and the full development of humanity. [...] Nonetheless, science and religion, with their distinctive approaches to understanding reality, can enter into an intense dialogue fruitful for both. (*Laudato Si'*, 62)

A little further on, he continues his reflections as follows: “If we are truly concerned to develop an ecology capable of remedying the damage we have done, no branch of the sciences and no form of wisdom can be left out, and that includes religion and the language particular to it” (*Laudato Si'*, 63).

Whether we agree or not that religion can contribute to resolving the ecological crisis, Pope Francis’s way of reasoning is undoubtedly interesting from a theoretical point of view. This is precisely where the ecological turn in Catholic social teaching, noted in the title of this paper, occurs. If we try to analyze the last two quotations from Pope Francis’s ecological encyclical, we will establish the following. We can conclude from Francis’s reflections that, in his view, religions (not only Catholicism and Christianity, because in these passages he speaks of religion in general) are useful instruments for achieving a common goal. A common goal which the Pope apparently considers to be the most important goal for humanity as a whole and definitely higher than the goals traditionally pursued by the different religions. In the context of the encyclical *Laudato Si'*, preserving the planet seems to be more important than individual salvation, which was the primary goal of every committed Christian for as many as two thousand years.¹⁷

According to an extreme, radical interpretation of *Laudato Si'*, such as the one proposed by some authors like Italian philosopher Flavio Cuniberto, through this encyclical Francis actually conveys a secular message. What’s more, according to this interpretation Francis invokes religious wisdom only insofar as it can serve ecological ethics which, in turn, assumes the form of a new religion. Cuniberto defines *Laudato Si'* as a post-Christian encyclical, insofar as it is “a concrete attempt at transfusing the old spirituality (which has already reached the end of its historical cycle) into the forms of the new, ecological spirituality”.¹⁸

This interpretation of Francis’s ecological encyclical is indeed radical, and not everyone will agree with it. Nevertheless, I wanted to mention it in conclusion to my paper because both Francis’s encyclical and Cuniberto’s interpretation offer serious food for thought.

¹⁶ “Faced as we are with global environmental deterioration, I wish to address every person living on this planet. [...] In this Encyclical, I would like to enter into dialogue with all people about our common home” (*Laudato Si'*, 3).

¹⁷ Cuniberto, *Madonna Povertà*, 85.

¹⁸ Cuniberto, *Madonna Povertà*, 88.

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Anastazija Tanja Djelic¹

PECULIARITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH THE POSITIONING OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AS A COUNTRY OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

Abstract

The EU provides economic stability to the Member States by creating a free transfer of goods and services. Thus, Turkey would most likely acquire more favorable trade routes as a member than it could as an independent nation. Also, because the EU is collective, a Member State with an economic crisis can rely on the collective, often avoiding catastrophic economic collapse due to available resources along with the Union's collective stability. Becoming a Member State also allows Member States access to EU collective funds available to help improve the economy of a new Member State as well as the country's overall standard of living. This allows a Member State to use EU funds to rebuild poor areas and raise the quality of life of residents. The leaders of the EU member states are aware of the importance of Turkey, and therefore none of them has the intention, and no courage, to close the door on Turkey, as it has the fastest growing economy in Europe and is an increasingly prominent leader in the Islamic world.

Keywords: economic integration, European Union, association, Republic of Turkey, Black Sea region

Introduction

The process of international economic integration is one of the most significant phenomena of the modern world economy. The causes of integration are multiple. From an economic point of view, international economic integration is a kind of consequence of the contradiction between productive forces and production relations in the world economy. Modern productive forces are more developed than ever in the past, and the development of the world economy, especially since the great economic crisis (1929-1993) here, and especially under the influence of World War II, was marked by market parcellation, strengthening of barriers to movement of goods, labor force, capital, technology, etc. It can be said that modern production forces exert strong pressure towards creating conditions for their development, that is, for expanding markets beyond the borders of national economies of individual countries. It is almost natural that the tendencies of economic integration, both temporally and in intensity, have been most pronounced on the European continent. Nowhere as in European countries has a contradiction emerged between the potential of the productive forces and the narrowness of the national market. As a result, economically, the largest and most complex integration group of the modern world (the European Union) has emerged. However, we must point out that the reasons for the emergence of EEC / EU should also be sought in political factors. The unification of Europe should bring an end to a long period of the history

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of warfare between Europe's largest powers and ensure peace on European soil. At the same time, a united Europe keeps the structure of the world's superpowers polycentric, balancing the great military, economic and technological development of the United States. Historian J. Fontana notes that throughout history, the peoples of Europe have always united against enemies, of different kinds, and different origins. We can say that today's unification process makes the same sense, but in different, more modern circumstances.

The Republic of Turkey is a Eurasian state located in Southeastern Europe and Southwest Asia. The country's position between Europe in the west, Central Asia in the east, Russia in the north and the Middle East in the south has also given Turkey great strategic importance. It has the 15th highest GDP in the world. The key sectors of the Turkish economy are: banking, tourism, agriculture, construction. Turkey has been fighting to join the European Union since 1949, when it was a founding member of the Council of Europe, and it is not until 2005 that membership negotiations begin. When trying to join the EU, Turkey went through three phases: the preparatory phase, the final phase and the transition period.

There are many reasons why Europe does not want Turkey, and some of them are: Only 3% of Turkey's territory is on the European continent, most of the population is literate, but higher education has a small percentage of the population of Turkey, Europe is afraid of labor and products cheaper but better quality and Turkey could take over the market, power in Turkey is autocratic, seemingly in the form of democracy, but President Erdogan does not follow the principles of democracy, Turkey plans to impose the death penalty, which is unacceptable under the principles of Europe, Europe fears that the Muslim faith to conquer Europe if admitted to the EU Turkey is working closely with Russia and the US. Although the negotiations have taken so long, they still have not been formally terminated, neither side wants to give in or give up.

The peculiarities and contradictions of accession to the European Union

EU accession is such a contractual relationship that allows non-member countries to enjoy some of the rights that are otherwise available only to members, without becoming members of the organization. From this point of view, it is clearer that accession is most often the preparation of the country for future membership, by adopting certain rules - standards that will help it primarily to foster part of the internal single market, but also to assume other obligations arising from membership. The fact that an affiliate gets the rights that bring it closer to the "club of the successful", where it wants to join, is also a big reason for the attractiveness of joining the EU. However, it is often forgotten that joining, and even more so joining the membership itself, means fulfilling the conditions and assuming the obligations that result from this process. These commitments are both political and economic and legal, but also specific, created for each of the associated states individually, according to their situations and are part of an agenda that supports the success of economic and political reforms and thus leads to more orderly, stable, predictable and prosperous societies. The state can strive for these standards without aspiring to full membership, but it is easier to have an ally on the reform path, whose professional, technical and material assistance is a great support in taking the necessary steps.²

² Djelic, T. A., *Economic Trends and Sustainable Development in Globalization Processes*, Scientific Monograph, Belgrade: Center for Strategic Research on National Security - CESNA B, 2018, p. 35.

The end of the Cold War made the enlargement of the EU hitherto unprecedented in scale, both in terms of the number of newly admitted members and the political, economic, social and administrative effects that such enlargement would have had. The states that applied for membership could be divided into two groups. The first consisted of countries such as Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and to some extent Malta and Cyprus. In these countries, the democratic system and market economy system have not been questioned. The second group consisted of postsocialist states and until then authoritarian political regimes such as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria. To the extent that the situation differed between the two groups of countries, the EU also had a different approach to the admission of all these countries into its ranks. The first two groups quickly separated Austria and the Scandinavian countries, both because of economic and political stability and predictability, and because of the development of relations with the European Communities and its Member States. For the same reasons, all post-socialist states will remain on the other pole.

The political situation in Cyprus and the lack of political consensus on EU membership in Malta will make the two countries join the group of post-socialist countries. Austria, Sweden and Finland will end their path to membership in 1995 in record time, doing so in about three years. The citizens of Norway voted against EU membership for the second time in 1994 in a referendum. For other groups of states, the Union's occupation of internal and foreign policy issues, such as the unification of Germany, completion of the internal market, the multiphase introduction of the monetary union, and conflicts in the former SFRY, will delay the definition of a clear and comprehensive political approach to post-socialist states aspiring to membership in the mid-1990s.

The search for a long-term political framework for enlargement, which will remain valid for the Western Balkans today with partial modifications, only began after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the conclusion of the Europe Agreement with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The first announcements that access to any subsequent Union enlargement would change became apparent in December 1993. For the EU, the new approach is the result of the need to strengthen the political influence and foreign policy, especially in Europe, but to expand the market to an impressive half a billion consumers today. Such intentions, on the other hand, have been thwarted in the short run, as the Union this time does not only adopt democratic political systems based on fair and democratic elections, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights, which was the case until 1995. Given the political realities in Europe in the early 1990s, the aspirations of the countries of the former Eastern Bloc as well as the interests of the EU, the Heads of State or Government set out at the 1993 Copenhagen meeting the basic criteria for EU membership.

Defining these criteria sets the foundation for enlargement policy. The Copenhagen criteria are based on three basic pillars: political, economic and legal-institutional. Copenhagen criteria: 1. Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities. 2. A functioning market economy as well as the ability to cope with competitive pressures in the Union's single market. 3. Ability to assume the rights and obligations arising from EU membership and Community law; adherence to the goals of political, economic and monetary union. Two years later, faced with the need for consistent and effective implementation of European regulations and standards, as well as effective coordination in meeting the Copenhagen

criteria, the EU at the Madrid Summit establishes another, the so-called. administrative criterion. The Presidency Conclusions on Enlargement emphasize that any enlargement is essential to meeting the Copenhagen criteria and in the context of the Essen 1994 Pre-Accession Strategy.³

In the division of competences between the religious levels of a state organization, some principles respecting it would probably improve the efficiency of social sector institutions. These rules are more or less respected, because in democratic countries the legislative process is always politically colored and its outcome is influenced not only by the logic of things and the principles of efficiency, but also by political logic and compromises. Also, developed country systems are not and cannot be the result of a coherent social design plan, but are usually the result of lengthy processes of institutional change. Therefore, the principles discussed in this section can sometimes be difficult to discern in life, but they must be kept in mind in institutional analysis and even in the construction of social institutions themselves.

At the outset, the distinction between decentralization and devolution must be emphasized. Decentralization refers to a state of affairs where the local level makes important decisions regarding the scope of rights, the organization of supply and the way of financing, all by local institutions. Devolution, on the other hand, denotes a system that is centralized and uniform in rights, organization and funding, but which in operational terms relies on local branches of central institutions. The difference between the two systems is large and obvious: while in the second the local self-government does not have any competencies, in the former there are complete. Some principles speak in favor of decentralization. First, through local decision-making on social issues, people's preferences, or local communities, are best respected. When the central government decides, then a uniform system is obtained that sometimes suits no one. Second, when decision-making is closer to the people, then political control of politicians and state affairs is also better. Therefore, says this principle, the influence of the people on decision making is more immediate, and the quality of the system is better. Third, similar to the previous one, when funding comes from local sources, then spending control is better as citizens see more clearly the (in) efficiency of using their own money.

On the other hand, some principles speak in favor of central solutions. First, when social issues are organized at the state level, then all citizens have equal rights, ie. they are equal before the law. From this point of view, significant differences in the rights of individuals between local communities, whether due to different municipal development or different political preferences in local communities, can be seen as inferior and unjust, as a violation of the right of citizens to equal status. Secondly, the financing of social functions from the central level provides the necessary solidarity between the unequally developed local communities, and thus the equality of financing of social needs throughout the country. Otherwise, there is a risk that social needs will be unequally met in different settings, and unless effective mechanisms of money spillovers are found, which is not easy to provide. Third, the local level may lack sufficient expertise to run its businesses effectively; also, the risk of nepotism and corruption is realistically expressed at the local level, although the same applies at the central level. As you can see, the aforementioned principles of organization of the social sector, but not only of it, operate in opposite directions - one speaks in favor of decentralization and the other centralization.

Therefore, deciding on the configuration of competencies is generally complex, and colorful in government in the vertical division of social functions in the modern

³ Baldwin, R., Wyplosz, Ch., *Economics of European Integration*, Data Status, Belgrade, 2010, p. 34.

world, and even in the European Union. However, there are some components of social policy that can be believed to be better organized at one level or another. Thus, financial contributions to the population (child and family allowances, social assistance to the poor, etc.) are better organized at the state level, as this guarantees equal rights for all citizens, and also addresses the problem of unequal development of all municipalities or regions. On the other hand, it is probably best to leave social services to the local authorities, since this is where their awareness and expression of local preferences come to the fore. This division of responsibilities is common in European Union countries, where the central government regulates financial transfers and local social services. Opinions about the third element of social protection - accommodation facilities - have not been crystallized and the practice is mixed, so somewhere they fall under the jurisdiction of central and somewhere local authorities. In recent times, another tendency is increasing the complexity of the situation - the private sector is increasingly involved in the supply of citizens with social services, which, in addition to the dilemma of vertical division, adds a new dilemma to that of the division of social protection functions between the state and the private sector. The private sector typically emerges as a provider of day-to-day services regulated, commissioned and funded by the public sector.⁴

In terms of economics, all EU Member States have benefited from enlargement. It has strengthened the EU's position as a strong global player. It has created a larger and more integrated internal market for the benefit of all Member States. In particular, enlargement has fostered growth and improved the standard of living in the Member States that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, while opening up new export and investment opportunities for fifteen members. Enlargement has lifted trade barriers, creating a larger, more integrated and more advanced internal market. By extension, the European Union has become more competitive and attractive to global investors. From 1992 to 2008, the single market generated an additional 2.77 million jobs and an additional 2.13% of GDP for its members. The value of exports of goods inside the EU (EU internal trade) was estimated at 2.8 trillion euros in 2012, 1.7 times the value of exports outside the EU. This was partly due to the significant growth of the accession countries of 2004, which saw an increase in exports of goods within the European Union from 34.1% to 41.6% of GDP in just 8 years. The value of European Union exports to the rest of the world increased by 50% between 2004 and 2012, while the value of exports of services grew by 81% in the same period. Until 2013, net exports of goods and services made the largest contribution to growth at EU level. The larger single market is more attractive to investors: the amount of FDI from the rest of the world towards the 27 EU member states has doubled in the last ten years and amounted to 30.5% of GDP in 2012. The single market has encouraged the creation of strong regional capital chains. This is illustrated by the successful integration of companies such as the Czech Škoda, now wholly owned by the German Volkswagen, or the Romanian Dacia, now part of the French Renault.⁵

The European Union, as a regional and global actor, influences all the major actors in international relations, and thus its enlargement has its effects, both on the Union bodies and the Member States, aspirants for membership, neighboring countries, as the largest global actors. (primarily to the US, Russia, China and NATO).

As all subjects in international relations are driven, first and foremost, by their

⁴ Stanovcic, V., *Rule of Law and Construction of the Legal State*, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, 2001, p. 12.

⁵ Jaksic, M., *Macroeconomic Structural Policy*, in: Group of authors, *Comparative Economic Policies*, 2010, p. 67.

interests, it is unambiguous that any expansion of the influence of EU membership, which entails institutional adjustment, often deepening, has an impact on the interests of other global and regional players, as their interests play a role in EU enlargement processes. The interest of the EU as a whole, that is, of its Member States, which leads to the continuation of enlargement policy, and therefore of deepening, may first prove to be political and economic. Politically, through a network of (inter) influences and the formulation of common policies, which strengthens member states' influence in the international arena. This is true both in the economic sphere (Lisbon Agenda, World Trade Organization), and in politics that can be formal (international missions - in BiH), in Kosovo, then through CSFP, PSP, etc.) and informal (recognition of Kosovo's unilaterally declared independence, participation in NATO operations, etc.). The economic interests of the Union and its members are achieved primarily through the Internal Market, the WTO, the CAP, special agreements with candidate countries through the SAA or neighborhood policy, etc. For these reasons, the EU is also very attractive to other countries that would like to include their interest in the "common interest" of the EU, that is, to secure a better political and economic position in international relations. This motive is a very good basis for the implementation of the so-called "Soft powers", ie. the impact of the EU on the political and economic life of the countries that wish to join it. The strongest weapon in this "business" is certainly the "conditionality policy", which is used extensively in the accession processes.

Each country wishing to be an EU member must undergo a certain process (today, the Stabilization and Association Process) through which that country is institutionally, legally and economically preparing to become part of the EU. However, this gives the Member States great influence over the reforms that must be implemented in these countries, most often using that influence to pursue their interest (direct political influences, economic preferences, etc.). The practice has shown that in addition to formal, universal criteria for entry into the Union, for each individual, there are specific, additional conditions by the requirements (EU). It should also be noted that for each of the following cases, more and more rigorous rules and procedures apply. This will be particularly pronounced in the case of the Western Balkan countries (The Hague Tribunal, good neighborly relations, etc.), especially after the (premature) accession of Bulgaria and Romania. These include, of course, the obligations of those countries to accede to the Schengen area, the EMU and to fully accept all acts and legal commitments taken by the Union before their entry, without the possibility of receiving any relief, as in the case of previous Member States (eg. budgetary relief Britain, the application of the Social Charter or the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case of Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic and Denmark in the case of EMU or CFSP, etc.).

The particular reason/motive, which applies to both the EU and potential members, is that the membership potential becomes strong a cohesive factor for countries in conflict or with unresolved (mostly borderline) problems. The accession process formally and informally commits them to good neighborly policy and cooperation to facilitate this path, which may even have an impact on the stability of conflict regions (Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Eastern Europe), as well as on the internal political stability of the countries concerned. As we have said, if we consider the EU to be a global or at least regional "player" in international relations, then it is every move or interest directly or indirectly affects the interests of other global "players", above all the United States, Russia, China and somewhat NATO. This is more than obvious when one sees that there are institutionalized modes of communication and cooperation between the EU and these actors, such as the EU-US Summit or EU-Russia or EU-China. Also, the

EU's attempt to play a more significant role in "global" politics is both the creation and development of the CFSP and the CSDP, but they also represent a means of cooperation / assistance to NATO and the US in "maintaining peace and stability in the world", as well as fighting international crime and terrorism.

It is interesting to observe the EU-US relationship, as it represents a relationship between strong allies and "angry" opponents at the same time. EU-US cooperation has come a long way. It is even institutionalized, and in practice visible throughout the history of the EU. This cooperation is particularly visible in the fields of economy (investment) and politics (counter-terrorism and international crime, most often through NATO). However, a rivalry is significant in both these fields. The economy has expressed the EU's desire to parry the US in all aspects (trade, investment, innovation, education), and in the political field to influence the creation of "global politics". The EU-Russia relationship is also very interesting and riddled with similar controversies as the EU-US relationship. At the same time, necessary allies in the Balkans, Afghanistan, or in the fight against international crime and terrorism, and large economic partners, and on the other, adversaries in influencing their immediate neighbors (Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus) or global politics (the Balkans, the Middle East), Iran, China), or disputes over energy policies and respect for human rights. Antagonism has increased significantly with the accession to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact which, for a reason, have reservations about that cooperation, even though large countries such as Germany, Italy or France have significant gains from this relationship. And these relationships are institutionalized and are given special attention.

It is understandable that these countries consider the European Union a significant partner but also a rival, and are looking for ways to establish better and stronger ties with it, but also to ensure their influence on its policies. This was especially evident after the Fifth Enlargement in 2004. When a large part of the former Eastern Bloc became part of the EU, the influence of the United States, with which these countries fostered particularly friendly relations, was greatly increased, primarily because of fear of Russia. This (delete "even") was seen (delete "and") during US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, when these countries were the most supportive of US policy, while the "old" EU member states were significantly more restrained. No wonder, then, that the United States is one of the biggest sponsors and promoters of EU enlargement, with a special focus on Turkey, which is a traditional ally in NATO. To some extent, a similar parallel can be drawn when it comes to Russia, with an emphasis on the Balkan countries (Serbia, Bulgaria).⁶

The European Union is addressing the biggest problems, such as greenhouse gas emissions from air pollution. GHG emissions in the EU today are significantly reduced compared to 1999 (approximately 83% of 1990 levels). In Latvia and Lithuania, for example, emissions are now 50% lower than those of 1990. Despite the increasing population, air pollution across the EU has been drastically reduced. Following its peak in 2006, energy consumption is also declining. Today's energy consumption in the EU is only 0.9% higher than in 1990. Environmental standards in the EU are strict, with significant allocations namely environmental protection. The Union is actively helping Serbia to achieve environmental standards in many areas, which include the installation of filters in power plants, providing clean drinking water, improving waste management, etc. For decades, the EU has invested heavily in reducing pollution and improving air

⁶ Djelic, T. A., Neskovic, S., Ketin, S., Lutovac, M., Economic and Environmental Context of Organic Agriculture and Farms in Serbia - Case Study, Fresenius Environmental Bulletin - FEB, Volume 28 - No. 1 / 2019, p. 91.

and water quality. Recycling and renewable energy are increasingly topical. The water on almost every beach in Europe as it is in most rivers and lakes is clean enough for swimming. Forests and another forested land cover more than 35% of the EU area. The expansion of forest areas in the EU exceeds the loss created by deforestation for the benefit of infrastructure and urbanism. This trend, which began in the 1950s (in some countries and earlier), is due to several factors. Several countries have expanded their forests with afforestation programs that are no longer used for agricultural purposes. This positive development puts the EU ahead of many other regions in the world undergoing intense deforestation.⁷

Basic information on EU members

Customs policy is one of the cornerstones of the European Union. It has played a key role in creating an integrated internal market and common economic policy. The Customs Union is one of a degree of integration and integration towards a single internal market. The term customs union means an area where there are no internal obstacles to the movement of goods (which primarily involves the prohibition of customs duties and charges) and for goods that enter outside are subject to common rules, duties and quotas. The Customs Union was established on 1 April 1968 and the creation of the internal market in 1993 removed the remaining restrictions on the free movement of goods.

The argument in favor of the benefits of a customs union is of limited strength, which is obvious compared to the argument for fully free trade. In simple terms, it boils down to the fact that in full free trade, it is free among all actors, which means that it is not subject to either customs or non-customs barriers, while in the customs union there is free trade with partners in the Union, but also a certain level of protectionism towards third parties. countries. There is no reason to opt for a customs union if the price of goods and services inside such a union were lower than the cost of goods and services outside the customs union. If this is the case, then it is not in the interest of the countries to introduce a customs union but to switch to a fully free trade regime. Other countries would then have reason to introduce a customs union. The reason is obvious. Companies from countries that offer lower prices for goods and services are more efficient than others who offer the same goods and services at a higher price. With free trade, they would be in expansion and less efficient ones would see a decrease in turnover or even closure. On this basis, it is clear that the customs union always introduces when prices on the world market are lower than those in the established union. When firms in some countries are less efficient than their competitors, the calculation changes. In the free trade area, they would be threatened by cheaper imports (as would job in those countries). Increasing efficiency of firms would only be observed in the long run by the gradual liberalization of trade, which would eventually lead to the introduction of fully free trade.

The free movement of people within the European Union raises security concerns in the governments of the Member States, as there is no longer any control at the EU's internal borders. It was therefore necessary to introduce specific security measures at the external borders of the European Union. And since freedom of movement in the Union can be abused by criminals, national police forces and the EU judiciary must work together to combat international crime. One of the most significant steps to make life easier for travelers in the European Union was taken in 1985, when the governments of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands

signed a treaty in Schengen, Luxembourg. They agreed to abolish passenger control, regardless of their nationality, at their common borders, to harmonize border control measures with non-EU countries and to introduce a common visa policy. In this way, they created a territory without internal borders known as the Schengen area. The Schengen agreements have since become an integral part of the Treaty on the European Union, and the Schengen area is gradually expanding. As of 2010, the Schengen rules are fully implemented by all EU countries except Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom. Three non-EU countries: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland also belong to the Schengen area. Stricter checks on the EU's external borders have become a priority for EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. An EU agency called Frontex, based in Warsaw, is in charge of the European Union for managing external border security co-operation. Member States can lend it ships, helicopters and planes to perform joint patrols - e.g. in sensitive areas of the Mediterranean. The European Union is also considering establishing a European Border Guard Service.⁸

Europe is proud of its long tradition of cordial reception of foreigners and its humane willingness to offer asylum to refugees fleeing danger and persecution. EU governments today face the urgent need to tackle the growing number of immigrants, both legal and illegal, in an area without internal borders. EU governments have agreed to harmonize their rules so that by 2012, asylum applications will be processed by a set of basic principles that are uniquely recognized throughout the European Union. Some technical measures have been adopted, such as minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers and the granting of refugee status. In recent years, a large number of illegal immigrants have been coming to Europe and one of the European Union's major priorities is to tackle this problem. The governments of the Member States are working together to prevent human trafficking and to harmonize common rules for the repatriation of illegal immigrants. At the same time, legal immigration is better coordinated with EU rules on family reunification, the status of long-term residents in its territory and the admission of non-EU citizens who wish to come to Europe for studies or research. As the European Union's population ages, legal immigrants with the right qualifications help bridge labor market gaps.

A concerted effort is needed to combat criminal gangs that run human trafficking networks and exploit vulnerable groups, especially women and children. Organized crime is becoming more sophisticated and regularly uses European or international networks for its activities. Terrorism has made it clear that it can take a brutal blow anywhere in the world. That is why the Schengen Information System (SIS) was established. It is a complex database that enables law enforcement and judicial authorities to exchange information on persons or objects being searched, for example, stolen vehicles or works of art, persons arrested or extradited. The next-generation database, known as SIS II, will have more capacity and will allow the storage of new types of data. One of the best ways to capture criminals is to track the movement of their illicitly obtained profits. To this end, and to cut off funding from criminal and terrorist organizations, the EU uses anti-money laundering laws. The most recent step taken recently in the area of co-operation by law enforcement agencies was the creation of a European Police Service (Europol).

Europol's headquarters are in The Hague and are made up of police and customs officers. Europol is involved in a variety of forms of international crime: drug trafficking, theft of vehicles, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, child pornography, counterfeiting, sale of radioactive and nuclear material, terrorism,

⁸ Neskovic, S., Ketin, S., Delic, T. A., International Politics and Ecology: Special Focus to the Protection of Air, Fresenius Environmental Bulletin - FEB, Volume 27 - No. 11 / 2018, p. 7549.

⁷ Miric, O., EU Regional Policy as an Engine for Economic Development, Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Zagreb, 2009, p. 112.

money laundering and the fabrication of fake euro banknotes. Tax, as a forced means of raising money from individuals, legal entities and other taxpayers, is used to finance public goods and services. Each country's public finances consist of both the budget and numerous other public funds. Public funds are collected through the collection of various forms of taxes⁹, but also other public duties such as customs duties, taxes, excise duties, fees, tax stamps and other para-fiscal levies. While the revenue side of the budget consists of collected public funds, the expenditure side determines their spending. In doing so, in the tax system of the European Union, taxes are collected and spent at various levels of government (from the local and regional level, through national, up to supranational - EU level).

Collected public funds are spent through various financial institutions such as budgets, treasuries and public funds. Tax differences between the EU Member States came to the fore when customs and non-tariff barriers to the free development of the Common Market were resolved. More specifically, while the establishment of the customs union eliminated the remaining customs barriers in the internal market, the establishment of the single market also removed the non-tariff barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. However, there remain differences between EU countries resulting from different tax structures, ways and objectives of using public funds, diversified public funds, as well as several other differences related to regulation, technical, sanitary and production standards, state aid policy, etc. Apart from the above, the presence of varying degrees of dispersion of corruption and the informal economy in the Union countries can be noted, which can have significant effects both on the size and structure of public finances and on the functioning of the legal sector of the economy. There have been numerous debates in the European Union about the tax structure, its partial harmonization, and possible full harmonization. These debates highlighted the complexity of the tax system in the European Union. Although very few results have been achieved in the field of harmonization of EU member states' tax systems, it is astonishing that the pursuit of the ideal basis for pursuing a common tax policy is closely pursued today.

Since its inception, the European Union has made great efforts to develop the Common (Internal) Market. However, one of the obstacles to the successful implementation of the Common Market is the different tax laws at the national levels of EU Member States. To finalize the creation of the single market, it was necessary to implement the so-called prohibition of tax discrimination, which involves the removal of tax heterogeneity (diversity) among the EU Member States. The elimination of national tax differences creates unhindered conditions for successful economic cooperation between the Member States of the Union. The European Union's fiscal policy relates to two key areas: 1) direct taxes (which are the exclusive competence of EU member states) and 2) indirect taxes (which have a direct impact on the free movement of goods and services). Unlike direct taxes, where the Member States independently decide and take measures to prevent tax evasion and double taxation, the harmonization of indirect taxes is regulated by supranational (European) regulations and is the responsibility of the institutions of the European Union itself (Council of Ministers, European Commission, The European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee). While the most significant direct taxes include: corporate income tax, income tax, interest income tax and dividends on natural persons, the EU indirect taxes include: value-added

⁹ Among which are the value-added tax (VAT), income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax, property tax, tax on various forms of other income, etc. As for taxation and collection, when it comes to spending the funds raised.

tax (VAT) and excise taxes.

Harmonization of Value Added Tax (VAT) is a tax area in which the European Union has moved significantly. Therefore, the EU Fiscal Policy is characterized by an extremely high degree of harmonization (harmonization) of VAT between the Member States. Thus, VAT has evolved within the EU, as a supranational organization, and it is clear that it is different from other taxes that fall within the legal competence of EU Member States. A brief overview of the development and application of VAT in EU countries - Value added tax is defined as a general consumption tax levied and paid on the supply of goods and services, at all stages of production and trade in goods and services, as well as on imports goods, unless otherwise provided by law. The Rome Treaty of 1957 prescribes, in a chapter entitled Tax Regulations, the role of the Council of Ministers of the EU in passing indirect taxes to the extent that such harmonization is necessary for the functioning of the Common Market. In 1960, the European Commission established the first Fiscal and Financial Committee, headed by German professor Fritz Neumark. The Neumark Commission will be remembered for:¹⁰

1. a comprehensive (extensive) examination of disparities in public finances of EEC countries,
2. determining the extent of their threat or hindering the development of the Common Market,
3. defining ways of eliminating fiscal differences between EU member's economic communities.

By 1962, this Commission had drawn up a General Sales Tax Compliance Program. In doing so, the Commission did not address the legal aspects of tax harmonization.

The process of harmonization of VAT (Value Added Tax) as a specific form of general sales tax within the European Union took place in the following stages:

1. Introduction and incorporation of VAT into the tax systems of EU Member States;
2. Harmonization of the VAT tax base in the mentioned countries and
3. Equalizing the number and amount of tax rates.

Although more than 30 different guidelines have been adopted to date about European VAT, the following are of particular importance: the First and Second Guidelines of 1967, the Sixth Guidelines of 1977 and Guideline 112 of 2006. The first guideline was to harmonize the legal regulations of EEC countries on general sales tax. For the first time, this Directive provided for the incorporation (introduction) of VAT with the right to deduct input tax into the tax systems of the members of the European Economic Community. The second guideline was to harmonize the legal provisions of EEC members on the structure and methods of implementation of the common tax system. This Guideline more closely defined the nature of VAT by insisting on consumable type VAT, while at the same time specifying how goods and services are traded in the country, taxed on imports, and exempted from export taxation. The guideline also accepted the principle of destination of goods intending to avoid double taxation. Unlike the principle of the origin of goods by which exports are taxed, the taxation of imports is applied by the destination of the goods. The guideline eventually provided for the possibility of introducing a higher and lower VAT tax rate, without specifying their amount. In 1970,

¹⁰ Antevski, M. Regional Economic Integration in Europe, Belgrade, 2008, p. 72.

the Council of Ministers decided to finance the common budget of the EEC countries. One of the revenue items of the EEC budget was related to VAT own resources. This is about the EU Common Budget, which has always been replenished, in part, by Member States' VAT revenues. To prevent an uneven and unfair distribution of tax burden among the members, there was an objective need to harmonize VAT tax bases. This has helped to equalize the number of national contributions paid. The sixth guideline concerned a common VAT system and a single tax base. This Guideline has brought the European VAT provisions closer together as it establishes a single tax base for all EEC members and later the EU. As a result of more than 30 later adopted technical guidelines, and due to numerous changes, European VAT regulations in becoming opaque, there was a need to adopt a new guideline in the form of a consolidated text of the applicable regulations. Thus, Guideline 112 of 2006 was adopted, which represents a consolidated version of all European VAT regulations.

The European VAT system applies to and charges both for the production and sale of goods (ie turnover) and for the provision of services throughout the European Union. The value-added tax is ultimately paid by the final consumers (customers and service users) in the form of a percentage share in the final price of the observed good and / or service. Subject to taxation are the following taxable transactions carried out by taxpayers in the territory of the Member States of the European Union:¹¹

1. Delivery of goods;
2. Acquisition of goods originating in another EU Member State;
3. Provision of services and
4. Imports of products from third countries (countries outside the territory of the European Union).

Taxpayer means any natural or legal person who independently and independently carries out his economic activity. Depending on the type of taxable transaction, the following two tax bases can be distinguished:¹²

1. the equivalent of goods delivered and services rendered and
2. the customs value of the goods at their import.

Taxable transactions (transactions) are subject to the tax rates of the Member State in which the tax liability is incurred. The tax rate is expressed as a percentage of the tax base. Under current EU fiscal regulations, in addition to the mandatory higher tax rate, which must not be less than 15%, one or more than two lower tax rates, which may not be less than 5%, maybe applied in EU countries. Certain EU Member States are allowed to apply reduced or even (in certain cases) and zero tax rates in specific geographical areas. At the same time, the EU's fiscal policy also approves the application of a tax exemption institution for a specific category or delivery of goods and services. These are mainly services of general social importance (such as medical and hospital services, goods and services in the function of social protection, teaching and teaching, certain cultural services, etc.), as well as certain transactions related to insurance, credit granting, certain banking services, postal services, gambling, betting, real estate sales,

¹¹ Delić, T. A., European Union Cohesion Policy Important for Improving Transport Infrastructure of the Countries of Southeast Europe, Thematic Proceedings, Contemporary Trends in Transport and Security of the Region of Southeast Europe, Nis: Faculty of Law, Security and Management "Constantine the Great" University Union - Nikola Tesla "in Belgrade, 2019, p. 127.

¹² Ibid, p. 128.

etc. In certain and exceptional cases, the special provisions regarding VAT payment may apply to:

1. small entrepreneurs,
2. farmers,
3. used goods such as antiques, cultural and artistic goods, etc.,
4. investment gold,
5. travel agencies and
6. electronic services.

European integration of the Republic of Turkey as a country of the Black sea region

The Republic of Turkey, as a State of the Black Sea Region, is a Eurasian state located in Southeast Europe and Southwest Asia. As much as 97% of the territory of the Republic of Turkey is located in the Asian part, and only the remaining 3% is in Europe. Turkey is bordered on the east by Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran, on the south by Iraq and Syria, and on the west by Greece, Bulgaria. The Mediterranean Sea and Cyprus are to the south, the Aegean Sea and the islands to the west, and the Black Sea to the north.

Due to its position on two continents, Turkish culture is a unique blend of Eastern and Western customs and traditions. The country's position between Europe in the west, Central Asia in the east, Russia in the north and the Middle East in the south has also given Turkey great strategic importance. Turkey is a democratic, unitary, constitutional republic founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Since then, the country's politics have started to turn west, so Turkey is now a member of many Western organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and OSCE.

In 2005, Turkey resumed negotiations for EU membership. At the same time, the state maintains and intensifies its political relations with the Eastern countries. It is in very good and close cooperation with the US, which hinders its entry into the European Union. Turkey is one of the developed countries. It has the 15th highest GDP in the world. The key sectors of the Turkish economy are: banking, tourism, agriculture, construction, electronics and textiles. Cereals, vegetables and industrial plants are grown in Turkey.

When it comes to Turkey's state system, it is a parliamentary republic where power is divided into: legislative, executive and judicial. The Constitution is the supreme law of the state. Turkey's President is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The president is the head of state and is elected by at least a two-thirds majority of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The executive is in the hands of the President and the Council of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President through a selection of members of the Grand Turkish National Assembly. Turkey is a country whose path to the European Union is specific and unique in many ways. The issue of EU membership is undoubtedly one of Turkey's most significant foreign policy problems. This situation should not be taken for granted, because it is, after all, extremely unusual. Dozens of countries of the last century have joined many international organizations

without this issue becoming the focus of their identity. It could be said that the issue of Turkish EU membership is proportionally the most important. Turkey's accession to the European Community is its identification with Western Europe, in: economic, military, political terms.¹³

Turkey was one of the founders of the Council of Europe in 1949. But a formal negotiation of Turkey's accession to the European Union followed in 1959. This is followed by negotiations with the European Commission, one year later, in 1960, in October. Turkey has faced numerous crises in both the economic and political spheres and this has led to delays and adjournment of negotiations on several occasions, so formally this agreement was signed only on September 12, 1963 and it enters into force in 1964.

In November 1970 - The Additional Protocol, signed and annexed to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, set out in detail how the Customs Union would be established between the two parties. In 1982, the European Community decided to formally suspend the Ankara Agreement and therefore freeze its political relations with Turkey as a result of the September 1980 military coup. As early as 1987, Turkey sought to gain full membership of the EEC. The EC foreign ministers decide to submit a request for an opinion to the Commission by a routine procedure. Two years later, in 1989, the European Commission gave its opinion on Turkey's request for accession and stressed that enlargement to Turkey and other potential candidates could only be considered after the entry into force of the 1992 single market.¹⁴

In 1993, to speed up the process of creating a customs union, the European Council established a Committee to oversee the process of creating a customs union. This Committee has been a positive result and the Customs Union is created and an Agreement is established in 1996. The European Commission and Turkey entered into a formal Customs Union agreement in 1995. This was the first customs union to function with a third country. The agreement was first and foremost to encourage the development of the economy in Turkey and to form a customs union with the European Commission. What Turkey lacked at the time was an improvement in standards and working conditions, as well as a better economy. Turkey must also resolve the issue with Cyprus and Greece as both are EU member states.

What also hindered Turkey's entry into the European Union was its close relationship with the US, as well as joining the European Union it would be the second largest population of EU Member States after Germany, and the many Member States did not want that many Muslims in the European Union. Finally, in 1999, Turkey officially received candidate status as a member of the Union. and in 2001, the Pre-Accession Partnership was formed. In 2005, the Council formally decided to start membership negotiations.

What is characteristic of the European Union agreeing with third countries is that it divides it into 3 stages, so was the situation with Turkey. The first phase is the "preparatory phase" and it lasts for a period of 5 to 10 years, which depends on the

level of development of the Turkish economy. At this stage, the European Commission provides financial and trade assistance to Turkey to help it strengthen its economy and customs union. Member States give privileges to Turkey when it comes to the customs union. The European Investment Bank also allocates part of the funds and Member States finance investment projects relating to the Turkish economy.

In the next phase, the transitional period, which may last for a maximum of 12 years, should harmonize economic policy and end the customs barriers between Turkey and Europe. This phase aims to align the customs tariffs of the European Union with those of Turkey. What needs to be addressed in this second phase are financial problems and monetary policy, as well as stable prices and balance of payments. Finally, the final stage is the final establishment of the customs union, which leads to entry into the European Union.

Geographically, Turkey is a Eurasian state. Only 3% of its territory belongs to Europe, in the not so "advanced and popular" part, ie. Balkan Peninsula.¹⁵ Turkey's largest city, Istanbul, lies on the shores of the Black Sea and has its own European and Asian parts. It is also the most liberal city in that country. What we can see in Istanbul is reminiscent of Europe greatly. It even goes beyond European standards, both in architecture and in modern terms. But the rest of the Turkish state is far more backward. Although the literacy rate in Turkey is above 95%, a large proportion of the population, and especially those from the interior, do not have the opportunity to study at colleges and universities, significantly limiting the openness of Turkish society to integrations of any type. The less educated population is, as a rule, more conservative and more inclined to autocratic models of government than democratic principles and integrations. Also, Turkey would be the second largest EU country by population if it is admitted to membership. She is expected to overtake Germany within a few years, gaining - as a Muslim country - a majority in the European Parliament and thus becoming a state that has influence in directing and defining the policies of the European Union, with most EU countries belonging to the Christian faith.

The Turkish government is an autocratic one with formal democratic institutions but no democratic spirit of political action, ie. there are institutions that are supposed to guarantee their democratic functioning (parliament, government, courts) but since they are influenced by the ruling group and its leader, democracy is reduced to a level of formalism and the dictatorships of the ruling group, its narrower or exclusively its leader, are practically enforced.

The head of state is also the founder of the Justice and Development Party, and now president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This controversial politician has worked for years to build a strong cult of self and strengthen the party. His party has 317 seats in the Turkish parliament, which is 40.87% of the total (550). What most resents Europe for the Turkish president are pressures on the media and journalists, restriction of freedom of speech, arrests of opposition politicians and activists.¹⁶ The European Union has declared that as long as Erdogan is in power it will not accept Turkey into the European Union. Another reason is economics.

Although it is developing much faster than the EU average in Turkey, Turkey is still lagging in other areas than the EU countries, such as unemployment, budget deficits and external debt. The performance of the economy is likely to pose a serious threat to Turkey's aspirations to become a full member of the EU. Despite significant efforts

¹⁵ Carkoglu, A., Rubin, B., Turkey and the Europe Union, London, 2003, p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 12.

¹³ Carkoglu, A., Rubin, B., Turkey and the Europe Union, London, 2003, str. 6.

¹⁴ Neskovic, S., The Danube Region and Process of Cross - Border Cooperation on the Balkans - Case Study, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 4, Cross - Border Cooperation and Development Policies in Bulgaria and on the Balkans, Thematic Collective Book, Veliko Turnovo: St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, Faculty of Social Sciences from the University of Craiova, Romania, Centre of Strategic Studies of National Security of Belgrade, Serbia (CESNA - B), Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, Romania, 2017, p. 17.

aimed at reforming the Turkish economy in recent years, with pressures stemming from the IMF and the EU, the Turkish economy has not been able to overcome its traditional problems of instability and recurrent crises. The performance of the economy in recent years has been characterized by low growth, high inflation balance. Turkey has not been able to generate the kind of performance in the economic sphere that would be synonymous with the continued concealment of EU norms in terms of per capita income and development levels within a reasonable time.

Also, the labor force - which is much more expensive and cheaper - frightens several European countries just as much as they fear the possibility of their market being flooded with Turkish goods, mainly agricultural products, which are much cheaper and of higher quality than European competitors. which may also explain its exemption from the Customs Union Agreement between the two parties.




Figure 1. International trade in goods, EU-28, 2008 - 2018¹⁷

Countries that are a major import and export partner of the EU are: Russia, Norway, Turkey, the USA, Japan and Switzerland.

The most significant development in the area of external relations during the first EC childhood was the conclusion of an association agreement with Greece Turkey and a group of African states, all former colonies of EC member states. The accession agreements with Greece and Turkey were qualitatively different from those with African countries, as Greece and Turkey wanted EC membership, albeit in the long run. The agreement with Greece, signed in July 1961, called for a customs union within twelve years, although the EC allowed Greece a large number of extensions for sensitive products. The agreement with Turkey, signed in September 1963, aimed at a customs union after a period of indefinite duration. Such an arrangement has kept Turkey's

economic development low. The EC accepted the aspiration for Greek membership, but was much more cautious in its treatment of Turkey. While praising Greece's contribution, he was much more careful about his treatment of the Turk. While praising Greece's contribution to European culture for its civilization, the EC questioned Turkey's European belief. Political instability and economic problems in Turkey have led to an Ankara association agreement. By the late 1960s, the EC had little to boast about joining with two strategically significant countries, whose mutual hostility would complicate Community action in the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁸

Turkey's dispute with Greece and Armenia is a stumbling block to EU membership, as Greece vetoes Turkey's membership specifically because of its stance on the Cyprus issue, which is the most significant problem between the two countries. For Turkey to join the European Union, it must recognize Cyprus as an independent state. Turkey says it will never agree.

Until recently, the absence of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia over Turkey's downing of a Russian fighter jet in Syria in 2014 was interrupted by the Turkish government's political upheaval internationally. The renewal of diplomatic relations on common interests, notably in trade but also in the field of energy (pipeline construction), sent a message to the Turkish authorities in the European Union that the country is not so interested in European integration now.

The creation of a new interest grouping on Eurasian soil appears to be at the pier, whose main pillars are Turkey and Russia. Even Erdogan himself said recently that the Turkish people can decide in the referendum whether to join the EU, because the same organization refused to grant a visa-free regime to Turkey because of restrictions on political and other freedoms in that country. With Trump coming to power in the US, he announces that he could make deals with Russia and forge some new alliance and co-operation, and given that Turkey is in close co-operation with Russia, it is thought that the co-operation of these 3 major powers.¹⁹

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker says Turkey's accession to the European Union will fail not because of a lack of desire on the part of EU members, but because Turkey does not want to introduce European standards. Juncker also said that reintroducing the death penalty in Turkey would result in an interruption of accession negotiations. Turkish President Tajip Recep Erdogan has said he expects the Turkish parliament to approve the reintroduction of the death penalty after a referendum extending his powers.

Turkey invaded Cyprus in late July 1974. But it was a reaction to the coup by Greece. The goal was to unite Cyprus with the mainland in Greece, regardless of the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community (about a fifth of the population) and international agreements. Turkish forces on the island increased dramatically in August 1974. Tens of thousands of Turkish troops have since remained on the island. The northern part of Cyprus later proclaimed itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", but it has no international recognition other than Turkey.

The EU's readiness to receive Cyprus, regardless of division, of the islands has deprived Turkey of the ability to exert some pressure on the EU. This, however, triggered a round of intense diplomacy of activities on the Kpark issue in preparation for the

18 Alihodžić, A., Sladoje, M., Investment and Project Valuation, University of Eastern Sarajevo, Doboj, 2018, p. 44.

19 Carkoglu, A., Rubin, B., Turkey and the Europe Union, London, 2003, str. 18.

17 European Commission, date: 7 November 2019, 15:42

December 2002 Copenhagen summit. The members were adamant that the divided Kpar would be admitted to the EU, but Greece threatened to halt all enlargement if it were not received along with the first wave of Central and Eastern European candidates. Trying to get the best out of the bad situation, the EU tried to calm Turkey by giving it additional economic assistance and a promise that it would become a member at some point, with Greece promising to join Cyprus. The EU's decision not to give a date at the Copenhagen summit to Turkey to start accession talks has further eroded relations between the EU and Turkey and diminished the prospect of Cyprus reunification.

The German parliament approved a resolution saying the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks during World War I as "genocide". Armenians say 1.5 million of their people died in the 1915 crimes. Turks refuse to acknowledge that it is genocide against them. The vote increased German-Turkish tensions at a time when Turkey's assistance was needed to stem the flow of migrants. More than 20 nations, including France and Russia, as well as Pope Francis, have acknowledged the 1915 killings as genocide. Turkey denies that there was a systematic campaign during the First World War to kill Armenians as an ethnic group. He also points out that many Turkish civilians were killed in turmoil during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The resolution uses the word "genocide" in the title and text. It is also said that Germany - at the time of the Ottoman allies - had some guilt over doing nothing to stop the killings.

In all these past years, Turkey has been making every effort to become a member of the European Union, and thus somehow neglecting its policies, turning to too many European standards. When asked about the reasons for Turkey's slow pace and progress towards membership, one Turkish diplomat replied: "Every year, they think of new reasons. A full list of reasons is always there, but the emphasis changes at different times. " Among those restrictions and complaints that may be mentioned are the size of the Turkic population, the Muslim population, restrictions on democracy, human rights issues, the Armenian issue, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus issue, direct conflicts with Greece and the structure of the economy.

On the one hand, Ankara does not need EU standards, which will be used as an excuse or guarantee for changes to the law, which would diminish the role of the military in Turkish politics once implemented. On the other hand, the way in which the Union treats the case of Turkey seems to have fatigued the politicians, which could be seen in the criticism at the expense of the EU, especially in the criticisms made by the President of the Republic when he said: "After all these years, let us be received or let them reject us. "He also points out:" Turkey is now a powerful country ... Turkey is not a country that will come to your door and pray for you. Turkey is a country that stands on its own two feet. Turkey is a country that is developing its industry, agriculture, energy, education, health and other sectors every day. If admitted to the EU as such, it will enter, but if it does not receive it, then Turkey will determine its path. " Erdogan appealed to Turks living in Germany not to vote for parties he described as "Turkish enemies".

Many, however, think that neither Germany nor France wants Turkey in the European Union, because Turkey would be the second largest EU country if it receives it, and soon become the first and therefore the largest number of members in Parliament would belong to her. The difficulty of annexing Turkey because the European Union is in principle rejecting Turkey, or hesitating to join Turkey itself, has shifted from political leadership to the Turkish people. According to the latest poll conducted by TNS Pierre on the subject a few days ago, only 28 percent of Turks support their country's EU accession, compared to 38 percent just six months ago. The survey, conducted in Turkey,

the US and 12 EU countries, showed large differences in Europe in terms of Turkey's accession to the Union. This idea is supported by most Romanians, 48% of them, while the French (28%) and Germans (15%) are the most critical of it.

Most Turks, however, believe that neighboring countries are more important to the economies and security of those countries than the European Union. Current developments and developments indicate that Turkey's accession is almost impossible, meaning that this relationship is likely to remain the same through slow negotiations and delays, which continue to last indefinitely without any timeframe for ending them. To stem the influx of migrants, mainly from Syria, flooding Europe's shores, the EU and Turkey signed a visa waiver agreement in March for Turks traveling to Europe.

Conclusion

The enlargements of the European Union have been extremely positive for both the Union and the Member States. With each enlargement, the European Union has seen economic growth and strengthening influence in Europe worldwide. Member States have also made progress in the accession process itself, thanks to the assistance of the Union countries. Upon admission, they experienced a real boom. Serbia, as a country on the European continent, should naturally strive for EU membership. The experience of other accession countries is positive, and this should be followed. I believe that membership in the European Union can bring many benefits, from economic to political.

We have partly experienced the economic benefits in the form of grants and investments, which, upon joining the Union, would be intensified. The political benefits are manifold and primarily related to foreign policy, which is much easier to conduct under the auspices of such an organization. The negotiations will present an opportunity for Serbian citizens to learn more about the European Union, its history, values of practices and benefits of membership. To complete the negotiations and the modernization of Serbia, the European Union annually allocates 200 million euros in grants to help the country gain full membership of the Union.

Serbia is now decisively on the path to EU membership, and on that path has the support of the European Union. The final say is given to the citizens of Serbia who will one day vote in the referendum on Serbia's accession to the Union. The experience of previous enlargements shows that smart reforms can change the fate of a country in the short term. This requires political leadership, national unity, and sometimes difficult decision-making. Serbia can achieve all this with the support of the European Union and its Member States, including project financing, technical advice, improvements and changes to legislation and its implementation, as well as advice to an efficient and transparent public administration. Turkey's EU accession process has been going on since 1949, and to this day its issue of accession has not been resolved, even more so as it seems to have become more complicated since President Erdogan's rise to power. With it comes autocratic power, which is unacceptable to the European Union. Also, it seems that Germany and France are most afraid of Turkey's accession to the European Union, as Turkey would be the second largest EU country by population if admitted. She is expected to overtake Germany within a few years, gaining - as a Muslim country - a majority in the European Parliament and thus becoming a state that has influence in directing and defining the policies of the European Union, with most EU countries belonging to the Christian faith.

In the latest poll, which could be expected to support Turkey's accession to the EU, the French supported with 28 percent and the Germans 15 percent. Even Turkey is no longer so "crazy" about Europe, so in the last referendum, only 28 percent of Turks supported joining the EU. While the benefits of joining the EU are numerous, Turkey also does not want to enter as much as it once did, perhaps for the reason that it is in close relations with Russia and the US. There is even talk that these 3 great powers will unite and make their alliance. Most Turks, however, believe that neighboring countries are more important to the economy and security of the Arab countries than the European Union. The leaders of the EU member states are aware of the importance of Turkey, and therefore neither of them has the intention, nor the courage, to slam the door on Turkey, as it has the fastest growing economy in Europe and an increasingly prominent leader in the Islamic world. Despite all this, neither side dares to break the deal, but it seems as though they will go on forever.

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**100 YEARS LATER:
REVOLUTION OR COUP D'ETAT?
THE RUSSIAN DISPUTES OVER 1917**

Abstract

The focus of the paper is on the Post-Soviet interpretations of Russian Revolutions in 1917 in the Russian Social Thought. The analysis of the basic lines of Russian disputes over 1917 is concentrated on:

- the terms: revolution, coup d'état, 'smuta', Russkaya or Russiyskaya?
- the chronology: where is the beginning of the revolution and the end of coup d'état – the First Russian Liberal Revolution'1905, the Liberal Reforms of Alexander II in 1860's, February'1917, October'1917?
- the ideological currents of Russian Social Thought about 1917: conservative, liberal, left;
- the modern Russian historiography interpretations of 1917;
- and the official point of view of Kremlin under Yeltsin and Putin.

Keywords: Great Rossiyskaya Revolution, Russkaya Revolution, Great Russian Revolution, 'Whites' and 'Reds', Mensheviks and 'Bolsheviks, Februaryists, October coup, October Revolution, Great Turmoil 'Smuta', Red Turmoil, Civil war, the Red Empire, Liberalism, Conservatism, Monarchism, National-Bolshevism, Sovietophilia, Slavophilia.

100 years after the 1917 revolutions, Russian authorities have been doing their best to neglect the anniversary. The revolution has been melted in everyday life to be drowned in modern "relevant activities". "Relevance" is a favorite word with the bureaucrats and it can earn you funding for more than one project. Russia is rapidly catching up with the Atlantic world in this regard.

The Kremlin's political botox, however, has failed to smooth out the old passions between the "Whites" and the "Reds", or between the monarchists against the "Whites" and the "Reds". The ideological vacuum in which modern Russia has collapsed after the disintegration of the USSR can not be filled up with ideology – a paradox with which most public figures in Russia disagree, looking for new ideological projects, or offering old ones. The Kremlin is trying to turn patriotism into an ideology; which it fails to achieve through directives, achieves convincingly through the historical fact of the annexation of the Crimea, and, to a dubious extent, through the militarist propaganda of the official media. Ukraine and Donbass are bad examples that can be given both positive and negative colouring.

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Why Russia, like any other Orthodox country, does not need an ideology, is quite a different matter. A sufficient prerequisite is to keep the balance between the three pillars of the fundamental nature of Russia, irrespective of any political system, namely, Orthodox spirituality, European culture and Eastern / Eurasian statehood. What is needed is a Russian strategy and not a Russian ideology, but it is just an outside perspective of a Bulgarian historian.

Russian public thought has had a specific taste for ideological disputes since the nineteenth century, up to the present day, and has not ceased to ideologize its past. The theme of the 1917 revolutions is but another example of ideologized historical memory. The purpose of this article is to make an ideological cross-section of the contemporary Russian society as represented in the disputes on the February and October events, 100 years later².

The ideological disputes in the contemporary Russian society go along two lines. The first matter of controversy is the terminology: 'Revolution' or 'Coup d'Etat'; 'February' and 'October' or 'Great Rossiyska / Russka Revolution'; 'Great Turmoil' or 'Great Anti-Russian Revolution'. The second controversy concerns the chronological scope, there exist disagreements on the beginning and the end of the 1917 events.

Revolution or Coup d'Etat? February' and 'October', or 'Great Rossiyska / Russkaya Revolution?

The controversy concerning the terminology for 1917 go beyond the academic definitions over which an ideological stratum has been visibly, or implicitly, overlaid. One of the most common stratifications of Russian historiography uses, for convenience, the ideological terminology 'pre-revolutionary', 'Soviet', 'post-Soviet'.

If, prior to 1917, Russian historical periodization used to be Euro-centric (Kiev-Moscow-Petersburg), following the collapse of the monarchy, it became a revolution-centered. In either case, however, the focus was ideological. 'Europe' was used as a myth, subject of enlightenment cult and imitation, an eternal catch-up-with – Westernization / Europeization. 'The Revolution' was a clash between the European, Petersburg Russia and the traditional, Moscow Russia, which yielded a third entity: the Soviet living utopia of an earthly paradise governed by hellish power.

The Russian historical time runs 'ante' and 'post' 1917; whereas the year 1991 does not have any symbolic significance despite the scale of the catastrophe that destroyed the Soviet Empire from within. 1991 did not create a qualitatively new system, but partly restored the February project for Russia, coupled with the Soviet heritage, which had 9th of May kept sacred as an identification marker. Russia, after 1991, has been a faceless quasi-imperial eclectic entity combining the care for Lenin's mummy with the rebirth of Russian Orthodoxy, Valdai with Valaam.

The distance in time is a fictitious criterion for the objectivity of historical interpretation. The current Russian disputes over 1917 remain in the sphere of the 'Whites' – 'Reds' dichotomy. 'Whites and 'Reds' is the traditional simplified division. There are many 'shades of red', which operate as parallel lines in the Civil War: the "Reds-against-

² An interesting contemporary, and timely, historical and sociological analysis of the Kremlin's policy concerning the historical memory of the 1917 a hundred years later is the study of Iliana Marcheva, representing a political and sociological cross-section: Марчева, Ил. Политики на паметта: официалната руска пропаганда за ВОСР по време на 100 годишния й юбилей. – Политически хоризонти. Год. I, бр. 6, декември 2017, 111–142.

Reds war" (e.g. Tambov's Uprising, West-Siberian Uprising and Kronstadt³).

Both the Reds and the Whites deemed the revolution sacred, no matter whether it was dubbed 'February' or 'October' depending on the ideological, respectively, liberal or communist colouring. Both factions, back in 1917, as well as today, have denied identification with Russian monarchy as their political image. Along with them, there are the monarchists, who have considered the revolution as a disaster, cruelty, and catastrophe. Monarchism also has various shades, ranging from nostalgia for the Romanov Dynasty and tsar's deification, to political philosophy of the monarchy as an optimal Russian system, regardless of the dynasty.

The term 'Great Russian Revolution' was also used by Prince Lvov, who headed the liberal Provisional Government, understanding it as a mixture of "elements of the universal character" of "the soul of the Russian people, which turns out to be a world democratic soul ... which was ready not only to merge with democracy all over the world, but also to stand before it and take the leadership along the path of development of the great principles of mankind: freedom, equality and brotherhood."⁴

In the 1920s, the Russian emigration began discussions over the terms 'revolution' and 'coup'. Developed was the concept of "the two conspiracies" and "the two revolutions," according to which the February one was the true "democratic revolution", while the October one was a Bolshevik "conspiracy" and "coup"⁵.

The emigrants' concept, however, developed ideologically as an opposition against the Soviet paradigm and did not take into account the views of the "Februaryists" themselves who considered February events as a coup. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks initially described the events as the 'October coup', not as a revolution.

In a personal correspondence with I.V.Revenko, Pavel Milyukov (December 1917 – January 1918) describes, directly and "strictly confidentially", the actions of the Februaryists as a 'coup': "We did not want complete destruction, although we knew that a coup would have unfavourable consequences during the war... the firm decision to take advantage of the war to make a coup was made by us soon after the beginning of this war."⁶

After 1991, the guild of Russian historians gradually introduced the concept of 'Great Rossiyska /rarely Russka/ Revolution'. In some history textbooks, it has been used since 1996⁷. Initially, it was used in parallel with the term GOSR, but in 2005, the Kremlin authorized the term 'October Revolution', from which 'great' and 'socialist' were omitted. In his statements on the occasion of the 1917 events, Putin has not taken sides. He uses both 'revolution' and 'coup' aiming at reconciliation and overcoming the 'schism' in his homeland history. In his speech at the Valdai Forum, in Sochi, (October

³ Борис Колоницкий. Красные против красных. – Нева, 2010, № 11. <http://magazines.russ.ru/neva/2010/11/ko4-pr.html>

⁴ Колоницкий Б. И. «Русская идея» и идеология Февральской революции. – Toronto Slavic Quarterly. 2007. № 21. <http://www.utoronto.ca/tsq/18/kolonitsky18.shtml>

⁵ Елена Якубовская. Февральская революция 1917 г. в оценке советской и русской зарубежной историографии 1920-30-х гг. Автореферат диссертации. М., 2009. <http://www.dissercat.com/content/fevral'skaya-revolutsiya-1917-g-v-otsenke-sovetskoi-i-russkoi-zarubezhnoi-istoriografii-1920#ixzz4ZEEOxUZ>

⁶ Из письма лидера кадетской партии, бывшего министра первого Временного правительства П. Н. Милукова бывшему члену Совета монархических съездов И. В. Ревенко. Конеч декабря 1917 — начало января 1918 года. – Материалы подготовил Артемий Ермаков, к.и.н. – Православие.ру, 7 нояври 2006 г. <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/625.html>

⁷ Боханов А.Н., Горинов М.М., Дмитренко В.П., и др. История России. XX век. Учебное пособие. М., 1996.

2017), he carefully stuck to the definition “Russian Revolution of 1917”⁸, without “Great”.

The Minister of Culture, Vladimir Medinski, also speaks about overcoming the ‘public schism’, preferring to use the impersonal “1917 events” to “revolution”. Medinski calls for “respect for the memory of the heroes from both camps (“Reds” and “Whites”), who sincerely stood for their ideals and were innocent of the mass repressions and war crimes.”⁹ “‘Innocent’ participants in a civil war” is a literary expression, far from reality.

The concept of the unified Russian History Book of 2013, puts the Great Russian Revolution in the larger period called “Years of Great Turmoil” (1914-1922)¹⁰. This is a replica of Pyotr Stolipin’s famous phrase, “They need great turmoil, and we need Greater Russia” (1907).

Russian Historians on the 1917, 100 Years Later

From contemporary Russian historians and public figures, Andrey Fursov adheres to the concept of “Russian Revolution” as wider than the October Revolution. 1917, according to him, marks the beginning of the “left Jacobin project of modern”, with two ideological stages: “international socialist” of Lenin and Trotsky (1917-1925) and Stalin, of the “Red Empire” (1925-1939)¹¹.

Elena Podomaryova has defined February as a ‘coup’, and October as a ‘evolution’, setting, however, the beginning of the revolution in March, marked by the renunciation of Nicholas II¹².

Yuriy Pivovarov prefers the term ‘Revolution, 1917’, while discerning signs of a “Russian revolution” as early as in the epoch of the 1960s reforms of Alexander II which was completed, according to him, with the collectivization (1930). His definition has a social point of reference and is focused on the rural issue. 1917 has also been explained by Pivovarov from the perspective of rural community as a “communal revolution”, or “a revenge of the community”, connected with the 12-year cycle of reallocation of land plots. There is, indeed, a coincidence between the communal cycles and key political events, both Russian and Soviet: 1905 (the First Russian Revolution), followed by the Revolutions of 1917, and again, 12 years later, the 1929 collectivization.

Yuriy Pivovarov further develops the thesis of Alexander Solzhenitsyn who sees the finale stage of the “great bloody irreversible revolution of world significance” in the destruction of the peasantry (1930-1932). However, Solzhenitsyn presents this “Rossiyska Revolution” as a combination between a “simulation of revolution” (1905), an “improbable February” – since “no resistance was offered on the part of power” – and

a “short, rude, local military coup - October” (1917)¹³.

As a liberal, Pivovarov sympathizes with the Februaryists and the ‘Whites’. In his opinion, the key event is the “February Revolution”; therefore October is a coup. The idealization of the White Movement is characteristic of the epoch of Yeltsin, part of which was Pivovarov: the White fought “for what Russia wants to become today, namely, democratic, lawful, multiparty, liberal”, and 1917 was “a tragic people’s revolution”¹⁴; that is, tragic from a liberal point of view, because the Februaryists were pushed back by the Bolsheviks, and not because the Russian monarchy was destroyed.

Andrey Zubov also uses the term ‘1917 Russka Revolution’ by and large, and his reading is ideologically liberal. Zubov condemns the ‘October 25th coup’ as destructive for “not just historical Russia; what disappeared was human society as such” and introduced was a “terrorist, expansionist regime.”¹⁵

The professional historians carrying out research on the revolutionary movements take up a peculiar stance. The curious thing about their position is that they have maintained the intellectualistic expectation of a revolution breaking up in Russia as something normal, as almost a natural phenomenon, no matter whether they sympathize with the liberal or left-wing revolutionaries. Also characteristic of these researchers is their sense of being neglected and lost interest in since the 90s.

Konstantin Morozov defines the situation where the interest in 1917 “has been artificially restrained for many decades” as a ‘paradox’. According to him, this has come as a result not so much of some ban on the theme, but rather the theme itself has ceased to be popular after 1991, and has become “peripheral”. What have come to the foreground are the problems of Russian liberalism and conservatism which used to be neglected by the Soviet historiography for ideological reasons. Dmitry Rublyov explains “the ideological hegemony of conservatism in Russia and the conservative propaganda in the mass media” with “fear of the revolution as a theme.”¹⁶

The fear of revolution has been fuelled by the expectations thereof. That is Russian fatalism for you.

Bishop Tihon Shevkunov also emphasizes the psychological factor of “mass psychosis” of Russian society on the eve of the Revolution. He observes a “frightening periodicity” of “turbulent times” and recommends “taking serious measures for ensuring hygiene of psychic behavior.”¹⁷

Alexey Gushev is convinced that, in Russia, “the revolutionary potential has not been exhausted to this day”. For him, the revolution is “bourgeois-modernizing” in character, with an open end, its beginning being marked by the “social revolution” of

8 Vladimir Putin. The world of Tomorrow: through Clashes towards Harmony. Sochi, 19th October, 2017, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/55882>

9 Владимир Мединский. Тезисы национального примирения России. 22 май 2015. <http://www.pravmir.ru/vladimir-medinskiy-raznitsa-vo-mneniyah-o-revolutsii-1917-goda-povod-dlya-dialoga-a-ne-konflikta-video-1/>

10 Концепция нового учебно-методического комплекса по отечественно истории. М., 2013, с. 39. – <https://www.kommersant.ru/docs/2013/standart.pdf>

11 Андрей Фурсов. Октябрьская революция выпустила энергию, которая сломала хребет Вермахту и запустила человека в космос. 08 нояври 2014 г. <http://andreyfursov.ru/news/oktjabrska-ja-revoljucija-vypustila-ehnergiju-kotoraja-slomala-khrebet-vermakhtu-i-zapustila-cheloveka-v-kosmos/2014-11-08-375>

12 Елена Пономарева. Помнить уроки прошлого. – Известия, 20 февруари 2017. <http://izvestia.ru/news/664618>

13 Александр Солженицын: Размышления над Февральской революцией. – Полит.ру, 05 март 2007 г. <http://polit.ru/article/2007/03/05/fevral/>

14 Юрий Пивоваров. 10 дней, которые потрясли мир: к юбилею революции 1917 года. – Полит.ру от 02 нояври 2017. <http://polit.ru/article/2017/11/02/revolution5/>

15 Андрей Зубов. Дух Октября. – Новая газета, № 143, 22 декаври 2017 г. <https://www.novaya-agazeta.ru/articles/2017/12/18/74968-duh-oktyabrya>; Пак той. Предмет ужаса. Почему власти в России игнорируют столетие Русской революции. – Новая газета, № 117, 20 октомври 2017 г. <https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/10/20/74268-predmet-uzhasa>

16 Константин Морозов, Дмитрий Рублев. – В: Круглый стол «Концепция “Великой российской революции. 1917-1922”: pro et contra». 10 февруари 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEcbesO5gWk>

17 Епископ Тихон (Шевкунов). Мы подожгли собственный дом. – Изборский клуб. 20 нояври 2017. <https://izborsk-club.ru/14342>

the 1960s-70s of the 19th century¹⁸. Gussev categorically rejects the concept of a “Great Rossiyska Revolution” and believes that it is yet to come.

Vladimir Buldakov, who sees 1917 as yet another “Russian turmoil” – in that particular case a “red turmoil,” – also assumes that “the Russian system is principally revolutionary, which is felt by many scholars. However, it is useless to try and guess when the thunder will strike ... our reality is a perpetual turmoil.”¹⁹ The “turmoil”, defined by Buldakov, is “a very precise description of the Russian lapse from order (‘poryadok’),” which is different from both ‘revolution’ and ‘coup’. ‘Turmoil’ is a cyclical Russian phenomenon, and not a linear European one.

Buldakov rejects the comparative analysis with the French Revolution (1789), which is popular and prevailing in historiography, and prefers the Russian factor in his concept. Therefore, he sees nothing unique in the October Revolution. What is more, he believes that following the revolution “the country continued to live within the framework of the former economic and government structure, and never made a leap into the future.”²⁰ Irrationality was the dominant factor in the ‘red turmoil’.

Alexander Shubin, in contrast, accepts the operation of the rational factor in the scheme of industrialization and modernization, the victory of city over village. He adheres to the concept of a “Great Rossiyska Revolution” (1917-1922) with two stages, respectively February and October ones, the latter being a coup which triggered a revolution: “a new stage of the Rossiyska Revolution, which was bound to initiate the transformation of the whole world.” In Shubin’s opinion, ‘Modernity’ and ‘Soviet’ are synonymous. He considers the epithet ‘Great’ as giving neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ evaluation, but just denoting “depth, scale and international resonance.”²¹

The discussions on the chronology of the Great Rossiyska Revolution are often a consequence of the ideological stances of the authors²². Proposed has also been a chronological scope (1905-1922) from legal perspective, divided in three stages: “first: a constitutional monarchy; second: a republic; third: a Soviet form of national representation, establishment of Soviet statehood”²³).

Boris Kolonitsky prefers the term “Rossiyska Revolution, 1917”, understood as a “specific state of power”, different from the normal one. As a historian of the revolutions, he says he “feels redundant” because of “the taboo on the theme of revolution and the taboo on the word ‘revolution’”. By way of anecdote, Kolonitsky cites Gennady Zyuganov: “Russia has carried out its plan of revolutions,” which is “an equivalent of passing a law on ending the tsunamis in Japan.” Kolonitsky denies the leading role of economic determinism and emphasizes the revolutionary inevitability of the “duality of government,” coupled with the “inertness” of “the officials who were in no hurry to discharge their duties.”

Kolonitsky has examined all “shades of red” in his dissension with the simplistic

18 Алексей Гусев. – В: Круглый стол «Концепция “Великой российской революции. 1917-1922”: pro et contra». 10 февраля 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEcbesO5gWk>

19 Булдаков В. П. Красная смута: Природа и последствия революционного насилия. М., 2010, с. 6.

20 Булдаков В. П. Цит. съч., 15–16. Пак той. – В: Круглый стол «Концепция “Великой российской революции. 1917-1922”: pro et contra». 10 февраля 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEcbesO5gWk>

21 Александр Шубин. – В: Круглый стол «Концепция “Великой российской революции. 1917-1922”: pro et contra». 10 февраля 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEcbesO5gWk>

22 Будник, Г.А. Новые подходы к изучению революции 1917 г. в России. – В: Вестник ИГЭУ / Ивановский государственный энергетический университет.—Иваново, 2008. Вып. 1. 40–44.

23 Михайлова Н.В. История государства и права России (XIX — начало XXI в.). Учебное пособие. М., 2014, с. 90.

thesis of “the insurmountable wall” between “Mensheviks” and “Bolsheviks.” Hence, he brings forth another factor, namely, the “non-party revolutionary attitude” related irrationally to an idealization of the revolutions at the beginning of the 20th century: “People thought, absolutely seriously, that there would be no prisons in Russia any longer; they believed that, in a free state, there are no slaves, no crimes, and thereof was bought for ludicrous amounts of money, even being pre-paid. People were ready to be at rallies all night. There appeared the verb “I’m going rallying”, an unusual interest in politics, hyper-politicization, and unusually high expectations.”

An irrational factor analyzed by Kolonitsky is “terror made sacred” through the names of the newborn babies. “Names are my favourite material. I think that people often lie when they claim they accept the revolution; even when they keep a diary, they sometimes write not for themselves, but for others, for justification. However, people seem not lie that much when giving names to their children. Suppose a person named his daughter Terrora, in the years of the civil war! His daughter! We can imagine what his attitude was, what terrible sacralization of terror was under way as well as a conviction that those institutions of power would last forever. It is well-known, and it is a safe guess what the most popular name was in Russia prior to the Revolutions; it was Nikolay. Following the revolutions there was a sharp decline in its usage; you know what the most popular male name was, in Russia, in the 20s, 30s and 40s, Vladimir. It is interesting what the most popular name will be during the entire period of Vladimir Putin’s government.

Kolonitsky also used the term ‘Balkanization’ of Russia in 1917, and also pointed out that the February Revolution “was, in many respects, an anti-German revolution” with the then popular slogan: “We defeated the inner German, and we will also defeat the outer one”. The “inner German” used to be either the King and the Queen, or only the Queen.”²⁴

Kolonitsky gives priority to the “political culture of revolutionary illegality” and the symbolism of revolution as a “political and cultural factor”. “Symbols are an important tool in the struggle for power, and sometimes an autonomous factor provoking and organizing different types of political conflicts.”²⁵

Conservative Memory for 1917

The conservative interpretation of 1917 also has shades, ranging from nuances of Sovietophilism mixed with anti-Bolshevism on the grounds of anti-Westernism (Nataliya Narochnitskaya), on the one hand, anti-Februaryism and anti-Sovietism with a monarchical romanticism (Leonid Reshetnikov, Victor Aksyuchits), on the other hand, and a third strain having a metaphysical, mystical approach towards history as “a set of meanings, not facts” (Alexander Dugin).

Nataliya Narochnitskaya considers the “1917 revolution” as a combination of two coups, namely, the February and October ones. Narochnitskaya idealizes the “Whites” in the Civil War, coupled with a denial of the liberal Februaryists (the future “Whites”). Her idealization has come as a result of a fundamental rejection of the Bolsheviks as “Reds” coupled with a tolerance towards the Stalin period as a ‘Soviet’ one.

24 Борис Колоницкий. Российская революция 1917 года: взгляд через 95 лет. «РУССКАЯ МЫСЛЬ»: Историко-методологический семинар в РХГА. 23 ноября 2012 г. http://www.rhga.ru/science/conferences/rusm/stenogramms/rus_revolt_1917.php

25 Колоницкий, Б.И. Символы власти и борьба за власть: к изучению политической культуры российской революции 1917 года. СПб, 2012, с. 13.

‘Red’, according to Narochnitskaya, were Lenin, Trotsky, the Internationalists, while ‘Soviet’ and ‘Soviet patriotism’ was Stalinist policy of reviving the Russian national idea before and during the Great Patriotic War.

‘Red’, in Narochnitskaya’s opinion was also “the late Soviet cosmopolitan intellectual and nomenclature elite”, as well as the present day left-wing intellectuals: “Try to attack Trotsky, and even Lenin, in the circles of the left-wing intellectuals, and they will crunch you. But in Stalin they see an incarnation of universal evil of all times and peoples.”

Narochnitskaya’s anti-bolshevism is compatible with moderate Sovietophilia prompted by the second period of Stalin’s national policy from in the mid-1930s. Crucial in her attitude towards Stalin is the fact that he was “absolutely devoid of worship towards Western history.” The Revolution was evil, however, the Soviet Union it created, is “a fact to be taken for granted”: “I define the destruction of the USSR as a ‘crime’ and I want to protect Soviet history from debasement. In our country, for some unknown reason, it has come to be believed that if one calls for respect for Soviet history, he necessarily praises the revolution. The USSR of my generation is not a pure realization of a Bolshevik project; its ideology has changed considerably!”²⁶

The spirit of May 9th is sacred and offers forgiveness for the USSR. “The spirit of May 1945 is Soviet patriotism, the notion of ‘national interests’, a restoration of Russian history, though with perversions, and its incorporation into Soviet doctrine. This, of course, was “Non-Russia,” but it was no longer the “Anti-Russia” conceived by Lenin and Trotsky. However, today we are Russians thanks to the spirit of May 1945.”²⁷

While Nataliya Narochnitskaya links the “Russian” and the “Soviet” elements through May 9th, the writer Daniil Granin is of the opinion that they are related through the Russian classical literature: “the Soviet and Russian, even pre-revolutionary, person had a different approach towards literature. Literature used to be a revelation. Literature used to be a sermon. Today, there is no such an approach.”²⁸

For the ideologist of modern monarchical romanticism, Leonid Reshetnikov ‘Russian’ is neither ‘white’, nor ‘red’, nor ‘Soviet’, but ‘Orthodox’ and ‘monarchical’. Reshetnikov, however, squares ‘Russian’ with ‘Caesarean’. According to him, “the idea of the Russian civilization as a special mission from above, based on serving God” does not contradict capitalism: “It is wrong to claim that capitalism, as such, is worthless. It should be found out what part of it can be used to the benefit of our country.”²⁹

Leonid Reshetnikov idealizes the role of the monarch, and recommended – at the event of Putin’s presidential victory (2018) – “that Putin should devote himself to the preparation of a mechanism for transition of the state into a monarchic form, to the point, perhaps, of [Putin] himself becoming a custodian of the throne”.³⁰

The mythologization, after the Soviet period, of the function of the ‘monarch’ put in the place of the ‘chieftain’ or the ‘president’ is a romantic ideology of monarchy, isolated anchoretically from the realities of modern Russia.

The “1917 catastrophe” seen as a “spiritual schism: intellectuals against the power, intellectuals against the people, intellectuals against the Orthodoxy,” is discussed by the conservative philosopher and monarchist, Viktor Aksyuchits, who proposes the term ‘ideomania’ (ideological mania). The Revolution as a “spiritual illness” of the Empire – “Peter’s Revolution”³¹ – is an upgraded version of the Slavophile understanding of the Europeanization of Russia.

The National-Bolshevik writer, Zahar Prilepin, sees no contradiction between ‘Russian’ and ‘Bolshevik’, and his attitude towards the ‘Whites’ follows ideologically the canons of the Soviet propaganda: “The Bolsheviks did not start the Civil War, nor did they need it [...] the war was launched by the Whites.”³² Prilepin forgets the Leninist slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil one, as well as Trotsky, for whom the Soviet government was “an organized civil war against the landlords, the bourgeoisie and the kulaks.” Zahar Prilepin thinks that “the liberal-bourgeois coup of 1991 was directed against the Soviet idols, and, first and foremost, against Lenin.”³³

The National-Bolshevik ideologist and writer, Edward Limonov, also makes no a distinction between ‘Russian’ and ‘Bolshevik’. According to him, ‘Russian’ also means ‘anti-bourgeois’, hence the “October Russian Revolution” was an antipode, and not a continuation, of the French Revolution (1789) which was a symbol of the victorious bourgeoisie (the third class).

A metaphysical, mystical-conservative approach towards 1917 is suggested by Alexander Dugin who offers a fourth interpretation of the revolutions based on a denial of three of them (the liberal, the Marxist and the nationalist ones, ‘nationalist’ being a simplification of ‘conservative’). Dugin considers the external factor to have been exaggerated in the cases of February and October events, but he himself hyperbolizes the domestic one claiming personal responsibility of the Russian people: “The October Revolution must be appreciated and understood on the basis of the logic of Russian history. This is an event for which all of us, me and you are responsible.”

Convinced that the revolutions were the work of the Russian people, Dugin fails to answer his own question of why they happened in the first place, and puts forward apocalyptic doubts: “Some secret of our national existence is hidden in the October events. And it is rather related to the mystery of lawlessness, to the mystery of the Antichrist.”³⁴ This is conservative mysticism.

In terms of the liberal mysticism of the writer Dmitry Bikov, a revolution is a “gambling of social creativity”, the work of the masses dedicated to a Leninist mystery: “a high flight of social creation of the masses. Lenin was the first to point to the masses the possibilities for such creativity.” “The revolution was not Bolshevik, it was

26 Наталья Нарочницкая. Чем грозит России демонизация советского государства? – Аргументы и факты. № 45, 08 ноября 2017 г. http://www.aif.ru/society/history/nataliya_narochnickaya_chem_grozit_rossii_demonizaciya_sovetskogo_gosudarstva

27 Наталья Нарочницкая. Сегодня самое губительное - оставаться на одной из сторон в споре о революции – Столетие, 7 ноября 2017 г. http://www.stoletie.ru/obschestvo/natalija_narochnickaja_segodna_samoje_gubitelnoje-ostavatsja_na_odnoj_iz_storon_v_spore_o_revolyucii_824.htm

28 Даниил Гранин. Октябрьская революция была великой. – Беларусь сегодня, 9 ноября 2013 г. <https://www.sb.by/articles/daniil-granin-oktyabrskaya-revoljutsiya-byla-velikoy.html>

29 Леонид Решетников. Между советским и русским человеком – пропасть безбожия. – РИСИ, 13.12.2016. <https://riss.ru/smi/37218/>

30 Леонид Решетников. Надо освободить историю от пластов лжи. – Двуглавый орел, 11.10.2017. <https://rusorel.info/leonid-reshetnikov-nado-osvobodit-istoriyu-ot-plastov-lzhi/>

31 Виктор Аксютин. – В: Дискуссионный клуб. УРОКИ ФЕВРАЛЯ. Интернет-конференция к 100-летию революции. Ч.1. 28 февраля 2017. – В: Переключки. Электронный журнал русского общевосточного союза. Опубликовано в журнале “Голос Эпохи”, выпуск 1, 2017 г. <https://perekluchka.livejournal.com/978492.html>

32 Захар Прилепин. 12 пунктов про Революцию и Гражданскую войну. – Свободная пресса, 07 ноября 2017. <https://svpressa.ru/society/article/185466/?aft=1>

33 Захар Прилепин. Контрреволюция 1917-го, контрреволюция 2014-го. – Свободная пресса, 30 октября 2017. <https://svpressa.ru/politic/article/184841/>

34 Александр Дугин. – В: Революция и Россия. Блог Изборского клуба. – Завтра, 1 ноября 2017 http://zavtra.ru/blogs/revolyuciya_i_rossiya

nationwide.” ‘Soviet’ in Bikov’s opinion is a synonym of ‘Leninist’, but not in the least bit of ‘Stalinist’: “In my internal calendar, I measure the period of Soviet power until 1929. What happened next was an ordinary attempt to restore the monarchy”.³⁵

Conclusion

The rumors about ending the Civil War on the ideological front are greatly exaggerated

Why do we speak of a Civil war 100 years later? Because ideological thinking is militaristic; ideology is alive while it is warring, until there is an enemy.

On the one hand, Edward Limonov is quite right to warn of “the dangerous co-existence of two ideologies: the ideology of Revolution still having a huge influence in Russia, and the ideology of those who were defeated by the Revolution of 1917.”³⁶

On the other hand, in 1917, Russia demonstrated historically that it was, surprisingly, able to shorten the distance between the epochs in no time – within a year.

February 1917 was the final of the 19th-century-style Russian liberal revolution. The ‘February’ beginning could be dated back to the Decembrists (1825), or the First Russian Revolution (1905) which imposed the constitutional monarchy.

October 1917 was the beginning of the 20th-century-style Russian Soviet revolution. The Soviet period officially ended in 1991, but actually started on May 9, 1945.

Paradoxical as it might sound, it is the acme, the peak of the Soviet that marked the beginning of the decline with the gradual desacralization of power. May 9, however, has remained in the mythical time of the Soviet Victory, which has outlived the Soviet state because it resulted from the revival of the Russian idea.

Why is the war going on? It is because it is spiritual. The ‘Reds’ keep the memory of the phantom Soviet superman. Soviet anthropocentrism has been described nostalgically by Alexander Zinoviev: “Despite all the shortcomings of the Communist system in Russia, communism opened up the opportunity for a great number of people to become gods. [...] I want to emphasize: in Soviet times people could become gods.”³⁷

Why is reconciliation still impossible? Because the parties do not see the ‘enemy’ within themselves, but outside of them. An honest example of ideological blindness offers a spontaneous observation of Darya Mitina, an internationalist, a communist in spirit possessing conceptual directness, and not an opposition figurant such as a CPRF member. Darya Alexandrovna has shared, with jubilant joy on her face book page, information about her meeting with sympathizers of her, a father with his daughter whom she consecrates with a red pioneer tie on occasion of November 7, 2017: “And then the child, with the pioneer tie just knotted, was proud to go with his father to the subway, and roar, to the terror of the passengers: “Rabochim – vintovki, burzhuyam veryovki!!!”

Here growing is one of our people;)”³⁸. The symbolic initiation ended with a no less symbolic song.

And what is the difference between “Rabochim – vintovki, burzhuyam veryovki!” and “Moskalyaku na gilyaku!”³⁹? There is no such. In the first case the rope was meant for the class enemy, and in the second one the gallows were meant for the national enemy. Darya Mitina is delighted by the sight of the little girl humming the Bolshevik song from the Civil War period. But if she hears the “Zapadnetsi’s”⁴⁰ oath revived on the last maidan, she will be horrified, and rightly so, because it is fascist and Russophobic. Imagine, however, a West-Ukrainian mother looking lovingly at her child who is singing “Moskalyaku na gilyaku” overheard from the elders. There is no difference, because it is a case of ideology, and it is maintained by hostility, no matter what the underlying principle, whether it be national, class, racial, confessional, etc. Enmity towards another human being turns even faith immediately into ideological passion.

From historical point of view, the controversy between all shades of ‘white’ and ‘red’ 100 years later is archaic and even meaningless. The October Revolution is as hopelessly outdated in the twenty-first century, as was the February one in the twentieth century.

The next revolution overhanging humanity as a globalist project (the Bolshevik Internationalism was the first planetary attempt at globalization), is the techno-genic revolution with its trans-humanist ideology. It is a futuristic progressive project relying on a technological leap of the bio-, nano- and cyber- technologies to realize the dream of the alchemists, namely, an artificial intelligence in an artificial man with controlled capabilities according to the guarantor’s profile – an immortal oligarch from a ‘shadow government’.

The ideological cross-section of the Russian disputes over 1917 is simply a manifestation of the ‘civil war’ of the anthropocentric ‘superman’ against the Christ-centered man. Peace is a matter of personal choice.

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RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF BULGARIAN EDUCATION: A TOOL FOR INTEGRATION IN SOCIAL REALITY AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE

Abstract

In this paper I look at the relationship between religion and education. For centuries, historians and social scientists have written and researched the relationship and influence between them. As a universal phenomenon in people's lives, religion can penetrate all the structures of society through the educational process. It is the most effective way in a society to develop the philosophy of education as religion builds not only the person but also the whole society with its values. For this reason, there is a mutual connection between religion, education and culture. Referring to this connection, as a part of the educational system in our country, the study of religion would lead to higher educational achievements, the building of religious culture and Christian literacy.

Key words: Religion, Education, Schools, Culture, Christianity, Educational systems

Religion and education, two of humanity's most ancient endeavors, have long been closely linked. Undoubtedly, modern access to school depends on the educational structure of the country. In many cases, at the heart of modern education, we can look for methods originally promoted by religious leaders and organizations to foster teaching, which would help us to analyze contemporary models in the education system.

From ancient times in Europe, Christian monasteries have become the seat of education and enlightenment. According to some theories, the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century has become a driving force in public education in Europe (Durkham 1998). Promoting Bible literacy as a major instrument of religious instruction has become a prerequisite for the emergence of many schools. However, history knows few instances of clashes between religion and science when prominent religious leaders were rebuked. The historical view of such events unfolds the evolution of religion in Europe, allowing us to understand the complex relationships of people with spirituality, religion, institutions and educational policies. Thus, from the modern age to the present, the religious formation of civil society is one of the keys that allow us to trace the place of religion in society and in teaching and at school. Religion has always been a powerful tool for socialization, influencing people's education and values. Today, it has become an integral part of the political debate, influencing the creation of different educational concepts.

Moreover, the topic of religious education is extremely important from the point of view of the social reality in which we find ourselves filled with intolerance and violence. The school needs to act as a socializing agent to promote education focused on social behavior, ownership, respect for ideals and the application of democratic norms. As a

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result of globalization and migration, Europe has become a multicultural community uniting different cultural ethnicities. Of utmost importance is the influence of the subject of “religion” in the moral upbringing of adolescents. In this sense, studying it would contribute to solving some social problems and at the same time contribute to moral education as a tool for acquiring the moral values needed to bring different ethnicities together as a result of multiculturalism.

To begin with, we must consider religion, in the context of its participation in the framework of law, and a number of international norms and treaties, ranging from the international level to the national. There are international agreements in the international arena that countries are committed to implementing and complying with. One is the one adopted in 1948 - the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948: 3,4), in which Art. 18 affirms that “every person has the right to a combination of thought, conscience and religion; the right to change one’s religion or belief, as well as the freedom to profess one’s religion or belief. “Also in Art. 26 clarifies that “education should promote understanding, tolerance and friendship between all peoples, racial or religious groups.” “Her personal function is: mental and personal integration of activity, attaining and maintaining mental equilibrium and supreme degree of security and meaningfulness of life” (Slanovikov 2000: 230). The Declaration removes all forms of intolerance and discrimination on a religious basis, classifying them as a crime. Another treaty is the “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (UN 1966), which states that States Parties commit themselves to providing and providing children and students with religious or religious education consistent with their own beliefs. Another pact is the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1976), which recognizes civil and political rights and establishes mechanisms for their protection. In his view, all States parties must respect and “guarantee the religious and moral education of children” (ICCPR 1678: 18). The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR 2010: 11) stresses the right to liberty: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right presupposes the freedom to change their religion or beliefs, as well as the freedom to express their religion or their individual beliefs, or collectively, publicly or privately, through worship, teaching, practices and observance of rituals. “As Hegel defines religion (Lectures on Philosophy of Religion 2010: 716) “it is essential and cannot be alien”, claiming that being is “seeded in religion”, thus “limiting life to infinity” . Signed in Lisbon in December 2007 by all Member States of the European Union, the Treaty establishing the European Community reaffirms the principles of “against any form of discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion”. In the field of education, they are respected in accordance with national laws governing their exercise, the freedom to establish training centers within the framework of democratic principles.

In the last twenty years, many policies have been implemented in our country in an attempt to introduce religion as a subject in the educational process. Even though religious education was introduced in some schools, it was also partially introduced. With the first steps that have been made, considerable experience has been gained. Based on the practices so far and adapting to the current education system, appropriate strategies should be devised for integrating religion into the general education curriculum in our country. The obvious urgency of the issue shows that the work of the various institutions and ministries must be synchronized. As there is a value deficit in Bulgarian society, the introduction of this subject would lead not only to an increase in religious literacy among adolescents, but also to a building of a value system and an emotional one in them. Lack of dialogue and sufficient information are becoming a hindrance and the adoption

of religious education is an isolation. On the one hand, this is because in the society this idea is still accepted with distrust and on the other - there are still no educated and qualified pedagogues and a precise methodology by which the subject can be adapted and adapted to other subjects of the educational content. That is why cooperation between the different institutions would create a precondition for highlighting the problem, creating models for cooperation and a clear concept for conducting religious education.

According to a 2016 study by the US independent agency Pew Research Center on “Religion and Education in the World: There are still major differences in educational attainment, but all beliefs have advantages - especially among women,” Christians are one of the most - highly educated religious groups. This should be an incentive and a basis for our further development, especially for our generations. Given the highly evolving global world we live in and the dynamics with which science and the world evolve, the open borders between countries and the various mechanisms for cooperation between them, there are many good practices that we can borrow from to address this problem. In itself, the integration of religion in mainstream schools in Bulgaria is a complex process related to the creation of a conceptual framework and mechanisms for its implementation. There are such systems created and working successfully in Romania, Serbia, America, England and others. As early as 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized the key role of religion in education and in building a democratic society. This encourages and aims to promote education in the Union.

Adaptation of religion into the curriculum will help to form a sense of belonging to the society itself and make it easy to become aware of the personality of each adolescent. Religious awareness can help children learn to appreciate the worldview and values of other cultures. Regardless of all the policies at this level at European level, it is also very important to pay attention to national and local ones. In our country, the idea of this type of education would be fully realized if there is good motivation on the part of the institutions and a high rating of public confidence.

From all of the above, I would conclude that the introduction of religion as a subject in secular schools would contribute to the creation of religious literacy among adolescents on the one hand and to the establishment of a stable value system and emotional intelligence in society. And in order for such education to be recognized by society, then its study must become compulsory. Thus, knowledge of Christianity would create in the students an adequate picture of the world, of our country’s national identity, and would become a prerequisite for building belonging and self-awareness in the global world in which we live.

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A RISE OF RELIGION AT THE BLACK SEA?²

Abstract

The geopolitical and security context of the investigation developed in this paper is one of turbulence: the Ukrainian crisis, concerning the annexation of Crimea, the Russian military aggression in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Donbas etc. The projects of cooperation and these related to the construction of two highways within the Black Sea region are commendable, but they are weaker positive signals, considering the frequent proofs of Salafism in Turkey. The highway metaphor is approached in a stark contrast to the ideological metaphor of trueness (starting from the official reference to the “true Turks”). As a conclusion, considering the rise of the religion in Turkey in the light of the theories of the “concentric circles” in international relations, an international diplomatic and security effort in structuring a more advanced global cooperation and security model including NATO, UE, Russia, China and South Korea, brought together to support a commonly sanctioned security paradigm is vital for the future of mankind.

Keywords: highway metaphor; “True Turks”; Salafism; Black Sea region; Wider Black Sea region.

Introduction

In the volume Prospective studies of the Wider Black Sea Region. Scenarios for its future in times of high international turbulence³ we notice a valuable observation, made from the very beginning, concerning the fact that it is extremely challenging to maintain a scientific focus on methodology in times characterized by turbulence – the Ukrainian crisis, concerning the annexation of Crimea, the Russian military aggression in the Eastern regions of Donetsk and Donbas etc.

The researchers capture and capitalize upon several vulnerabilities in the region as well as in the extended Black Sea Region, “developed in midterm (3-5 years) scenarios with black swan” developments. Because all are extremely interesting, as following, we are listing all the scenarios identified: “The collapse of the idea of solidarity and a divide inside the once relatively cohesive European Union. A divisive two/ three tracks EU with geographical divides East-West, Old-New Europe, transatlantic vs. euro-centric EU; A hard and harsh Brexit, harming British economy leading to a major reduction of its involvement in the Wider Black Sea Area Security and Defense; The emergence of power politics, polarization and a split, with countries associating themselves either with

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² Paper presented at the International Conference “Geopolitics in the Black Sea Region – new trends and challenges”, October 30, 2018, Sofia.

³ Iulian Chifu, Narciz Bălășoiu, Prospective studies of the Wider Black Sea Region. Scenarios for its future in times of high international turbulence, (Bucharest: Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale “Ion I. C. Brătianu” al Academiei Române, 2018).

France, or with Germany, and a perpetual fight inside the EU, or even a real unbalanced rivalry between France and Germany on the continent, in the long run (polarization - midterm, rivalry, conflict, war-long term); China is beginning to act as a rival/competitor of the US on strategic projects in the Wider Black Sea Region at a strategic investment level; EU-US rivalry in economic, strategic and military approaches, which would lead to less EU cohesion or to a hard divisions inside the EU; Turkey exiting NATO, in continuous confrontation with the EU. Closer ties with Russia or condominium; A weak Turkey, in turmoil. A Turkey that could become subject of Russia's involvements in its internal affairs; A Bulgarian-Turkish open conflict, with a large scale military intervention."⁴

Teodor Meleşcanu indicates the worsening security situation in the Donbass, the violence accompanying the crisis and the slim chances for a political resolution of the conflict (despite the Minsk process), the instability and volatility associated to protracted conflicts in Transnistria, the Republic of Moldova, with a strengthened Russian military presence), in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia, areas with Russian military bases, and in Nagorno-Karabakh, all of these seen in connection with "a larger military build-up in the Black Sea, including the modernization and enlargement of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and furthermore a platform for projecting its military force and activities, including in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria", effecting the "military balance in the region and beyond"⁵.

The analysis conducted by Teodor Meleşcanu emphasizes other emerging threats connected to Russian unconventional propaganda and information, soft security, war: "The array of instruments used by revisionist forces to change the established status quo or alter free choices of leaders and societies in the region is a large one, including pressures of economic and political nature, putting into question cultural and identity elements of national states, cyber-attacks, use of propaganda and fake news to influence and distort the public perceptions. The use of hybrid operations covers various levels of involvement and achieving new strategic goals. Propaganda warfare has reached record magnitude, both externally and internally, and continues to be extensively used, with a view to distorting reality, creating confusion and divisions. Hybrid warfare tactics also almost automatically result in an increase of divisive movements inside sovereign states. Mass media and especially social media, NGOs, persons belonging to different groups of minorities are used as vectors of disinformation inside national societies."⁶

There is a significant change in the political, security, balance of powers and cooperation geo-profile at the Black Sea, as well as in the Wider Black Sea region: "The overall picture around the Black Sea is thus one of amplified and diversified security concerns. Aggression and hybrid tactics, the situation in the Caucasus and developments in the Levant create a dynamic that leads to increased transnational threats in the form of criminality, trafficking in persons, smuggling in drugs and even potential terrorist risks. Protracted conflicts generate 'grey zones' that undermine regional security and economic development. Thus, when speaking about security challenges in the Black Sea today we cannot pin-point one single menace that is threatening regional security. Overall, the regional narrative is nowadays much more about security and military capabilities in the area, than it used to be 10 years ago, when the focus was still on cooperation and economic opportunities."⁷

⁴ Ibidem, p. 9.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 13.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 14.

Understanding regional relations as a system of "concentric circles", without discarding multinational or bilateral geopolitical formats in the Wider Black Sea region, we see in a renewed perspective the reasons why "The strategic value of the Black Sea has been a mantra in Romania's public discourse for the last almost three decades, highlighting the region as a crossroads between Europe and Central Asia, leading to Middle East and, via the Turkish Straits, to the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. Notwithstanding the fact that most seas are crossroads in their own regions, the Black Sea is a special juncture of several big powers traditionally disputing supremacy and competing narratives of national development, inter-state relations and overall world order."⁸

Two highways at the Black Sea

At the same time, despite turbulence we can see that new plans of multinational cooperation at the Black Sea persist. The very idea of this paper was triggered by the news concerning the projected highways in the Black Sea region in correlation with the studies and news regarding the deteriorating situation in Turkey. Thus, on the one hand, we know that the Black Sea countries complete preparations for implementation of Black Sea Ring project. „Russia has officially started implementation of a project, known as the Black Sea Ring Road, which involves building a four-lane highway system connecting the countries surrounding the Black Sea. The Black Sea Ring Road is a substantial project, a highway measuring some 7,140km in all. Among the [8] countries participating in the project are Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Greece and Bulgaria. At the same time Armenia, Azerbaijan, Albania and Serbia will also be connected to the road through additional routes. The project does not have a single budget, as each country will pay for its own section using its own sources."⁹

This project is interesting not only for the nations involved, but also for the EU which supports it, through the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), while the World Bank (WB) has announced a contribution , too.

As the highway is going to pass through Istanbul and Edirne in Turkey; Batumi and Poti in Georgia; Novorossiysk, Rostov-on-Don and Taganrog in Russia; Mariupol, Melitopol and Odessa in Ukraine; Chisinau in Moldova; Bucharest in Romania; Haskovo in Bulgaria; Komotini and Alexandroupolis in Greece it is going to contribute to the prosperity and further development of these cities. Maybe not all the countries are going to succeed to commission officially the highway in 2019-2020, but the project seems feasible and very profitable. "The initiative for the building of the Black Sea Ring Road dates back to the 2006 meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). This organisation focuses on multilateral political and economic initiatives in the Black Sea region. A year later in 2007, an agreement for the implementation of the project was signed in Belgrade by official representatives of 12 BSEC states. The project was finally approved in 2011 during the meeting of the members of the BSEC in Istanbul."¹⁰

Another highway project was proposed at the 3 seas summit: „The Three Seas

⁸ Ibidem, p. 22.

⁹ Eugene Gerden, "The Black Sea Ring Road project will improve transport connections for the region", available at <http://www.worldhighways.com/sections/emergent/features/black-sea-countries-complete-preparations-for-implementation-of-black-sea-ring-project/>, accessed Aug. 26, 2018.

¹⁰ Eugene Gerden, "The Black Sea Ring Road project will improve transport connections for the region", available at <http://www.worldhighways.com/sections/emergent/features/black-sea-countries-complete-preparations-for-implementation-of-black-sea-ring-project/>, accessed Sept. 11, 2018.

Initiative is a flexible political platform, at Presidential level, launched in 2015. The Initiative includes the 12 EU Member States located between the Adriatic, the Baltic and the Black Seas: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Dubrovnik Summit in 2016 opened the dialogue under the aegis of the Three Seas Initiative, followed in 2017 by the Warsaw Summit, where the 12 Three Seas Initiative states were joined by the US President, Donald Trump. The third Summit was hosted by Romania, in Bucharest, on 17-18 September 2018. North-South highway 'Via Carpathia,' connecting Klaipėda in Lithuania with Thessaloniki in Greece".¹¹

We find that such preoccupations are symbolic for the imperatives of economic cooperation and togetherness in the Black sea Region, but are these imperatives fading?

A philosophical glance over the highway metaphor

Approaching the highway metaphor we can emphasize interesting meanings, within a political symbolism order, which leads us to a specific concern. A highway is not only a transportation route, a sign on a map, a symbol of separation or unity, but also an avenue for the more general circulation of ideas, for instance. In general, road as a metaphor is not only a powerful means of expression, but also it captures something essential about human existence, in general, and contemporary human existence, in particular. The idea of road is not even perceived as a metaphor when it sends to meanings such as "entry," "escape," "means to an end" or "progress". Leaders take the "highroads of promise" and often "take the wrong turn," or "fall asleep behind the (national or international driving) wheel". We are living in times of "ecstasy of communication". For the purposes of this paper, the "ecstasy of communication" is mainly the expression of connectedness, which is characteristic for our times.

But how relevant is connectedness in contrast with the present day fragmentation of views and opinions, as symptoms of the fights for cultural hegemony enforced by globalization? How relevant is connectedness considering the frequency of the infringements on human rights and the frequency of terrorist strikes?

These are extremely turbulent times. From this perspective, with lucidity, maybe we should ask ourselves: What is going to travel on these highways: cooperation projects, prosperity, more democracy, or metaphors of enemies, metaphors of scapegoats, metaphors and ideologies of salvation fundamentalism, Salafism, terrorism and short-sighted aims?

According to Joas Wagemakers, who is proposing the entry dedicated to "Salafism" in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion, we find that 1. "Salafism is a branch of Sunni Islam whose modern-day adherents claim to emulate the 'pious predecessors' (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ; often equated with the first three generations of Muslims) as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible."; 2. "Different scholars of Islam throughout time have striven to emulate the early Muslim generations in the legal sphere, in theological matters, or in both. The ideas espoused by these scholars have more or less culminated in the Wahhabi movement that started on the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century, which in turn helped spread a Salafi message to the rest of the Arab and Muslim worlds and even beyond. As such, the trend now referred to as Salafism came about, expressing itself ideologically in teachings that are meant to present the trend as exclusively and meticulously adhering to the example of the salaf, while rejecting all other sources

¹¹ <http://three-seas.eu/about/>, accessed Oct. 2, 2018.

of influence."; 3. "Practically, Salafism can be divided into three branches: quietist Salafism, whose adherents shun political activism and concentrate on "cleansing" and teaching Islam in all its 'purity'; political Salafism, which does concentrate on political commitment as an integral part of Islam through contentious debates, parliamentary participation, and founding political parties; and Jihadi-Salafism, whose followers seek to overthrow supposedly apostate regimes in the Muslim world through violent jihad."; and 4. "Although the term 'Salafism' is heavily contested among Salafis – with adherents of one branch often not allowing the application of the label to be applied to the other branches—its various ideas and manifestations show that Salafism is quite a diverse phenomenon."¹²

Given the situation in Turkey, the concerns related to Salafism, authoritarianism, and the anti-human rights orientation of the Turkish politics are to be taken into consideration. One cannot place all the negative information concerning the current domestic affairs in Turkey only on the fake news phenomena, on a deteriorated relation between Turkey, Western Europe and the USA. We cannot realistically think that the domestic situation is of no consequence in terms of security in the Black Sea region as well as in the Wider Black Sea region.

Lately, the long-secular Turkey, represents more and more a historical reality anchored in the past. In Turkey, sharia (often associated with corporal punishment, such as beheadings carried out by Islamist extremists) is gradually taking over.¹³ Such events are undemocratic and dangerous for the security climate in the region. According to the model of the "concentric circles" we may see the consequences of the rise of religion in Turkey even amplified in the wider Black Sea region, not only "exported."

Many rather serious news agencies, such as Reuters, are announcing that "Turkey's president wants to create a "pious generation" and to reshape Turkey via Islamic schooling."¹⁴

The analysts are emphasizing that "This is a process which started with the abolition of the secular values, replaced by Islam values, by the cancellation of the freedom of debates over values and the aims of modernization and eventually with the imposition of religious thought in all the sectors of the public life, replacing the freedom of thought expression and speech entirely."¹⁵ Although it started gradually, other analysts fear that "Turkey is turning into another Pakistan".¹⁶ Other prospective analytic perspectives indicate that U.S.-Turkey Tensions might have as a consequence the total blockage of the common fight against ISIS¹⁷. And this is the official view, not some scattered rumours. As a consequence, as well as an official point of view, now there are concerns raised about Turkey's reliability as a battlefield partner and as a partner in the commitment to its border enforcement and efforts to root out Islamic extremists.¹⁸

¹² Joas Wagemakers, "Salafism", Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion, Online Publication Date: Aug 2016, , accessed Sept. 14, 2018. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.255

¹³ Cf. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/.../2018/.../in-long-secular-t-...> - Feb. 2018, accessed Sept. 14, 2018.

¹⁴ See <https://www.reuters.com/.../special.../turkey-erdogan-educati...> 25 Jan. 2018, accessed Sept. 14, 2018.

¹⁵ When It Comes to Debate Over Turkey and Islam, the Left Is Dazed ... <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/.../when-it-comes-to-debate...> 24 iun. 2013, accessed September 14, 2018.

¹⁶ Turkey is turning into another Pakistan - New York Post, <https://nypost.com/2018/.../turkey-is-turning-into-another-pa>, 3 March 2018, accessed September 14, 2018: "There isn't much that Turkey's president can do these days to further debase his reputation in the West."

¹⁷ <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-trump-syria.html>, accessed Aug.-Sep. 2018.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

As early as 2016, observers, journalists and researchers underlined that Turkey is performing a “dangerous dance with radicalism” and, in fact, this was the ardent news title published in *Politico*¹⁹ at January 13, 2016.

Micheal Jansen, analyst and journalist, noticed that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is encouraged by his re-election and determined to exercise an Ottoman kind of military and Salafi Turkish fundamentalist Islamic influence in the Middle East, inducing instability in the area.²⁰

This Salafi-like Turkish fundamentalist Islamic influence in the Middle East is all the more dangerous coming from the country that had had a leading status in the Middle East as the most westernized, democratic, modern and secular country of the region.²¹

The religious authority in Turkey becomes a mouthpiece for outrageous fundamentalist statements²², while the political authority itself becomes Islamic and fundamentalist, with several dire consequences the increase in urban poverty and Islamic fundamentalism along with an increase in grassroots activism.²³

Other worrisome consequences include the rise of xenophobic social media exposure of an “eliminationist anti-Christian mentality,” (Daniel Goldhagen) as well as of “Crypto-Armenians, Greeks, and Jews”, who are all said to be “masquerading as true Turks”.²⁴ Demographical data show that the Christians form a minority of about 0.2 percent. The source of this ideological scapegoating of those who fail to mimic the only accepted Turkish identity, namely that of the “true Turk,” is President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Reconciliation Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) promoting this ideology (based on the identification of socio-political and, first and foremost, religious scapegoats). This sort of ideology setting in motion the idea of trueness in terms of religion and ethnicity is not only an example for fear management and a threat to democracy in Turkey, but worse, it is only one step away from the Nazi political and ideological line based on the idea of purity and superiority. The rise of religion, namely fundamentalism and Salafism, in Turkey, precisely because the country used to be a beacon of democracy, stability and prosperity in the Middle East, implies that this country is going to have even more authority as a beacon of fundamentalism,

19 [https://www.politico.eu/.../turkeys-dangerous-dance-with-rad...13 jan. 2016](https://www.politico.eu/.../turkeys-dangerous-dance-with-rad...) - Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's flirtation with radical Islam in Syria and march from liberal ... Erdogan is playing with fire in his support for Islamic extremists, and history provides many 2018 POLITICO SPRL

20 <https://www.irishtimes.com/.../erdogan-re-election-threatens-...> Thu, Jun 28, 2018, 06:00 Updated: Thu, Jun 28, 2018, 15:44, by Micheal Jansen, accessed Aug 29, 2018. “ Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is determined to reclaim former Ottoman ... through military means and export of the Salafi fundamentalist brand of Islam.”

21 How Strict is Islam in Turkey? Some Travel Tips - World Nomads, in <https://www.worldnomads.com>, accessed Oct. 17, 2018. The article shows: “Turkey is the most Westernized Muslim country in the Middle East, and it has long been known for its secular government. Religious extremists are more likely to have issues with their own government than ...”

22 Turkey's religious authority surrenders to political Islam, <https://www.economist.com/.../2018/.../turkeys-religious-aut...>, accessed Oct. 17, 2018. On the 8th of Jan. 2018, the news present the information that Turkey's directorate of religious affairs, known as the Diyanet, has a knack for odd and outrageous pronouncements.

23 The rise of political Islam in Turkey: urban poverty, grassroots activism, <https://www.researchgate.net/.../276364207> The rise of pol, accessed Sep. 17, 2018. On May 1, 2015, Sertaç Sehlükoglu and others published The rise of political Islam in Turkey: urban poverty, grassroots activism and Islamic fundamentalism.

24 Fehim Taştekin, “Turkish genealogy database fascinates, frightens Turks,” *al-Monitor* (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 2018 apud Anne-Christine Hoff, “Turkey Turns On Its Christians”, *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2018, Volume 25, Number 3, June 01, 2018, <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/turkey-turns-on-its-christians>, accessed at 16th August 2018.

becoming a regional threat. We should also point out as well the ideological disguise of the xenophobic orientation of the ruling political force, AKP, behind the symbolic promises of “justice” and “reconciliation”, becoming smoke screens for their opposites, and becoming also standards of injustice and discord, as well as an alibi for any future “eliminationist” actions aiming to restore the “trueness” of Turkey by elimination all the “untrue elements”.

Historically, we may argue that the politics led by Erdoğan and the AKP is merely the continuation of the ideological positions and deeds that remained built into the Ottoman mass deportations and massacres (see, especially, the Armenian genocide, the expulsion of the Greeks – more than a million – by the end of World War I²⁵ or the infamous Christian persecutions, in general).²⁶

The researchers notice that the rise of the Islamist Turkish national ethos was heralded as early as December 1998, “when Erdoğan, then mayor of Istanbul and an opposition politician, announced that the ‘mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers,’ quoting a line from a poem by the nineteenth-century nationalist poet Ziya Gökalp underscoring the Islamist foundation of Turkish identity. And while this recitation landed Erdoğan in prison for inciting religion-based hatred, once at the helm, he steadily realized this vision, systematically undoing Atatürk's secularist legacy and Islamizing Turkey's public space through such means as the government-operated Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet), which pays the salaries of the country's 110,000 imams and controls the content of their Friday sermons.”²⁷ And all culminated with the July 15, 2016 abortive coup when the faithful were instigated to revolt and this revolt as mainly Christophobic²⁸.

Symbolical and worrisome for any discussion of the rise of religion in the Black Sea region, at the times of the 2016 coup d'état, in the Black Sea city of Trabzon, the “true Turks” attacked Santa Maria Catholic church, but fortunately, at that time, the Turks in the neighbourhood decided to dissipate the rioters after they witnessed the broken Church windows.²⁹ Faced with such actions and noticing the sense of the development of events Istanbul pastor Yüce Kabakçı said: The reality is that Turkey is neither a democracy nor a secular republic. There is no division between government affairs and religious affairs. There's no doubt that the government uses the mosques to get its message across to its grassroots supporters. There is an atmosphere in Turkey right now that anyone who isn't Sunni is a threat to the stability of the nation. Even the educated classes here don't associate personally with Jews or Christians. It's more than suspicion. It's a case of let's get rid of anyone who isn't Sunni.³⁰ This quotation represents an argument for the concern with the development of xenophobia and fundamentalism in Turkey into a variety of religious Nazi ideology.

Phenomena associated to fundamentalism bring along more concrete expressions

25 Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (Oxford: Berghan, 2003), p. 6; John Eibner, “Turkey's Christians under Siege,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2011, pp. 41-52; Daniel Pipes, “Dhimmi No More: Christians' Trauma in the Middle East,” danielpipes.org, Jan. 2018, accessed Aug. 15, 2018.

26 Ibidem.

27 Anne-Christine Hoff, “Turkey Turns On Its Christians,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2018, Volume 25, Number 3, June 01, 2018, <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/turkey-turns-on-its-christians>, accessed at August 10, 2018 and October 2, 2018.

28 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “The Global War on Christians in the Muslim World,” *Newsweek*, Feb. 6, 2012.

29 *The Express* (London), Apr. 22, 2016.

30 Ibidem, Aug. 1, 2016.9 apud Anne-Christine Hoff, “Turkey Turns On Its Christians”, *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2018, Volume 25, Number 3, June 01, 2018, <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/turkey-turns-on-its-christians>, accessed at 10th August 2018.

of the “eliminationist anti-Christian mentality,” such as Anti-Christmas Campaigns. There are several examples, but we have selected here only one. “On December 28, 2016, for example, in the western province of Aydin, the ultra-nationalist Islamist group Alperen Hearths staged a forced conversion of Santa Claus to Islam, putting a gun to the head of an actor dressed as Santa Claus. A representative of the group explained the staging of the conversion this way: Our purpose is for people to go back to their roots. We are the Muslim Turkish people who have been leading Islam for thousands of years. We will not celebrate Christian traditions and disregard our own traditions like Hıdırellez, Nevruz, and other religious national holidays.”³¹ (Interestingly, the Islamists consider New Year a Christian holiday and they ban that, too, thus acting unwillingly almost along the mainstream theological lines of Christianity, which does not sustain either the New Year celebration full of various excesses, of magic and of pagan practices). In Muslim-majority states, notably Egypt, Christmas and New Year’s Eve celebrations often form the scene of murderous attacks.³²

The rise of fundamentalism and Salafism in Turkey amounts to a “State-sponsored Conspiracy Theory”, namely a theory (sustained by the State) indicating the Christian Turkish citizens as “not real Turks”, potential national threats, “seeds of Byzantium,” “crusaders,” and a “flock of infidels,”³³ demonized along with the Jews and other usual scapegoats. Non-Muslims, even the atheists are the collaborators of the West, plotting against the country. Human rights lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz emphasized the disturbing role played by pro-government media, which are perpetuating an alarming narrative of scapegoating Turkey’s religious minority and connecting the coup plot to them ... Particularly pro-government media outlets have taken an anti-U.S. and anti-EU attitude, which I can call a xenophobic attitude, in which they attempt to demonize the West and accuse it of the coup attempt. And this narrative targets and harms non-Muslims in Turkey.³⁴ The Non-Muslims are the embodiment of the ideological Other in Turkey.

Another panic signal is represented by the Islamization of Turkish Institutions, for instance, the schools, the army, the Diyanet (the government-operated Religious Affairs Directorate). The analysts notice the following relevant fact: “the army chief of staff and the Diyanet listed missionary activity as one of the main threats facing Turkey. In 2001, the National Security Council identified Protestant missionaries as the third-largest threat facing the nation. Three years later a report by the Turkish armed forces accused Protestant missionaries of planning to pass out a million Bibles and to convert 10 % of the Turkish population by 2020, and urged cooperation among governors, mayors, and security and education personnel to counter the danger. In a 2005 article in its monthly magazine, the Diyanet warned that while missionary activities appeared innocent, their object was to divide the country, undermine its unity, and make Turkish citizens tools of their dark ambitions”.³⁵

Another illustration: “The Syrian Christian co-mayor of Mardin was asked to step down from her post by the Turkish government in November 2017. Likewise, the Turkish authorities removed an Assyrian sculpture from a public square, in front of the local council building, in Diyarbakir. No explanation was given for the removal of either the sculpture or the co-mayor, who was replaced by an official appointed by the

31 Hürriyet Daily News (Istanbul), Dec. 29, 2016.

32 “A Gruesome Christmas under Islam,” ryamondibrahim.com; “Death and Destruction on Christmas: Muslim Persecution of Christians, December 2016,” raymondibrahim.com, accessed Oct. 4, 2018.

33 The National Herald (New York), Sept. 28, 2016.

34 Voice of America News, Sept. 25, 2016.

35 Jenny White, *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 80-101.

government.”³⁶

Anthropologist Ayşe Gül Altınay, having observed classrooms around the country, found almost no discussion of peace, coexistence, dialogue, or nonviolence. Instead, students were taught to fear differences and to treat their non-Muslim friends as decidedly the “other.”³⁷

The “tradition” legalizing the deportation of “persons judged to be a threat to national security” is still alive and daunting (in 1915, the Ottoman Empire’s Committee of Union and Progress or the CUP passed this sort of confiscation of property and deportation legislation, stating as following: Leave all your belongings—your furniture, your beddings, your artifacts. Close your shops and businesses with everything inside. Your doors will be sealed with special stamps. On your return, you will get everything you left behind. Do not sell property or any expensive item. Buyers and sellers alike will be liable for legal action. ... You have ten days to comply with this ultimatum.)³⁸ for a century later, Turkey’s civil codes still entitle the executive powers to confiscate property on the basis of protecting “the national unity” of the Turkish republic.³⁹ For the Turkish patriots who understand patriotism as an identification with the regime the worries concerning the anti-minorities oriented Salafist authoritarian regime are exaggerated, while for the other patriots and for the world-wide admirers of the modern and democratic State which Turkey used to be, patriotism needs lucidity and critical spirit.⁴⁰

Conclusions

In conclusion, Turkey threatens to become an exporter of mistrust, instability, Salafism, fundamentalism and xenophobia, in the Black Sea Region, as well as in the extended Black Sea Region and in the Middle East. The Sunni, Salafist ideology becomes the exclusionary (and rather arbitrary) norm in all the spheres of life. The identification of the Other is not just a stage in the creation and affirmation of national identity, but it has coercive, punitive, unjust, life quality menacing and, eventually, life-threatening consequences. First and foremost Turkey becomes a threat for its citizens, who are going to sanction this course of events sooner or later.

The fundamentalist environment in Turkey does not indulge guarantees for life and property, free speech, free competition and cooperation, which are the prerequisite conditions of development and progress, hence triggering poverty and under-development along the way. Analyses that have as their main quality, besides critical thinking, to indicate the precise reasons for international concern and their serious consequences are prohibited leading to stagnation and underdevelopment in the country, which are to be

36 Uzay Bulut, “Turkey Uncensored: The Fate of Assyrian Christian Churches and Monasteries,” The Philos Project, New York, July 13, 2017.

37 Ayşe Gül Altınay, “Human Rights or Militarist Ideals? Teaching National Security in High Schools,” in Gürol Irzik, Deniz Tarba Ceylan, and İsmet Akça, eds., *Human Rights Issues in Textbooks: The Turkish Case* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2004), pp. 76-90.

38 Uğur Umit Ungör and Mehmet Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), p. 69.

39 Anne-Christine Hoff, “Turkey Turns On Its Christians,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2018, Volume 25, Number 3, June 01, 2018, <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/turkey-turns-on-its-christians>, accessed at 10th August 2018.

40 The words of G. Orwell may be extremely relevant “The two aims of the Party are to conquer the whole surface of the earth and to extinguish once and for all the possibility of independent thought. When people ‘disappear’ no one is allowed to mention it, no one is mourned, no one person is important, only the Party and Big Brother are important.”

exported in the Middle East and the Black Sea region, too.

This is by no means an attack toward a NATO partner, a fashionable criticism spread throughout Europe, this is not (an absurd) exercise of cornering a country that fell in the disgrace of the great and powerful USA, but an expression of deep concern for the viability of the cooperation projects and activities at the Black Sea, and for the peace and stability in the Black Sea Region. As all the information and security sources are warning, as a NATO partner, Turkey has become less reliable and less predictable after the coup of 2016.

As problematic as Turkey for the viability of the cooperation activities at the Black Sea, and for the peace and stability in the Black Sea Region may prove to be Russia and Ukraine, taken separately and/or together, for various reasons that we cannot approach here, provided the framework of a conference paper.

The interrogation about the course of Turkish fundamentalism is not a vain lament, but a plea for lucidity, a plea for the route of cooperation and togetherness at the Black Sea, creating and preserving enduring positive trends. As long as Turkey abides by its international economic and security treaties and obligations we may trust that the drive of fundamentalism should not aggravate the current problems of the wider Black Sea region.

The democratic future of Turkey is vital for the Black Sea region. The activity of an undemocratic, fundamentalist Turkey is going to deteriorate the activity of all and any Black Sea organization including Turkey as a member (the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, The Black Sea Commission; International Centre for Black Sea Studies; Parliamentary Assembly of Black Sea Economic Cooperation; Black Sea Economic Cooperation; Black Sea Trade and Development Bank; Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia or TRACECA and Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM, or ODED – GUAM).⁴¹

An international diplomatic and security effort in structuring a more advanced global cooperation and security model including NATO, UE, Russia, China and South Korea, brought together to support a commonly sanctioned security paradigm is vital, too. As always was the case, if humanity is to have a future, this future of mankind is a future of togetherness, diversity and cooperation, which is as much a pragmatic imperative as it is a philosophical one.

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⁴¹ https://www.bstadb.org/publications/Regional_Cooperation_in_the_Black_Sea.pdf, accessed August 28, 2018.

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ETHICAL BASES OF INTERCULTURAL INTERACTION

Understanding the ethical foundations of cultural diversity is impossible without understanding of the meaning and significance of the interaction and dialogue of cultures in the modern era. The problems associated with the intensification of the globalization processes of the modern world are most acute in the context of intercultural dialogue as a necessary condition for the existence of people in a multicultural world, where they turn out to be residents of the “one house” and the corresponding global consciousness, ethics, lifestyle. With the growth of awareness of the integrity of the world, the process of forming a globally oriented worldview, associated with the recognition of common moral principles and global values, also intensifies. In these circumstances, the need arises for clarification and concretization of universal moral categories that make up the unified ethical foundations of intercultural communications. This determines the socio-cultural relevance of the problem.

The new reality requires a new language for its expression, and this implies a serious transformation of worldview positions, value attitudes, i.e. bringing in line with the changes of the previous norms of morality, ethics, law, and therefore new terminology. Today, philosophical science is faced with the task of critical reflection on existing values, norms and principles, the development of new approaches, value bases and the formulation of moral principles for the future world order, as well as the formation of a globally oriented worldview that would adequately reflect the reality of modernity. Thus, as absolutely accurately noted acad. A. A. Huseynov, “if we understand global society not as a convention ..., then it also requires a global ethos. Not just a universal system of ethical reference, built on culturally different moral mentalities, life habits, etc., not just open cultures in relation to each other, but a single ethos, a new unified ethical culture - unified not only on universal grounds, but also according to external manifestations, symbolic-sign structure, specific norms and mechanisms of functioning”(1).

The ethical foundations of intercultural interactions are the content of moral norms, concepts, principles, values, as well as mechanisms for their inclusion in the processes of regulating social communications. The purpose of ethics is to create optimal moral prerequisites and conditions for self-preservation and development of a system of people's interaction through distinguishing and understanding specifics norms, rules and values of another culture.

The ethics of intercultural communication as a science studies the moral problems that arise in the process of dialogue of cultures, especially the value orientations of subjects of intercultural interaction, the content and essence of their moral qualities, the problems of the moral choice of ways, means, rules, forms, which, on the one hand, help to build the interaction of cultures, and on the other hand, they introduce peculiar implied unexpressed restrictions. These restrictions ensure the stability of the system of mutual obligations by understanding the specifics of the norms, rules and traditions of another culture.

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Throughout the history of the development of intercultural relations, constant attempts have been made to find universal regulators of the process of inter-subjective interaction of representatives of different cultures, in particular, by improving the legislative framework in the field of international cooperation and human rights, creating economic and political regulators to resolve problems that have, essentially, moral problems. Solving moral problems, gaining mutual understanding and consent of participants in intercultural interaction with each other and the world as a whole is impossible without resorting to ethics, which makes it possible to justify the unity of universal moral values for all cultures.

Thus, the need for global ethics is based on the fact that consideration of the prospects for the development of intercultural communications without regard to moral standards and moral-ethical attitudes cannot be fruitful.

Modern philosophy is characterized by a shift from a "philosophy of consciousness" to a "philosophy of communication." This turn is connected, first of all, with the development of the doctrine of the necessity and methods of achieving eternal peace and the fundamental universality of the moral requirements of Immanuel Kant. It should be noted the importance of the teachings on the intersubjectivity of Edmund Husserl, the "phenomenology of sympathy" by Max Scheler, the "dialogics" of Martin Buber, the "existential communication" of Karl Jaspers, the teachings on the meeting of Otto Bolnov, the "communicative action" of Jürgen Habermas, the "global justice" of Karl Ballestrin and "ethics of discourse" of Karl-Otto Apel. A contribution to the identification of the ethical foundations of inter-subjective interaction between representatives of different cultures was made by the works of philosophers A. Huseynov, F. Dalmar, A. Schweitzer, E. Durkheim, E. Kassirer, Yu. Lotman, I. Mamedzadeh, M. Mamardashvili, M. Moss, K. Wissler, F. Fukuyama, etc.

Assessing the works of moral philosophers, we can conclude that the ethics of intercultural interaction is designed to find new effective normative-value constructions in order to create dialogue and improve the quality of communication at the level of individual behavior.

Considering the essential and substantive elements of the ethical basis of the interaction of cultures, it should be noted that the laws of life of the subject of intercultural relations determine the cultural traditions and norms of the community to which it belongs. In turn, any sphere of human activity has its own value dimension, which is expressed in morality, economics, politics, art, and social order. The presence of inter-subjective communications both in culture itself and between different cultures ensures its existence and self-development, regulated by a system of ethical categories, moral laws, values and norms.

The study of the interaction of universal concepts as a means of promoting intercultural communication is interdisciplinary in nature, however, it is the philosophical and ethical interpretation of this phenomenon that involves the appeal to fundamental value dominants that allows us to clarify and justify the most effective regulators of intercultural interaction. This is a process of interaction between subjects (individuals, groups, organizations) belonging to different cultures, with the aim of transmitting information or exchanging values using the sign systems, rules and techniques adopted in these cultures. It should be borne in mind that the rapidly changing world is often tried to explain with the help of such established, familiar concepts as, for example, democracy, universal values, justice, equality, responsibility, etc. It does not take into

account that each of these terms, like the current system of values and ethical norms that have been formed and filled with content in fundamentally different historical conditions. In addition, the solution to the problems of intercultural interaction rests in many respects on centuries-old norms, principles and stereotypes of people's behavior and needs a fundamental rethinking. At the same time, others, for example, religious tolerance, worldview pluralism, racial, national and religious tolerance, considered as a general principle of social trust, non-violence, collective responsibility should be developed as much as possible.

An important ethical problem caused by the processes of universalization and the growing unity of the world is the loss of localities by societies. Local perspectives, in which isolated worlds of life have traditionally existed, are included in a single perspective of a globalizing world. Private social systems are transforming into a more holistic and integrated global social system. As a result, a conflict arises between them, which in practice manifests itself at the level of international relations in that all countries begin to exist in one coordinate system, and in the sphere of cultural and spiritual life, along with integrative processes, isolation and opposition of different cultures are strengthened. A significant problem of our time lies in the fact that the traditional division of the world is losing its moral legitimacy. The consequence of the formation of a global community is the requirement of equal and fair consideration of the interests of all its members. The ethical demand of the new order is formulated as a requirement of international justice. In the economic sphere, the problem of justice is expressed as the statement of the equality of distribution and participation in the world economic order, in politics - as the problem of equality and democracy of the world political order, in culture - as the need to establish universal humanitarian standards and preserve the identity of national cultures.

Ethical science of the global world community is not designed to destroy traditions and call into question traditional ethical behavior. First of all, it is focused on issues that either have no solutions in traditional morality (for example, cloning, euthanasia, the environmental crisis, etc.), or require revision of traditional solutions in connection with new conditions for the survival of mankind. Thus, the foundations of a civilization of partnership and joint responsibility of the world community are laid.

The ethical approach to the consideration of the problem of intercultural interaction is one of the determining ones, as it is focused on the identification and study of the deep moral foundations of relations between people. The scale and depth of this approach is determined by the fact that ethics is faced with an extremely difficult task of determining the value ideals of good, due, fair, etc. as the moral principles underlying the ethical basis of intercultural interaction. The ability to voluntarily accept and share moral responsibility contributes not only to the elimination of intercultural differences, but also creates an atmosphere of mutual respect, understanding of the need to preserve the diversity of world cultures. Moreover, the observance of ethical principles is the basis for creating relations in order to maintain peace, justice and equality between people. K.-O. Apel believes that any decisions regarding which a full consensus of an unlimited community of arguments can be considered ethically sound. The notion of what is fair and what is unfair can only be worked out through dialogue. (2) And although full consensus within the framework of intercultural interaction is possible only theoretically, it provides a very practical guideline for approaching the ideal. Intercultural dialogue is the only way from tolerance to mutual understanding to achieve social solidarity, as it is he who opposes the neglect of the interests of another, serves as the guarantor of freedom

and diversity of cultures.

The diversity of the participants in intercultural interaction, in which everyone is a carrier of a certain cultural tradition and system of moral values, necessitates increasing the effectiveness of the communication process. This implies an adequacy in understanding the moral and ethical motives of activity. The process of identifying these motives as information carriers, identifying common ethical foundations in various positions of subjects of communication is extremely complex and involves mutual tolerance, unity of understanding and interpretation of moral concepts and norms, respect for individual rights and freedoms, and preservation of the identity of carriers of culture. And here the role of ethics in the prevention and resolution of conflicts arising in the process of intercultural interaction is very significant.

From an ethical point of view, the main problem of intercultural relations is the problem of mutual understanding and responsibility, concern for maintaining the diversity of cultures in a rapidly developing world, which has led to increased standardization and universalization of all vital processes of modern societies and cultures.

Today, for the first time, it is about taking responsibility for the possibly unreviewable consequences of collective human activity in science, politics, economics, which are changing the global community on a planetary scale. Thus, a question arises before humanity, requiring a completely new dimension and understanding of the concept of responsibility. If the basis of the existence of mankind has traditionally been individual responsibility, today the priority belongs to planetary, joint responsibility. Note that in reality it does not yet exist, and its necessity is put forward as a task. Ethics also serves as a control mechanism for systems whose development cannot be measured on the basis of strategic expediency alone. For the ethics of responsibility, the criterion of ethical significance cannot be one goal, but only the totality of all the consequences associated with it.

Modern social ethics is a form of social management; it seeks not to set the ultimate goals of history or to change the nature of man, but to carefully intervene in these systems, adjusting the unified work of society. It should be able to balance real social processes with ideal values of life.

The dialogue of cultures is anthropological in nature and includes communication both between historically established communities (nationalities, races, ethnic groups) and between social groups (confessional, professional, cultural and historical). At the same time, the thesis that modern culture is the heritage of all mankind, the result of a long historical interaction of different peoples, is not in doubt. Moreover, as noted by A.A. Huseynov, the processes of intercultural interaction can receive moral sanction only if they are combined with a mutually respectful dialogue of cultures and do not encroach on socio-cultural diversity, the uniqueness of traditions, mores, beliefs, etc.

The culture of modern dialogue should focus primarily on such universal principles as respect, tolerance, mutual understanding and cooperation, which ensures its effectiveness. So, in interstate cultural communicative relations of representatives of different nationalities, the dominant is the interest in each other's cultural experience and heritage. It should be noted that the willingness of the parties to include in their own traditional experience new values and attitudes of a different culture is possible only on the basis of universal values. This raises the problem of finding ways of the most adequate synthesis of universal and national values. And in this case, it is obvious that without a guide to universal values, intercultural interaction is impossible.

It is this approach that is the priority area of the multicultural policy of Azerbaijan, which makes a significant contribution to strengthening the dialogue of cultures, intercultural interaction. This is confirmed by the annual traditionally international humanitarian cultural dialogue forums held, where prominent government and political figures, Nobel Prize winners, and outstanding scientists from around the world discuss urgent problems that concern the international community (5).

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GEOSAFETY CHALLENGES AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE DANUBE - BLACK SEA REGION

Abstract

The concept of the Danube-Black Sea region marks the European Union's systematic strategy based on the ecological, economic, political and secure connection of the European continent with other areas. The original initiative of forming the Danube Region concerned the ecological protection of navigable transversals determined by the Danube River Basin in the Black Sea. The adoption of the Convention as the cornerstone of the newly emerging region was presented as a humanistic philosophy of joining people, resources and diverse areas, which later expanded into the sphere of economics. The geo-security context of the Danube-Black Sea region, as well as the related area of the Balkans, is characterized by various contemporary challenges, risks and threats, as well as a policy of expansion to the east. It is dominated by traditional crisis trends, economic controversies, religious conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, conflicts of great powers and migration processes. The economic dimensions of the new region according to the European Union initiative mean the integration of the Danube into existing projects of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, ie expansion through cross-border trade and economic cooperation. The aforementioned postulates produced numerous contradictions, primarily in the views of the Russian Federation through the prism of a permanent rivalry with the United States and Turkey's efforts to maintain the position of regional hegemony.

Keywords: Danube-Black Sea region, geo-security, geopolitics, economic cooperation, energy, ecology, Russian Federation, Turkey, European Union

Introduction

Contemporary conditions for the existence of states in the processes of globalization and transition, with clearly expressed requirements for achieving economic growth and social development, imply the need to improve the situation in all segments of a particular country. The stated conditions indicate that the progress of the state union is realized through internal progress and external integrations within subregions and regions. What can be said with certainty is that association is a cornerstone of economic development, security and peace. Development varies from country to country and its degree is conditioned by the degree of natural, social, and especially economic development of a particular country. Consequently, the lower level of development of a country, the lower is level of development of its economic power, and thus the country can hardly survive as an individual. This implies the need to connect more countries to achieve common interests and goals and to achieve the synergistic effect of association.

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The fundamental purpose of forming the integration of countries is to protect national interests in international economic relations and to enhance economic strength. Integration should above all contribute to the achievement of the following goals: increasing export capacity and reducing dependence on country imports, improving international competitiveness in the field of economy, securing financial and strategic support from major international organizations, preserving national security in national and international contexts, active participation in projects of worldwide importance, positioning local products in international markets, creating a globally recognized brand and providing a better standard of living for its residents.

The Danube - Black Sea region represents a connected territorial unit with constantly expressed political and security contradictions over a long period. As a geographical space connecting two continents, it designates a communications system of first economic and economic importance. A large number of countries with different social and religious backgrounds exist in the face of centuries of conflict and constant tension. Leading forces in the context of military-political groupings have always been essential in this area, which gravitates to and integrates into the neighboring area of Southeastern Europe. All contemporary security challenges, especially terrorism, organized crime and migration, are very often present in the most extreme forms. The Danube Region and Balkan geopolitical guidelines indicate significant human and physical resources. Traditionally tender of world actors present in the long term, with implications in all areas of public life in the countries of the region. Those regions connecting Europe with Central Eurasia, and the Black Sea - Caspian macro-region. Related to energy resources and aspirations for domination of the great powers, initiate new confrontation between the great powers, which makes it the most unstable area of the wider macro-regions in the world.

The Danube Region has been established by the will of the European Union and the adoption of the Convention on the Protection of the Danube River 29.06.1994. in Sofia, which entered into force in 1998. Similar to the previously formed Baltic region, the aim is intergovernmental cooperation in managing water areas with a broader economic and political point of view states that belong to the Danube basin. The political dimension of the Danube region is based on a humanistic strategy of connecting people and places in the wider area of the purpose of social development. It is a new geopolitical term to implement foreign policy aspirations. The adoption of the Strategy for the Danube region by the European Parliament 21.01.2010. was encouraged regional cross-border cooperation in economic development. Here are mentioned all ten direct Danube countries, with Serbia, which was first mentioned. Also, four other countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro as the country's entire Danube river basin.

Integrations and regionalization in globalization conditions

The economic integration of national economies can take many forms that vary according to the degree of interconnectedness of economies. There are six phases of international economic integration, with each successive phase representing a higher degree of integration of national economies. Besides, the effects of creating a single form of integration are waning over time, and states subsequently seek to establish many forms of cooperation. The most common forms of economic integration are:⁴

1. Preferential trade agreement - represents the lowest level of integration within which member states impose lower barriers to mutual exchange than to trade with non-member third countries. Each country continues to pursue its foreign trade policy, with preferential treatment for the countries that are members of this agreement;
2. Free trade zones-countries are mutually eliminating trade barriers to each other, ie. trade is free within the integration. In doing so, each country retains its barriers (its foreign trade policy) to countries that are not members of the free trade area. A problem that may arise in the functioning of a free trade area is that there is an economic interest in importing goods originating in non-member countries only through the Member State with the lowest customs duties towards non-member countries, and then reselling on the markets of other member states of the zone, which are left without customs revenue by such procedures. In practice, the free trade area is often incomplete, ie. completely free imports from the Member States do not exist in all but certain types of products;
3. In addition to free trade within integration, the Customs Union also implies the establishment of a common foreign trade policy towards other countries, ie. harmonization and equalization of all foreign trade instruments applied to trade with non-member countries. This eliminates the potential problems of reselling goods that exist in the free trade area. If countries remove barriers to trade partially, ie. only for certain types of products or services, and towards third countries pursuing a common trade policy, this is a partial or incomplete customs union;
4. The common market - which in addition to the characteristics of the customs union also implies the freedom of movement of factors of production (labor and capital) within the integration. The effects of free movement of people and capital can be both positive and negative for both the inflow country and the outflow country. If free movement is only one of the factors of production, while maintaining permanent or temporary restrictions on the movement of another factor, we are talking about partial, ie. incomplete common market;
5. Monetary union, in addition to all its previous characteristics, implies the existence of a common currency, a single central bank, and thus the conduct of a common monetary policy. For countries to be eligible candidates for monetary integration, certain conditions must be fulfilled. These are first and foremost: similar inflation rates, similar interest rates, low budget deficits, stable and not very high public debt ... For one currency and one monetary policy to be appropriate for all members, it is necessary that the economic cycles are harmonized and that do not report so-called. asymmetric economic shocks (these are shocks that in one country lead to an increase in economic activity and others to a fall). If not, different monetary policies would be appropriate for different countries of the monetary union, so the union would not be functional and optimal for everyone. If all the necessary integration conditions are fulfilled, monetary union brings significant benefits to member states, such as: a fall in interest rates, a fall in inflation, better price comparability, no exchange rate risk, elimination of currency conversion costs, etc., which all to growth in trade and movement of capital, increased investment and increased competition;

⁴ Prekajac, Z., International Economics, 2nd Edition, Futura Publications, Novi Sad, 2008, p. 214.

6. Economic Union - represents the highest possible degree of the economic integration of several countries, in which countries, in addition to all the above, have a common fiscal policy, social policy and all other economic policies. Therefore, the member states of this phase of integration can be said to represent in full terms a single economic system. A more realistic scenario is the realization of an incomplete economic union, in which certain economic policies are unique, while maintaining national sovereignty in the conduct of other economic policies.

A political union is a type of complex state which, unlike personal or real union, has its international legal personality, that is, it is treated as a single entity. In it, states create joint institutions with certain powers. Depending on whether the states have transferred sovereignty to the common institutions of a political union, they are divided into:

- Confederations (Alliance of States)
- Federations (state federations)

The European Union, the precursor to the creation of the European Union, was the Agreement on the European Coal and Steel Community (Ceca) signed in 1951. by the two opposing countries of Germany and France, but also Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. Following this agreement, seeing the positive effects of the association, the countries launched the process of discussing the creation of a European Economic Community. The European Union is a community of regulated countries dedicated to democracy, peace and the well-being of citizens. The three pillars of the European Union are:

- Economic policy,
- Common Security and Foreign Policy,
- Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs.

The European Union, as well as its Member States, are among the biggest human rights defenders in world politics. The condition for the EU to conclude an Economic Cooperation Agreement with a country is that the country respects the human rights of its citizens.

Full economic integration - is the most complex and versatile level of integration in which member states have fully completed comprehensive integration processes, that is, transferred all elements of national, economic and political sovereignty to supranational institutions of the integration system to create a single economic and political area. In this final integration process, there is a release of huge potential forces that have been captured by the artificial barriers of each Member State.

The conventional definition of globalization involves the process of opening and liberalizing national financial markets and their entry into the global capital market. However, nowadays, more commonly, this term refers to the "international integration" of goods, technologies, labor and capital, so it is possible to speak of globalization in a broader sense.⁵

The term globalization is derived from the word "global" which means totality, and globalism is a way of looking at what is happening globally. Globalization thus

⁵ Dujšin, U., Globalization, Economic Integration and Croatia, Proceedings of the Faculty of Law, Zagreb, 49, 2, 1999, p. 179.

implies a social process that strives for the inclusiveness and uniqueness of the world.⁶ Globalization, as an idea, is about "reducing" the world, but also about raising awareness of the world as a whole.⁷ Globalization can be found to be one of the consequences of the development of science, modern technology, the market economy, democracy. Globalization has also allowed the free movement of capital, goods, information and people through the expansion and abolition of borders.

Ever since globalization has taken hold, there has been a remarkable emphasis and a new, somewhat surprising interest in regional culture. This profession, which we may call localism or regionalism, is closely related to the phenomenon of globalization. Regionalism is the other side of the coin of globalization. It turns out that the old idea of the growth of nations by the unification of their regions is the wrong starting point. All over the world, new states today define themselves as ethnically diverse, try to become independent from the former large entities and want to create new nations and states.⁸

Globalization and regionalization of the world economy represent the most significant and the most challenging features of the last twenty years of the last century. The interest in regionalization of the world economy in the post-war period was of different intensity. Studies of regionalism fueled by the growth and development of European regional organizations were numerous during the 1950s and 1960s. However, the significant slowdown in European integration processes in the late 1960s caused a decline in interest in integration theories. Realists and later neo-realists and their approach to the field of international relations had a further influence on the attitude towards regionalism. Their strengthening came only in the late '70s and early '80s, and the point was that the emphasis was on the interaction between the state and the international system in general, without considering the region.⁹

With the end of the Cold War, in the mid-1980s, and the destruction of its structure in the world, countries were forced to re-position themselves in the international system. For this reason, globalization emerged as a feature of this decade, while the early 1990s, fueled by the collapse of the USSR (March 11, 1990 and December 25, 1991) and significant events in the Balkans for us - the breakup of the SFRY¹⁰, intensively began to develop regional strategies.

The term regionalism very often is understood unilaterally. Its economic side is primarily taken into account. trade aspect. However, it should be broadly understood so that its three key dimensions are included in the analysis.

The first dimension of regionalism involves the extent to which countries in a defined geographical area have significant shared historical experiences and face the same problems. For example, the countries of Southeast Europe can be said to have been predominantly influenced by the USSR, while in recent times they face the problem of transition.

The second dimension of regionalism is the extent to which some countries have developed socio-cultural, political and / or economic ties in a particular geographical area, differentiating them from the rest of the global community. For example, common

⁶ Turek, F., Globalization and Global Security, Croatian Association for International Studies, Varazdin, 1999, p. 159.

⁷ Milardovic, A., Globalization, Pan Liber, Osijek-Zagreb-Split, 1999, p. 62.

⁸ Köstlin, K., New Understandings of the Region and Culture, Folk Art, vol. 38 No.2, Vienna, 2001, p. 33.

⁹ Prekajac, Z., International Economics, 2nd Edition, Futura Publications, Novi Sad, 2008, p. 243.

¹⁰ Carevic, M., Causes and Consequences of the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Banja Luka, 2003, p. 243.

security and political interests between the US and Canada.

The third dimension of regionalism emphasizes the extent to which certain groups of geographically close countries have developed organizations to manage the crucial sectors of their lives together. One example is the European Community.

Taking all of the above into account, it can be concluded that these three dimensions are interdependent and that the regions may have all three dimensions equally developed, as in the case of the European Community, for example, or maybe at different stages of integration with limited progress in particular dimensions.¹¹

Open regionalism is an effort to address one of the central issues of modern trade policy, which is how to achieve compatibility between the explosion of regional trade agreements around the world and the global trading system contained in the World Trade Organization. The concept seeks to ensure that regional agreements in practice are the basis for further global liberalization and not a stumbling block to such progress.

An ambitious but undefined concept of open regionalism, owing to a series of conflicting opinions and definitions, can very easily be translated into an operational and very significant political agenda. Properly defined and implemented, it can enable regional and global free trade to be achieved at the same time. And it can also provide a definitive answer to the potential conflict between regionalism and globalism by bringing all regional liberalization initiatives into a global free trade agreement, thereby eliminating any preferential arrangements. All this, the notion of open regionalism, makes it the most promising international trading strategy at the beginning of the 21st century.¹²

Globalization has many of its dimensions and properties that cannot be broken into "positive" and "negative" because they are intertwined, enter into one another, and even become blind. Although world production has been growing much faster than population since the nineteenth century, it is still visible today how little productivity growth has had an impact on underdeveloped countries, in which the race between population growth and food production continues. Low-income countries whose population has a low literacy rate and short life expectancy are the biggest problems. Most of this population works in agriculture, and because of the general backwardness, a small proportion of them have the opportunity to get a job in industry or other non-agricultural activities. This population accounts for 55% of the world's population and accounts for only 1/5 of the income of highly developed countries. Thus, the lack of capital prevents the introduction of new technologies and improvements in production. This creates a situation where one obstacle creates another and thus forms a vicious cycle of poverty.

Many have welcomed globalization as a salvage solution to all their problems, but many are not interested in it.¹³ Today, there are no concerns about the negative effects of globalization, but there are also positives to this process - the development of science, health care, greater food production and greater connectivity between people. There is also awareness of personal and other people's problems, as well as providing assistance and solidarity with those in a disadvantaged position.

As for regionalism, there are many arguments for and against. The conclusion is

that regionalization has taken hold and is a difficult process to stop. Most countries want to connect regionally, considering it as a stepping stone for inclusion in international trade flows, neglecting it so that in addition to positive, regionalization also has a negative aspect. Given the dimensions and arguments outlined above, it is quite certain that regionalization has its valid basis and justification. However, just closing into regional blocs has negative implications for the further development of the world economy. The interdependence of economic and political developments and how these areas will affect international relations must also be taken into account. Certainly, global, regional and local integration are interdependent, but so globally, given the structure of world power as a whole, it has a much greater impact on regional and local than vice versa. That is why regional integration: economic, technological, political and cultural, can only modify and mitigate the effects of global, in terms of objective subordination to the most powerful countries in the world, but not eliminate that subordination.

The above postulates of contemporary integration, economic cooperation and the concept of regionalization are fully applicable to the current Danube - Black Sea region. This area is especially interesting because of its geographical characteristics, different socio-political order, economic anomalies and security controversies. The fact is that the geo-security position and generally lower levels of economic development relative to the western countries imply requirements for the inclusion of the observed countries in modern integration flows. It implies the central role of the European Union and its interests in the context of integration of the countries of the region.

Geosecurity features of the Danube - Black sea region

The political implications of the radical changes of the late twentieth century positioned and channeled the situation in all states, especially the former socialist system. Tectonic disturbances caused the collapse of the former security bloc of the Eastern Bloc, and at the same time strengthening the position of the US-led Western Coalition, which became the only superpower. The formation of the European Union marks a major geostrategic project with clear geo-security objectives. The new paradigm of Western hegemonism involves the involvement of all segments of collectivity to reach the borders of the Russian Federation, master the space of Eurasia and the disposition of vast energy resources. In this context, the Danube Region is formulated and gives essential importance to the Black Sea Basin.

The Danube is the second-longest river in Europe, right after the Volga. It is 2860 km long and on its path, from its path from Donaueschingen in Germany to the Black Sea, it passes through ten European countries. These countries are: Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Ukraine.

The Danube region is a functional area that is defined by its river basin. Lately, there have been some dramatic changes. After two waves of enlargement of the European Union in 2004. and in 2007. and Croatian entry into the European union this "the most international" river basin is now by its largest part area of the Europe Union. That opens new possibilities when it comes to overcoming the challenges and earning potentials of this space. Social-economic prosperity, competitiveness, environmental management and efficiency in resource management could now be improved and safety and transport in the region could be modernized. In the region, there is a need to connect people, ideas and their needs. The development of the region must be balanced with the protection of the environment. The joint effort is required to avert disaster and minimize risks, such as

11 Prekajac, Z., International Economics, 2nd Edition, Futura Publications, Novi Sad, 2008, p. 244.

12 Bergsten, C. F., Open Regionalism, Working Paper 97-3, Institute for International Economics, 1997, p. 15.

13 Pavic, R., Introduction to Huntington: A General Atmosphere of Global and Economic Opportunities, Geographical Horizon 1-2, 1999, p. 21.

floods, drought and industrial accidents. This region could be at the top of Europe union in the areas of trade and entrepreneurship. The gap in education and unemployment rates could be overcome and The Danube region could become a safe and secure area.¹⁴

In the past The Danube region has passed many tumultuous events, many conflicts, with the movements of population and undemocratic regimes. However, the fall of Iron curtain and expend od Europe union have opened the opportunity for a better future. It also means the possibility of dealing with some great challenges, such as:¹⁵

- Mobility- The Danube is, by its self, the main trans-European transport network, however its potentials are still not fully utilized. Freight transport on the Danube represents only ten to twenty percent of freight transport on the Rhine. Water transport has great meaning for improving effectiveness and environment protection, so the way for exploiting all potentials of the Danube in this area must be found.
- Energy- the price of fuels in the region is high. Fragmentation of markets leads to bigger costs and loss of competition. Reliance on the small number of external suppliers increases vulnerability, periodical winter crises show us that. Greater choice in the supply of energy through mutual relation and the real regional market would have a positive effect on increasing energetic security of this region's countries.
- Environment- every year the planet gets more and more polluted, so it is not a surprise that the questions about environmental protection are becoming more and more important. Pollution does not know national borders, so this is one more problem that requires joint efforts. Great problems, such as inadequate utilization of wastewater, unnecessary fertilization and land exploitation are constantly present and they make the Danube very polluted. Also, we must consider the influence of transport connections, tourism and energy facilities on the environment.
- Risks- massive and common floods, droughts, industrial pollution are significant problems of the Danube region. Prevention and effective reactions are not possible without adequate cooperation and information exchange of all countries.
- Social-economic- in this region there are big differences in these areas. There are some of the richest and the most successful, but also some of the purest areas in Europe. There are not enough contacts and cooperation between countries, financial and institutional. The percent of highly educated people in the region is lower than in this percent in Europe, again with significant differences from country to country, noting that the best are leaving the region.
- Security and organized crime- problems in this area are still there. Human trafficking and smuggling goods are specifically expressed.

A joint approach is the best to these challenges, with defining priorities,

¹⁴ Neskovic, S., The Danube Region and Process of Cross - Border Cooperation in the Balkans - Case Study, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 4, Cros - Border Cooperation and Development Policies in Bulgaria and on the Balkans, Thematic Collective Book, Veliko Turnovo: St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, Faculty of Social Sciences from the University of Craiova, Romania, Centre of Strategic Studies of National Security of Belgrade, Serbia, Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, Romania, 2017, p. 16.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 20.

agreements and joint actions. For example experts for development and experts for the environment must work together to find the best solutions and solve some of the most important questions for the benefit of the whole region. Besides challenges, the Danube region also has some opportunities. Many of its areas have outstanding natural beauty, wealth history, legacy and culture. Development potential is very large, especially in the countries most affected by transition since 1989. year.

There are creative ideas and a quality workforce:¹⁶

- The region is the area in which Europe opens to the East. The Danube region links Europe with the Black sea- Caspian region, which is one of the richest parts of the world with fuel. From the standpoint of Europe union, this region could be marked as gate and corridor in the area of central Asia- an important geostrategic space for Europe union.¹⁷ Existing transport and trade links must be developed (for example TRACECA traffic connection connects Europe union over the Black sea with Caucasian region and central Asia.¹⁸
- The region has a solid education system with a large number of universities. However, their quality varies. Education and profession must be organized according to the needs of the market and student mobility between countries must be motivated and helped.
- The region has outstanding cultural, ethnic and natural variety. It has several global cities and heritage, including the fact that the Danube runs through most of the capital. These advantages of the Danube region require the construction of modern tourist offers and infrastructure so that both tourists and hosts could enjoy and make a profit out of it.
- The region could better use renewable energy sources, whether it is biomass, water, wind or solar energy. Taking activities in this area and better management of energy requirements would lead to switching to an economy with a lower level of carbon emissions, and with that lover damaging of environment.
- The region has significant natural resources: diverse of plant and animal world, water resources and beautiful sights (The Danube delta, Carpathians, Uvac...). These resources should be better protected and restored sustainably.¹⁹

To take advantage of these opportunities are needed better cooperation, planning and larger joint investments and development of the key relations in the region. That's why the European Commission at the request of the European Council prepared Strategy for the Danube region. This strategy has four defined goals that constitute the core of this strategy and they are essential for the implementation of activities in the territory of the whole Balkan. Countries included in The Danube strategy are: Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldavia and Ukraine.²⁰

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 29.

¹⁷ Jeftić, Šarčević, N., The Danube-Black Sea Region as a Geopolitical, Energy and Security Area, Institute for International Policy and Economy, Belgrade: 2012, p. 30.

¹⁸ Neskovic, S., Transport Corridors in the Function of Southeast European Development, Proceedings, International Conference "Road Mobility and Safety", Travnik: Travnik International University, 2013, p. 22.

¹⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/communic/danube/com2010_715_danube_sr.pdf

²⁰ Stojović, J., Knezevic, S., Bogdanovic A., Knezevic, I., Guide to European Strategy, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2012, p. 12.

Four basic goals of the strategy are:

1. Connecting The Danube region. This first pillar is directed to the questions of traffic, energetics and culture and tourism to provide a good connection of the countries in the region and the whole region with the rest of Europe. Emphasis on three key areas. They are:²¹
 - Improving mobility and multimodality:
 1. Internal waterways
 2. Road, rail and air connections.
 - Encouraging sustainable energy
 - Promotion of culture and tourism and contact between people.
2. Protection of the environment in the Danube region. The second pillar is directed to the protection of the environment so that we could track the progress in projects and activities which are related to the environment. This pillar of the strategy is focused on these three areas:
 - Restoration and maintaining of the water quality
 - Management of environmental risks
 - Protection of biodiversity, landscapes and quality of air and land.
3. The third pillar of the strategy- Building prosperity in the Danube region is all about building information society, innovations, the competitiveness of enterprises, education, job market and marginalized communities to improve the prosperity of the region. Special emphasis was put on the following three areas. They are:
 - The development of the society of knowledge through scientific research, education and information technologies
 - Support the competitiveness of enterprises including cluster development
 - Investing in people and skills.

To accomplish the goals that are defined in the third part of the strategy the most important thing is to take actions that are aimed to strengthen all the countries of the region to create, strengthen and use knowledge, because these are the key factors for achieving progress and development.

4. The fourth pillar is called Strengthening of the Danube region. It consists of two areas:
 - Strengthening of institutional capacity and cooperation
 - Join work in promoting security and fighting against organized and heavy crime.

The basic idea is that only a safe region, with good management can become a prosperous and attractive place for life. Therefore all the activities have the task to improve democratic institutions, state administration and organizations on the central, regional and local level, with special emphasis on cooperation in the region and on security. Improvement of mobility and the better-connected region also bring some

security risks. To reduce the risks of greater mobility accompanied by rising cross-border trade and growing economic integration, security and cooperation in the security field are particularly emphasized in this pillar of the Danube Strategy. So, that is why this pillar contains some activities aimed at combating corruption and organized crime, cooperation in the field of political asylum and to fight to prevent illegal crossings of border crosses in the Danube region.²²

Starting from these four goals, eleven priority areas of the strategy are defined:²³

- Improving mobility and multimodality: internal waterways- coordinated by Austria and Romania
- Improving mobility and multimodality: road, rail and air connections- coordinated by Slovenia and Serbia
- Promoting sustainable energy- coordinated by Hungary and the Czech Republic
- Promotion of culture and tourism and contact between people- coordinated by Bulgaria and Romania
- Restoring and maintaining water quality- coordinated by Hungary and Slovakia
- Management of environmental risks- coordinated by Hungary and Romania
- Preservation of biodiversity, landscapes and quality of air and land- coordinated by Germany and Croatia
- Development of knowledge society- coordinated by Slovakia and Serbia
- Support the competitiveness of enterprises- coordinated by Germany and Croatia
- Investing in people and skills- coordinated by Austria and Moldavia
- Improvement of institutional capacity and cooperation- coordinated by Austria and Slovenia
- Working together to provide security and combat against organized crime- coordinated by Germany and Bulgaria.

The Danube region is composed of many different countries. Its members are distinguished by size, strength, wealth, there are different cultures, etc differences... The relations between them were not always the best in the past. Conflicts and differences between them were always the cause of distrust and reluctance, which are still present. But the past is behind us. We must turn to the future and to what she wears. In the future, which will be much better for all of the countries if they realize the meaning of cooperation and start to apply in practice what they recite and agree in theory.²⁴

²² Neskovic, S., The Danube Region and Process of Cross - Border Cooperation in the Balkans - Case Study, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 4, Cross - Border Cooperation and Development Policies in Bulgaria and on the Balkans, Thematic Collective Book, Veliko Turnovo: St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, Faculty of Social Sciences from the University of Craiova, Romania, Centre of Strategic Studies of National Security of Belgrade, Serbia (CESNA - B), Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, Romania, 2017, p. 30.

²³ Ibidem, p. 31.

²⁴ Neskovic, S., Regional Cooperation and European Integration in the Function of the Western Balkans, Thematic Collective Book, "New Challenges to the Balkan Security" Vol. 3, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, 2016, p. 15.

Black sea economic initiatives and strategy of the European Union

When you look at the map of the world it can be seen that the Black Sea is spread over two continents, one part of which is in Europe and the other part in Asia. This makes it a transitional territory on these two continents. With the Marmara Sea, the Black Sea is connected with the Bosphorus Strait, and with the Sea of Azov it is connected via the Kerch Strait. The surface of the Black Sea is approximately 422,000 km², with a maximum depth of 2210 m. Countries on the Black Sea coast are: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. Until recently, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was an integral part of Ukraine.

The countries of the Black Sea region also include countries connected with it by a river and sea routes - Serbia (Danube), Moldova (Dniester), Albania (Mediterranean Sea), Greece (Mediterranean Sea).

Black Sea Economic Cooperation - CMES (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) was established in 1992, at the initiative of Turkey, at a particularly favorable moment for the development of new forms of regional cooperation in Europe, following the disappearance of the blocs, the SEV, the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. CMES was founded by eleven countries - five Balkan countries: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Albania, as well as the Black Sea coastal countries, members of the former USSR: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and three Caucasian countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. These countries cover the area from the Adriatic to the Pacific, and in addition to the Black Sea, it indicates that this area in the immediate environment includes seven more seas. Together, they have a population of 327 million (5.8% of the world population), and their cumulative GNP represents about 3.21 world GDP.

Although the creation of CMES was supported by all the coastal countries of this socio-economically diverse and traditionally burdened area, each country also saw specific national interests in its participation. In doing so, Russia sought to express a new approach in regional foreign policy, denouncing the practice of hegemonism as inherent in the disappearing USSR. Turkey saw an opportunity to realize its specific geostrategic position, increased economic power and leadership ambitions in the region, as well as align relations with Russia.²⁵

It is interesting that, unlike other similar forms of cooperation, the composition and number of CMES members has not changed much since it was founded, except that only the Serbian State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was admitted as a member (later after the separation of Montenegro). This is not the result of a lack of interest from other countries, but is primarily due to the lack of consensus among the CMES Member States over longer-term options regarding the expansion and development of CMES. This is also partly due to the complex circumstances regarding the political situation or international position of individual candidate countries (for example, Macedonia, Iran). Although other initiatives for cooperation in this region have emerged since the founding of CMES, this organization is undoubtedly the most comprehensive and comprehensive (by membership and cooperation topics).

Cyprus and Montenegro have applied for membership but are currently rejected due to the rivalry between Turkey and Greece.

Observer countries are: Austria, Belarus, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Germany, Poland,

²⁵ Lopandic, D., Kronja, J., Regional Initiatives and Multilateral Cooperation in the Balkans, Second Edition, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2010, p. 140.

United States, Slovakia, Tunisia, France, Croatia, Czech Republic.

The way this community works is the occasional meetings of heads of state and government, and regular meetings of foreign ministers once a year, or semi-annually. The bodies are: Permanent International Secretariat, Auxiliary Bodies of the Working Group and Experts, Parliamentary Assembly, Business Council and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established and based on three pillars, which define the motives, intentions and directions for the members. The main driver is the desire to overcome opposites and conflicts through the unification of common interests, especially in the field of economics and business. It is modeled after the European Union, as defined in the Statute and Work Program of the President of Turkey in 2001.²⁶

The CMES was launched, after two years of preparation, at a meeting of Heads of State and Government of the eleven countries of the region, held on 25 June 1992 in Istanbul. The Summit adopted two documents: the Declaration on Black Sea Economic Co-operation and the Bosphorus Declaration²⁷ outlining the objectives, content and forms of economic cooperation in several areas. In doing so, participants deliberately avoided the coverage of other important, purely political or security issues within the CMES.²⁸

Over the past twenty years, the development of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation could be conditionally divided into the following stages:²⁹

I PHASE - represents a period of initiation and gradual organization and profiling of this initiative, without major concrete results or clearer organization, and lasts for the first two to three years of CMES, ie. between 1990 (launch of the initiative), and in 1992 (first meeting) to 1995;

PHASE II - may be conditionally linked to the organization of a second high-level meeting of representatives of the CMES countries (ie at the level of Heads of State or Government, or other High Representatives) in Bucharest (30 June 1995), after which the Foreign Ministers adopted a special Action plan, which encouraged and reorganized the work of CMES supporting bodies. Eight more new working groups have been formed. The functioning of cooperation has been strengthened by the introduction of the Ministerial Troika system. The work of the Permanent International Secretariat of the CMES (aka PERMIS) in Istanbul was intensified, and from the end of that year the joint financing of the work of the Secretariat (which until then was funded only by Turkey) was switched. This phase is characterized by the intensive holding of the CMES meeting at all levels, especially at the level of heads of state or government (two summits of the CMES countries were held in Moscow on October 1996 and in Yalta in June 1998). Finally, this period was crowned by the signing of a charter for the transformation

²⁶ Jeftic, N., Regional Cooperation of the Black Sea Region Countries, Scientific Paper, Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia, 2006-2010, p. 34.

²⁷ Summit Declaration on Black Sea Cooperation, Istanbul, 25. June 1992, In: PERMIS, BSEC-Handbook of Documents, vol. I, Istanbul, July 1995, str. 3.

²⁸ Neskovic, S., Modern Armed Conflicts as the Main Cause of Migration Process, Thematic Proceedings of Leading National Importance, Scientific Conferences with International Participation "South-east Europe and Postmodern Challenges", Proceedings, Edition Security in Postmodern Ambience, Book 23 and 24, Belgrade: Center for Strategic Research on National Security - CESNA B Belgrade and Faculty of Law, Security and Management "Constantine the Great" Union - Nikola Tesla University in Belgrade, 2018, p. 59.

²⁹ Lopandic, D., Kronja, J., Regional Initiatives and Multilateral Cooperation in the Balkans, Second Edition, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2010, p. 141.

of CMES into an international organization (at the Yalta Summit) and the final entry into force, at the beginning of 1998, of a treaty establishing the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank;

PHASE III - With the ratification and implementation of the aforementioned Charter, the cooperation of CMES countries have entered a new phase of institutionalization. At this stage, CMES has gradually acquired all the characteristics of a regional international organization, with scattered bodies and bodies, within which internationally binding documents (agreements, memoranda) are being adopted. From a declarative forum, CMES has focused on a kind of project-oriented organization. Yet this trend has not quite succeeded;

PHASE IV - The development of CMES can be linked to the process of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe during the first decade of the 21st century. After 2007, two CMES members (Bulgaria and Romania) became members of the European Union at the same time, which physically brought the whole Union to the shores of the Black Sea. This makes the EU much more involved in relations with CMES, especially through the so-called Black Sea Synergy policy.

CMES is characterized by the institutional abundance and diversity of bodies and forms of cooperation, which is to some extent in contrast to the limited results so far.

1. The main form of decision-making is the regular meetings of foreign ministers of the CMES countries.
2. Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs), which meets twice a year
3. CMES Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS)
4. CMES subsidiary bodies (working groups and expert groups)
5. CMES Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC)
6. CMES Business Council
7. Thessaloniki-based Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
8. International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)

At the CMES Summit in Yalta (June 5, 1998), the Heads of State of all 11 Member States signed the Charter on the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, based on which this forum grew into a regional organization with international subjectivity.

This charter essentially did not introduce some major innovations into the earlier functioning of CMES, but has transformed the past practice into an internationally legally binding vocabulary. The Charter, whose official language is English, has 34 members and is divided into 10 chapters.³⁰ The preamble emphasizes the desire of the signatories to develop "lasting and close cooperation" as part of the integration process in Europe on the basis of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter and on the principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, social justice, as well as "equal security and stability".

The Charter came into force after being ratified by at least nine signatories. Following its entry into force, some other supporting documents, such as the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the CMES Organization, the Staff Regulations of the

³⁰ Report of the 11th meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs, PERMIS, Istanbul, May, 1998, p. 120.

Secretariat staff, and the like, were concluded.

After years of hesitation to engage more deeply in the Black Sea region, the European Union has changed its strategy after enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria. This way, the EU took to the Black Sea coasts, making its role in this region different. The EU Commission received observer status at CMES.

One of the first steps of greater EU involvement in the CMES region is the announcement of the implementation of the so-called Black Sea Synergy Initiatives.

The Black Sea Synergy essentially complements the various forms of EU bilateral cooperation with individual CMES members, such as: the EU-Turkey accession strategy, strategic partnership with Russia and the so-called neighborhood policy with Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus countries.³¹

The main areas identified as topics for the development of "synergy" are: democracy and human rights, cross-border movement control, frozen conflicts, energy, transport, environment, trade, maritime and fisheries, science and education. Partnerships are envisaged in three key sectors: environment, transport and energy. The Black Sea Synergy is, in a way, a regional element of EU policies towards CMES countries, which, therefore, does not replace but complement its bilateral policies towards individual countries. In this respect, Synergy forms part of the European Neighborhood Policy towards Eastern European countries.³² The most important aspect of Synergy is the possibility of engaging significant financial resources for cooperation from European Union funds earmarked for the Neighborhood Policy (Neighborhood Policy Investment Fund - NIF), etc.

After the CMES was established and the basic lines of action were determined, the basic domains of cooperation were defined, including:³³

1. economy and trade
2. cooperation in the field of tourism
3. communications
4. ecology
5. agriculture and agrarian industry
6. energy
7. electronic communications network
8. science and technology
9. information statistics and data exchange
10. Health and Pharmaceuticals
11. transportation

³¹ Nešković, S., Geostrategic Position and Security Synergies of the Black Sea Region Trough Cooperation with the European Union, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, Cross - Border Cooperation, Security and Development Perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Region, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 16.

³² http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-78_en.htm?locale=en

³³ Jetic, N., Regional Cooperation of the Black Sea Region Countries, Scientific Paper, Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia, 2006-2010, p. 43.

12. emergency assistance and the fight against crime

After a lengthy consultation, the BSEC Economic Agenda was added to this list³⁴ which has 5 main areas and these in turn cover several sub-areas. Together they make up the BSEC 'agenda' for a longer period. These include:

1. Accelerate effective multilateral economic cooperation and achieve sustainable development
2. Cooperation in the field of institutional strengthening of the state administration
3. Program of security standards and measures in the framework of multilateral cooperation
4. Orientation towards mature partnerships, shared aspirations and shared values
5. BSEC External Relations

Considering all the above, the most important advantages, ie. the positive results of CMES can be cited by the fact that this kind of integration has been formed and is functioning successfully. On this basis, a very numerous network of cooperation bodies was created and CMES formed certain international integrity and position, and also played a role in supporting the social evolution of transition countries that are members of CMES. It can also be noted that CMES has been particularly successful in organizing groups and bodies that have discussed various issues so far.

The shortcomings showed in the cooperation of CMES countries so far are cited:³⁵

- lack of a clear long-term strategy and priorities (especially in the early phase of CMES);
- insufficient political support for the proposed projects;
- insufficient efficiency or great slowness in the implementation of ideas and proposals;
- insufficient financial resources for cooperation, which is related to the low level of development and economic difficulties of most Member States;
- the impact of political instability in the individual Member States on the whole process;
- Too large cultural-social and political differences between members (ie membership incoherence);
- insufficient level of economic exchange and links between participants;
- over-focus on non-political goals and avoid addressing key political and security issues;
- insufficient division of competencies between CMES bodies and duplication of activities;
- unresolved bilateral political and security problems between some members, which affect the general atmosphere in CMES;
- duplication of activities and / or membership with some similar sub-regional

organizations, etc.

The greatest achievements of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation are in the fields of transport, telecommunications, energy, environment, health, trade, foreign investment and international relations. The disadvantages are the lack of a clear long-term strategy and priorities, insufficient political support for the proposed projects, insufficient efficiency, insufficient financial resources for the implementation of the projects, large differences between the members, insufficient level of economic exchange, avoidance of political goals and security issues, etc.

It can be concluded that the most significant trend that has emerged in recent years is the strengthening of European Union participation in the CMES region. The Union has an interest in relativizing or suppressing the influence of two significant non-EU actors in the region, namely Russia and Turkey, through its direct action. The greatest advantage of Union involvement lies in the fact that its policies are usually accompanied by financial resources that are more significant than those normally engaged in regional cooperation. Also, the Union has not been treated as a threat by anyone, that is, its role as a "civilian force" allowing it to communicate more easily and to mediate in some of the regional or bilateral disputes. The importance of energy sources in the Black and Caspian Sea region will undoubtedly continue to increase the EU's interest in participating in CMES in the coming period.

Recently, several formal proposals have been made to improve regional cooperation and reform of regional institutions, as well as to improve the integration of the region into the EU. Thus, it was proposed to establish a special group (Wisemen group) to evaluate the results of regional cooperation so far, in particular the work of the PSCIE, and to propose guidelines for the content and form of future cooperation, suggesting that a more institutionalized form for this initiative should be considered. from forums or processes. A new approach to regional cooperation in the future is proposed, based on: restoring cultural, economic and political ties; overcoming the legacy of the past and building relationships that will meet the challenges of the future; and on developing a new spirit of collaboration. The four policy principles around which the vision of future cooperation should be structured are as follows:³⁶

- Regional ownership and inclusiveness - in the future, as many regional initiatives as possible are needed to strengthen cooperation and solve problems through bilateral, trilateral and multilateral processes;
- regional reintegration - fostering political dialogue at the highest level. A mechanism similar to that in the EU - 2-3 summits is proposed instead of an annual summit. Reintegration and integration of regions in the economic field (air routes, highways, high-speed trains), culture, education and science;
- the importance of the European integration process - a two-way process in which the Balkan region can also contribute to making the European Union multiculturally and economically competitive, as well as being politically and strategically relevant on the international scene. The region should use its centuries-old multiculturalism as an asset, and politicians in the region should make the Balkans attractive to the EU and an area of economic interaction of

34 of BSEC Economic Agenda for the future, a Document adapted by BSEC in March 2001 and approved by the 4th Meeting of the BSEC Council of Ministres in Moscow, 27 April 2001.
35 Manoli, P., *The Dynamics of Black Sea Subregionalism*, Routledge, 2016, p. 86.

36 Nešković, S., *Geostrategic Position and Security Synergies of the Black Sea Region Trough Cooperation with the European Union*, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, Cross - Border Cooperation, Security and Development Perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Region, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 18.

wider benefit;

- joint appearance and coordination of positions in regional and global organizations - it is necessary to develop an inter-Balkan dialogue on certain broader issues and to take a common position. Solidarity, consultation and the development of joint projects in global fora can have a positive impact on regional cooperation in the Balkans and vice versa.

The following is an elaborated proposal for the establishment of a Western Balkans Fund for regional cooperation modeled on the Visegrad Fund. The main objective is to financially stimulate multilateral cooperation of civil society organizations in the Western Balkans in the fields of culture, science, education, cross-border cooperation and exchange of experience. The founders of the Fund are the states, which should also contribute to strengthening the cooperation and links between the state and civil sectors in the Western Balkan countries. The fund should be at least 10 years old and could initially include countries that want to do so with the open option of joining others. Initial contributions may also be more modest to trigger the whole mechanism. The possibility of contributors from a wider range of stakeholders is open, as well as the opportunity to engage part of the funds of the countries of the region from the national components of the IPA program.

It should also be added that several international conferences are being held on the topic of EU integration and enlargement policy and a large number of texts published by prominent European analysts and researchers. An almost general conclusion from these analyses is that the EU should be even more energetic and concrete in its enlargement policy, which would be of mutual benefit and important for sustainable stability (one good example in this regard is the effectiveness in fulfilling the visa waiver plan).

The countries of the SEE region cannot influence the development and solutions of the wider crisis in the EU, they can have a limited impact on the dynamics of the Union's enlargement, but they can continue to play a key role when it comes to promoting and further developing regional cooperation. In the medium term, this could facilitate both the EU integration process itself and the problems related to the economic and social situation in the region. The SEE countries have the task of reassessing the results of cooperation and trying to define a common vision of the region and the role of the PSCIE and the JRC in the coming period.

The countries of the region could form a special panel of experts in regional cooperation and high representatives of the member states of the PSJIE ("Group of Wise") within the PSCIE or the JRC to prepare a plan with options for the development of cooperation. This could also be achieved through extended coordination between the EU-PSJIE-SRS, which would analyze and evaluate the results of regional cooperation so far, and in particular the work of the PSCEA. In addition to diplomatic bodies, the creation of a wider team of independent experts could be initiated in parallel, which would analyze achievements in specific areas and make proposals for improving cooperation. At the same time, it may be suggested to organize several think tank meetings and non-governmental organizations to discuss the issues of improving the form and area of regional cooperation.

For the time being, it seems unrealistic to merge the PSCIE and the JRC into a single solid organization, which would further weaken the current level of regional cooperation, as it is unlikely that all PSCIE member states would support it, and that the current format of multilateral cooperation would be weakened and weakened. The

merger of the PSCIE and the JRC could be realistic when all the countries of the region are members or on the safe path to membership, so the creation of such an organization would not be seen as a substitute for or competition with the EU integration.

Some of the possible ideas for improving cooperation can be categorized as:³⁷

1. Intensifying the work of the PSCIE: - increasing the number of meetings at the level of ministers and committees of political directors of foreign affairs by introducing special ad hoc meetings to exchange opinions on specific topics (certain international issues, economic and similar topics). In addition to the usual political issues at each summit, consider one topic in more detail (Agenda 2020, economic development, infrastructure, the fight against organized crime, culture, etc.); - Preparation of a joint program and work plan for several Presidencies in important areas (meetings of Ministers of Defense, Interior, Transport) - thus ensuring the regularity of meetings prepared by specialized working groups under the chairmanship of the Chair and in cooperation with the Secretariat of the JRC.
2. Strengthening the link between the PSCIE and the JRC: - align the next JRC strategy with the JCEC program for the same period (three-year residency program as in the case of the EU); - integrate the JRC to a greater extent as a working secretariat assisting the Chair of the PSCIE; - organize special working meetings of the PSCIE countries before the JRC meetings; - strengthen the coordination of EU-PSJIE-SRS with more concrete content and use the analytical capacity of the JRC Secretariat to prepare thematic summits and ministerial meetings; - improve thematic functional cooperation in the region on priority topics (eg transport infrastructure, energy, environment, investment and business environment).
3. Greater complementarity between the EU and PSJIE / SRS processes: - align the work program of the JRC with the dynamics of the enlargement program whereby JRC activities should have an incentive function; - Strengthen coordination mechanisms between the European Commission and the PSCIE bodies and the JRC.

Other suggestions:

- take joint action with the support of the PSCIE and the JRC to represent the region in the EU and the Member States (fine arts, music, tourism, etc.);
- support the establishment of the Western Balkans Fund in the framework of the SRS, modeled on the Visegrad Fund;
- The PSCIE and the JRC should actively support the involvement of civil society organizations in all areas of cooperation.

37 Nešković, S., *Geostrategic Position and Security Synergies of the Black Sea Region Trough Cooperation with the European Union*, Cross - Border Book Series "New Challenges to Security and Development of the Balkans" Vol. 5, Cross - Border Cooperation, Security and Development Perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Region, Proceedings of International Scientific Conference 16 - 17.11.2017, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 2018, p. 21.

Conclusion

The process of regionalism and regionalization reflects the internal conditions, priorities and capabilities of individual member states of a particular region. The Danube region and the Black Sea cooperatives, ie initiatives, represent authentic strategic projects of the European Union. The essence of the aforementioned conceptions is to confirm and enhance the influence of this collectivity in the existing countries and to extend it to the territory of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. This refers to the expansion of Western action along the borders of the Russian Federation, which involves the inclusion of countries of the former socialist system. In the case of the Danube - Black Sea region, domestic and systemic conditions (such as state-building, transition and conflict) have limited regional cooperation to economic and political affairs. Regionalism has achieved very little compared to other foreign policy instruments.

The role of governments in decision-making and policy formulation of an institution such as CMES has had a dominant influence. The politics of the Danube - Black Sea region were led by leaders who witnessed a "Cold War" era, a long transition and an era of nation-building, confronted with "great power" rivalries. Consequently, their leadership and management styles were often more authoritative and more internal-oriented, while their foreign policies were very cautious and limited to supranational institutions. For this reason, Member States have not sufficiently integrated themselves into practice. The reasons for this, however, should not be simply attributed to the "unwillingness" and "reluctance" of the states themselves to cooperate, but rather to the shortcomings in terms of resources and experience, together with the fact that the geopolitical and economic environment in which the Danube regionalism was built and The Black Sea was inconvenient. Thus, despite the many advantages that this region has made possible through its integration, it must be acknowledged that the more numerous disadvantages of this integration indicate that in the future, however, more problems and challenges must be addressed and more attention paid to the weak points of this integration.

It can be concluded that not only globalization and regionalization are the only tendencies that characterize contemporary developments. In the future, some new alternatives and completely different directions for moving the new world should open up. Too simplistic picture of the dynamics of world development that oscillates in the viewpoints of globalization - regionalization can hardly be considered realistic because of the parallel existence of those viewpoints and the inability to separate the two viewpoints. From another angle, as history has shown so far, sudden and unexpected technological leaps can lead to some new forms of economic development, economies and societies in developed countries. Should this occur, it is logical to expect that the most developed countries, to protect their national interests and preserve their wealth, will close and virtually occupy monopoly positions vis-à-vis others.

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KHALVATIYYA AS A UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON OF INTERCULTURAL AND INTER-CIVILIZATION DIALOGUE

Annotation

Among the trends of Islamic philosophy Sufism is a trend which generates the greatest interest and has made efforts to turn into the stronghold of the religion it belongs to since its inception.

This must only be associated with the universal nature of the ideals advocated by Sufism which invites the most ordinary people irrespective of their race and religion to moral purity, ethical beauty and the Truth with essences through gaining wisdom. The proponents of Sufism in the true sense of a word have appeared in Azerbaijan since the X century. As, since the XII century, when tasawwuf got systematized on these lands, important philosophical trends like Suhrawardiyya, Abhariyya, Zahidiliyya, Khalwatiyya, Safawiyya, Hurufism, Ishragiyya, Akhiliyya have emerged from the formation of the tasawwuf world outlook...

According to the researchers, Khalwatiyya is one of the most significant trends of Sufism which was formed in the environment of Azerbaijan and has spread to a number of countries round the world, and Seyid Yahya Bakuvi, (died in 1463/64). the most famous among its founders, was the student of Abu Abdullah Sirajaddin Omar al-Khalwati Shirvani, known as piri-avval - the first saint man of the sect, its establisher.

He is received as a founder of insignia in scientific literature and one of the important theories of his mystical doctrine, to mainly experience of Halve. System of Bakuvi's worldview is reflected in generation who is continued thinkers in Azerbaijan, as a variety spiritual centre of regions of Islamic culture. After died of Seyyid Yahya, his sons and students (flowers his studies were reached approximately 20.000 persons and 360 of them were continued his studies.

And today millions of people address Sufism, since this doctrine invites people to universal ideas cleaning them from puny feelings, and targets every individual irrespective of their race, religion, nationality and gender, at his/her Creator. The Sufis who possess the effective ideas of the sacred books as a whole are the offspring of not individual nations, but of mankind.

Key Words: Khalwatiyya, Seyid Yahya Bakuvi, Sufism, Islam, religion

Like all tasavwuf jamaats, Khalvatia also went through a phased development before becoming a tariqat. Researchers distinguish four stages of this period:

1. The period from Abdulgahir Sukhravardi to Sheikh Ibrahim Zahid Gilani. This period in the sources of Khalvatia is designated as the period of the Usul of khalvatia.

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2. The period from Sheikh Ibrahim Zahid Gilani to Pir Omar (XIII-XIV centuries). This period is called the sectarianization period.
3. The period from Pir Omar to Sayyid Yahya Bakuvi, who formed the basis of the tariqa (XIV-XV centuries).
4. The period began to develop and spread with Sayyid Yahya (after the 15th century). This period is called the period of sectarianization and branching. Köse Fatih, İstanbul'da Halveti Tekkeleri, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Doktora Tezi, İstanbul 2010, s. 6

The name "Khalwatiyya" is taken from the nisba (attribution) of the tariqah's founder Siraj al-Din Omar Ibn Akmal al-Din al-Khalwati (d/ 800/1397-98). His full name in the sources is Siraj al-Din Omar Ibn Akmal al-Din al-Gilani al-Lahiji al-Khalwati.³ According to the sources, which give information about his life, Omar ibn Akmal al-Din loved (practiced) khalwa (spiritual retreat) and zikr (remembrance of God) in seclusion. It is mentioned that he was often meditating in a hollow of tree.⁴ For this reason, the tariqah (Sufi order) founded by him was called Khalwatiyya. During his khalwa he was performing zikr using the seven names of Allah: Lā ilāha illā-llāh (There is no god except Allah), Hu (He), al-Haqq (The Truth), al-Hayy (The Ever Living One), al-Qayyum (The Self-Existing One), al-Qahhar (The Subduer). This tradition of zikr was later adopted by some other tariqahs as well. Al-Khalwati advised his murids (followers) to perform khalwa, uzla (seclusion and solitude) and sukut (silence), and also he explained the main principles of Khalwatiyya on the bases of the four types of death which were expressed by the famous Sufi Hatim al-Asamm. For him, those who wish to enter the way of sayrawsuluk (spiritual path), should permanently struggle with their nafs (the self which commands to evil). He expressed it with the term of 'al-Mawt al-ahmar' (the red death). Secondly, the saliks (mystic wayfarers) should bear all kinds of trouble. This, in turn, is called 'al-mawt al-aswad' (the black death). Thirdly, they should be satisfied with what they possess, and should never complain. This principle is called 'al-mawt al-akhḍhar' (the green death). The last principle is that they should eat less and be occupied with praying and meditation. Omar al-Khalwati expressed this principle with the term of 'al-mawt al-abyadh' (the white death).⁵

Although Umar al-Khalwati was the founder of the Khalwatiyya order, it was systematized and spread by Seyyid Yahya Shirwani. For this reason, Shirwani is considered as the second founder (pir-e sani) of the tariqah. It could be said that Yahya Shirwani was the true founder of Khalwatiyya.

Seyyid Yahya Shirwani was born at the end of 14th century in Shamakhi in a prominent sayyid family. He was from the descendants of the imam Musa al-Kazim (d. 183/799). His father Bahaaddin was thenaqib al-ashraf (head of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) in the Shirwanshah State. After a certain time, Seyyid Yahya left Shamakhi to Baku, which was the capital of the Shirwanshahs at that time, and lived there until his death in 1463 or 1466. He had studied education in Moslim religious school (Madrassa) in Shamahi, which was scientific and educational centre of Islamic East. As-Seyid Jamaladdin Yahya ibn as-Seyid Bahaaddin ash-Shirvani al Bakuvi (whose forefathers used to be the Shirwanshahs' naqibs), had a perfect education and wrote works in three great languages: Turkish, Arabic and Persian for the intellects of

his time. He created the peculiar pieces of the sect Khalwatiyya and the Gnostic (irfani) literature.

Bakuvi lived 40 years in Baku by means of I Halilullah. He opened philosophical-religious school –Khanagah of sect Khalwatiyya. Thinker helped himself followers improve knowledge and science, he changed himself religious retreat in madrasa, where people studied spiritual and secular science. He is received as a founder of insignia in scientific literature and one of the important theories of his mystical doctrine, to mainly experience of Khalwa.

System of Bakuvi's worldview is reflected in generation who is continued thinkers in Azerbaijan, as a variety spiritual centre of regions of Islamic culture. Seyyid Bakuvi's mainly works is protected in fond of manuscript and library of Istanbul, these manuscripts are:

1. Acayibu'l-Kulub
2. Atvar'l-kalb
3. Beyanu'l-ilim
4. Esratu'l-vuduve's-salat (risale ma la buddbatiniyye)
5. Gazelliyyat
6. Keşu'l-kulub
7. Kissa'i Mansur
8. Mekarim-I ahlak
9. Menakib'Iemiri'l-mü'minin Ali Kerremallahü Vechehü
10. Menazilü'l-aşikin
11. Makamat
12. Ramuzu'l-işaret
13. Salavtu'n-Nebi
14. Şerhumeratib-i asraru'l-kulub
15. Şerhusualat-i gülşen-i esrar
16. Şerhuesma'isamaniye
17. Şifau'l-esrar
18. Tasarrufat'umukaşafat
19. Virdüsettar

It is obvious from the content of his works that Seyid Yahya presented the human being as a creature consisting of heart, nafs and soul in tasawwuf literature, and thoroughly commented on the characteristics of these notions in his works Atwarul-Qalb, Kashful-Qulub, Sharhi-Maratibi-Asraril-Qulub, Shafa al-Asrar going further into details. One of them fundamental manuscript of Shifa Al-Asrar what is protected in Istanbul. This manuscript is written in Turkish language and this work is translated with interpretations to Azeri language in 2010 years.

In his work Shafa al-Asrar, Bakuvi emphasized the utmost importance of science

³ Mustafa Tatci. "Elmalı'nın İrfan Ocakları: Bektâşilik ve Halvetilik Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme", Elmalı İrfan ve Sevgi Şehri, 2009, p.65.

⁴ See. Sadık Vicedani. Tomar-ı Turuk-ı Aliyyeden: Halvetiyye Silsilenamesi, İstanbul 1338-1341, p.19.

⁵ Mehmet Serhan Tayşi. "Ömer Halveti", DİA, İstanbul, 2007, XXXIV/65.

for those who started the path of tariqat (sect). In his works he attached equal importance and value to science and tasawwuf, i.e. wisdom and heart. The path of those who wished to enroll in this outstanding Sufi's school definitely passed through the acquisition of science. His following lines clearly demonstrate the sheikh's high attitude to science.

Science is the grandest crown, make friends with science,

The crown of science is dignity, deserve it and put it on your head.

The one, who has perspicacity, should acquire science,

Those who want a contented life should turn into science's companion.

If you have a bit of science, you have as if the wealth of the world,

If you are ignorant, there is no use of you to your relatives and family.

If the scholar's science yields fruit, the world will be happy,

The world with an unhappy scholar is unhappy itself.

The scholar is the person who will take actions through science

And reveal the concealed secret and, thus will acquire the crown.

The sciences Bakuvi meant were sciences like tafsir, hadith, fiqh (Islamic law). The sheikh stated the impossibility of joining tasawwuf without acquiring these sciences. The followers of the trends that did not follow the stated, rolled down into secrecy, turned into a threat for both religion and society, and caused disturbances. In brief, Bakuvi's scientific notion of tasawwuf has yielded its fruit, his Sufi school of Khalwatiyya has never been registered in history for going astray from its faith, causing religious, social and political intricacies despite of its wide spread through time. Meanwhile, the sheikh of this sect had 20 thousand murids (followers) back in his life time.

The sheikh, who owned this giant sect, wrote about the foundations of the Islamic tasawwuf and ethics in general in his work *The Mysteries of Sufism* (Shafa al-Asrar of the manuscript of the work, pointed out, "While explaining the tasawwuf principles in this valuable source, between the lines the sheikh warns against some belief deviations disseminated then in Shirvan and its surroundings, draws attention to the religious-social bases frequently emphasizing the ethical values").

Thus, the human being stands in the centre of the sum of ideals adopted in Sufism which invites its followers to moral ethical principles having adopted high ideological and psychological views. This human being is a supreme creature created by Allah (God) in the most perfect manner and enriched with numerous moral and material senses. If human being's material and moral senses are not positively used and developed, they will be of no good and even can turn harmful, like the worthlessness of unprocessed ores. As explained by Bakuvi, if the heart, the strongest human sense, even the core of the senses is inclined towards the soul, the true leader in morality, and developed towards its goal, the human being can reach the true point of humanity, and find happiness both in the world and afterlife. There is also a sense called nafs controlling the human being, and if the heart is inclined towards it, it will involve itself in disaster following the wild desires and wills and become unhappy both in the world and afterlife. (Shafa al-Asrar, Azerbaijani translation, page 4a-b).

Order of Khalwatiyya was separated broadly to Caucasasia and Turkey in XV century. It has reached to Egypt (firstly, Khalwati were diffused by three Azeri: Shamsad-din

Demirdash, Sahin al-Halvati and Ibrahim Gulshani) and Middle East. Even, this action surrounded Sudan, Ethiopia, Abyssinia and West Kenya and this mystical and religious sect has reached to border of Zanzibar.

Insignia Khalwatiyya had evaluated many times during century. It has created itself three basically currents:

1. Rushaniyye
2. Gulshaniyye
3. Demirtashiyye

In Afghanistan have been diffused studies of order of Sheikh Safiad-din al-Khalwati (died in 1381 years), in Middle East Kasim al-Anvari (died in 1451 years), in Indonesia- Sheikh Muhammed bin Abdulkarim Assaman (died in 1775 years), Sheikh from Damask Mustafa Kamal ad-Din al-Bakri founded in average of XVIII century himself private system of thought Khalwatiyya-Bakriyye. In the end of XVIII century, one of the flowers Khalwatiyya Sheikh Abu al-Abas Ahmed at-Ticani diffused order of Tijaniyya in The North-West of Africa in 1781 years (He died in 1815 years in Fes, Morocco where he is buried).

After died of Seyyid Yahya, his sons and students (flowers his studies were reached approximately 20.000 persons and 360 of them were continued his studies. There are some famous among them as a Dede Omar Roushani, Aladdin Rumi, Yusif Muskuri Shirvani his work was published "Bayan al-Asrar li-t-talibin fi-t-tasavvuf") diffused his studies to The West and South-West of Caucasasia to direction of Anatolia, direction of Balkans and Africa, by crossing Syria, Egypt and Sudan, to mountain of Kabuli in Alger where Khalwatiyya has reached there in XVIII century.

The Algerian Sufi School was the source of many saints and sufi sects. Among them the founder Tijaniyya Order Sheikh Ahmad Al-Tijani (1737-1815), the founder of Rakhmaniyya Order Mohammed Ben Abd al-Rahman al-Rakhmaniyya Gastuli (1715/1793) and the founder of the Sanusiyya sect Sidi Mohammad Ben Ali Al-Khayyabi Al-Mustaghanmi are to be presented in the first ranks. Sheikh Muhammed b. Abdar-Rahmanak-Gashtuli al-Azhari and where Khalwatiyya had taken itself name from creator and become called Rahmaniyye.

Should be noted in particular the role of women in the spreading the teaching of Khalwatiyya. Especially must be noted Laila Zaynab the daughter of Sidi Mohammed Ben Belkacem Al-Hamiliyya, who led enough the large Zaviyya and belonged to the Order Rakhmaniyya until 1914 year of death. His tomb is Saidavalley.

After his death, his followers spread Khalwatiyya in the whole Islamic world, in particular, in Anatolia, and thus Khalwatiyya became one of the biggest Sufi orders in terms of its khānqāhs and followers.

After Shirwani, the Khalwati order divided into four branches: Raushaniyya which belongs to Dada Umar Raushani, Jamaliyya which is ascribed to Sheikh Muhammad Chalabi Jamali known as Chalabi Khalifa, Shamsiyya which was founded by Sheykh Shams al-Din Sivasi and Ahmadiyya which belong to Shekh Shams al-Din Ahmad Sivasi. These branches, in turn, have divided into different sub-branches. In general, the Khalwati order has more sub-branches than other Sufi orders.⁶

⁶ Aşkar. "Bir Türk Tarikatı Olarak Halvetiyye'nin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Halvetiyye Silsilesinin Tahlili", pp.555-560.

The Basics of the Khalwati Order:

Like in other Sufi orders, the notion of sayrwasuluk, which is considered as a spiritual journey towards Allah, possesses great importance in Khalwatiyya. As it was mentioned above, the Khalwati system attaches great importance to the notions zikr and khalwa. In this respect, these two notions play a key role in salik's achieving a spiritual purification by overcoming different stages in the way to Allah.

The basics of the Khalwati order are as follows:

1. Performing zikr by reciting Lāilāha illā-llāh
2. Performing zikr by reciting the above-mentioned seven names (al-asma al-arbaa) of Allah
3. Having our hearts purified from all kinds of evil and thus getting spiritual maturity⁷

Murids (followers) of the Khalwati order have daily as well as individual and collective zikrs. One of the most common supplications is Seyyid Yahya Shirwani's famous book of supplication Vird as-Sattar. Like in all alawi orders, collective zikrs are performed audibly. The musical instruments like nay (reed-flute), qudum (kettle-drum) and daff (tambourine) are used during zikrs. Dawaran (zikr ceremonies in which dervishes move rhythmically in a circle) also has a great importance in the Khalwati order.

The spread of Khalvatia in the Balkans

Despite the well-known fact of the spread of Islam and its tariqats during the Ottoman period, there is an assumption that this story is somewhat ancient.

As a forerunner of Islam in the Balkans, a mythological figure under the name of Sari Saltuk is especially mentioned. This historical and mythological character lived much earlier than the Ottoman conquests in the Balkans. For example, Ahmet Yashar Odzhak, who conducted research in this area, believes that the activities of Sarah Saltuk in the Balkans occurred in the time of the Anatolian-Seljuk Sultan II Izzeddin Keikavus (1234-1280). The researcher also believes that after settling in Dobruja, which is part of the territory of today's Romania and Bulgaria, Sari Saltuk, together with the dervishes who are subordinate to him, acted in the territory of today's Romania and Moldova, sought to preach and spread Islam⁸.

It should be noted that one of the most widespread and widely branched sects of Sufism is Khalvatia. Bulgarian researcher, Ina Merjanova, notes that with the conquest of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Sufi tariqats also began to spread in these areas. Thus, along with the Naqshbandi sect, the Khalvatia was able to penetrate the Balkans, as well as Bulgaria.⁹

Jane Hathaway notes that in the XVII-XVIII centuries, along with Anatolia,

Halvatia was divided into several branches also in the Balkans.¹⁰ The issue of the wide distribution and branching of the Khalvatian sect in the Balkans, which was further developed by the followers of Sayyid Yahya Bakuvi, who is from Azerbaijan, also affects Side Emre.¹¹ Some researchers attribute the date of the spread of Khalvatiya on the Balkans to the XVIII century. For example, N. Alekperova relates the date of distribution of the said tariqat to this century.¹²

It should be noted that in the Balkans, Sufism was not limited to the sect of Khalvatia. For example, famous for his research on the history of the spread of Islam, including Sufism in Eastern Europe, and especially in the Balkans, H.T. Norris writes that in the Eastern Balkans, especially Macedonia and Bulgaria, the Sufi sect of Bektashiya also played an important role.¹³ One of the main areas of distribution of Bektashiya are precisely the Balkans and Bulgaria. H.T. Norris also addresses the issue of widespread in Bulgaria purely esoteric (internal) sects of Sufism - Hurufism and Alevism.¹⁴ As a result, Hurufism, which was founded by Fazlullah Naimi - Astarabadi (1340-1394), after facing intense criticism in the Islamic world, was able to continue its existence exactly in the Balkans.

Conclusion

The principles of Khalvatiya's teachings, its philosophy developed by Bakuvi in the 15th century are preserved to the present and the modern world perceives it as one of the manifestations of the past and modern humanist culture of the Islamic region.

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TYPES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-WHAT WE MIGHT EXPECT TO HAPPEN?

Abstract

The paper explores the three manifestations of AI-narrow, general and super AI. It also describes the consequences due to AI implementation in the area of labor, medicine, education, security systems, etc.

Keywords: Narrow, general and super AI; future of jobs; media and AI; education and AI; security and AI;

We are expecting several megatrends, some huge evolutionary steps, which will totally change the concept of reality the way we know it. Each radical change in human society in the past was caused by some of the key factors, which allowed it – from wood, stone, bronze, iron, through steam, electricity, automation, to our times, with the introduction of the Internet, technologies and the different appearance of artificial intelligence. Soon, these new trends will outline and alter not only politics, economy, trade, culture and societies, but our biology and ethics as well.

As we discuss AI, we have to take into consideration that it will have at least three manifestations. The first is the so called “narrow” or “weak” artificial intelligence [1]. It is named thus, because it is designed to address limited, single tasks. A great part of the currently functioning systems of artificial intelligence are exactly this type of it, which performs clearly defined task/s. This is a technology, which allows high functioning systems to repeat, and even surpass human skills in terms of their assigned tasks. Such are: “Watson”, “Siri”, “Kortana” and “Alexa”. They have a definite degree of intelligence in a certain field, but without the completeness, complexity and associations in judgment, of which humans are able.

The second manifestation will be of the so called strong, general artificial intelligence, which will understand, and will possess cognitive abilities and self-awareness, which make it indistinguishable from humans, although the speed and skills for processing of information will be quite faster [2]. Such artificial intelligence would make systematic summaries, would think rationally and would learn from its experience. It would have understanding with experience of the surrounding environment, in the same way as humans, but with far faster reaction abilities. That suggests that a similar system would become stronger in the field of knowledge, the cognitive abilities, the processing speed, because of the possibilities for exponential development. Thus, a new specific kind of entity or even entities would appear.

The third manifestation would be of the super artificial intelligence, which will repeatedly excel and surpass humans and it will be hard to anticipate its behavior and

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described its “nature” [3]. Probably that will be the last pure human invention (according to Nick Bostrom, Elon Musk)-either because after that humans and AI will create together, co-create or because we may even disappear.

Certainly, we must specify that the last two may never happen, that is why some analysts rather categorize them as a technological balloon or unfeasible projects. Even in current manifestation, AI will have a significant impact on our reality in key sectors.

Labor and future of jobs

According to Osborne’s and Benedikt’s report [4] in 2022 about 47% of the professions will pass to partial or total automation and robotization on a global scale. For 2025, the percent grows to 52%, to reach the expected level of 70% for 2035. At the same time, an opposite, even mutually exclusive forecasts exist. On the one hand, the technological optimists announce that many job positions and professions will disappear, but this will give a chance for new to appear, which are more creative and more innovative, able to evolve new, undiscovered to the present human potential. The progress in the machine, deep and reinforced learning [the way we teach AI] indicates that not only professions with monotonous and repetitive functions, but also such which process data, as accountants, journalists, T.V. speakers, legal councilors, doctors for diagnosing elementary deceases, will be gradually replaced by the machines. In the indicated areas, the experts will remain for the cases, where complex solving of issues is necessary. But they have to co-work and coexist together.

The Israeli researcher Yuval Harari in his book “Homo Deus – a brief history of tomorrow” [Harari, 2016] discusses that humanity will pass to the “machine intelligence economy”, “the economy of dehumanization”. Again, he confirms that, all the workers on monotonous production lines will be replaced in stages by industrial robots.

The same applies for fast - food chefs, translators, accountants, office managers, farmers, etc. Farmers are alive proof of the influence of technology. They used to be 87% in 19 century in USA and now they are around 2% of the working force and probably they will decline to 0, 5%. The future farms will be the so called pink vertical farms - based on hydroponics system. They will take very small places, probably on the rooftops in the big cities and will not need staff.

There is an application based on artificial intelligence, “doctor Watson” [5], which in America is used by almost 18% percent of population for diagnosing trivial deceases, while the tendency is that it will become better in diagnosing for complicate ones. A similar algorithm is used as well for legal analyses again in the USA, while Estonia tends to introduce a judge-artificial intellect, which arbitrates cases to 7 thousand Euros. Therefore, medical doctors, judges and lawyers are also threatened.

We can provide another example with Steve Larson [6] - a composer, who 2 years ago gathered an unbiased audience of about 3 thousand people, to whom he presented 3 works – his own, of the composer Bach and of algorithm of artificial intelligence. At last, he asked the audience which melody was uttermost heartfelt and heartwarming. Guess what did the audience say? They undoubtedly chose AI composition.

In Hong Kong there is already a board of directors of AI for the risk investments, so called VCs. In other words, neither the very complicated, nor the creative professions are not threatened.

So, it’s obvious, that all countries must immediately reform a lot of systems-their educational systems beyond the overspecialization and profiling, which create attitudes for interdisciplinary cooperation and regular retraining. The models of the social and health systems, have to be rethought, too. A question of global consensus is the new type of productions to be taxed, because the robotization and AI practically will not have a cost, while replacing more and more human labour. Robots will have the capacity to work day and night-24/7, for them there is no need of compensations - salaries, social and health insurances will be no necessary, while only an initial investment for the purchase of the equipment. But if global agreement lacks on these issues, it will repeat the phenomenon of searching for tax havens, which will generate huge inequalities of a new kind.

What will happen with Politics, governance and elections process (democracy)?

In the context of the notion for new governance, where the idea of shared responsibility and objective forms for reaching solutions, politics, management and the election processes are also embodied, they are as well open for the implementation of artificial intelligence. It’s not accidental that again Harari speaks that politics, religion and economy will merge in one new ideology-the so called “datism” - the name comes from “big data”[Harari.2016]. Everything from the future digital infrastructure of IoT will report permanently data. On that way, AI will be taught by Big Data-that is providing an effective decision for everything.

In politics, we already have a precedent in this direction, in the last Presidential Elections in Russia in March 2018 a candidate was registered with the name of “Alice”, who received 25 thousand votes. “Alice” was not a real personality, but artificial intelligence, created by Yandex, the Russian equivalent of Google. Her comparative advantage was shown as arguments that she “depends on logic” and is “not led by emotions, doesn’t seek personal advantages and does not make judgements.” She is also available 24/7, doesn’t age, has an intellect that works seven times faster than a human brain and, is able to take into account millions of opinions, and “always remembers you” [7]. If we already have AI in VC board, why don’t we have government positions like that? Of course, that will be far in the future, but we know that more and more politician refuse to bear responsibilities for unpopular decisions. So, they may delegate that in the future to AI. That’s why we have to be careful not to dehumanize politics, too.

Health and healthcare

A powerfully developing trend is the accomplishment of increasing longevity of humankind. It will be possible by means of growing organs and tissues of stem cells, by means of 3D and 4D biological printing, nanorobots, which will “repair and fix” locally problem areas in the human body, or in a more remote perspective merging of the human brain with cloud systems and artificial intelligence (singularity) [8] by means of chips or nano-electromagnetic particles.

With the concept of gene-editing, the prevention of many genetic diseases becomes possible, too. In this context, again, moral-ethical issues arise if we have the right to design perfect, but unified children. This is something that allows to erase almost everything from our genes but does that guarantee that it is for good or can somebody predict what the consequences will be? By the technology of CRISPR-CAS9 and the in

vitro procedure it will be totally possible to “repair”, “add”, “delete” and totally preset what the child will be as biological characteristics. The selection probably will be made again by AI.

Another trend is in telemedicine, which gains greater popularity, as AI algorithms, which set diagnoses. There are a number of breakthroughs in the diagnosis of the early stages of cancers and of such cancer that will be developed in 5 years. A number of inventions are introduced, the so-called “wearables” – clothes, accessories and devices, which already reports the status of human health, following indicators of human blood, urine, sweat, saliva, and etc.

The telemedicine, the medical software and these devices are at an affordable price and may to a great extent increase the role of prevention in the healthcare. All these processes will be controlled by the artificial intelligence, which will be in permanent self-training by the information from them.

Defence, Safety and security and crime prevention sectors

In military aspect, the future wars are also expected to be waged by forms of artificial intelligence. Smart drones, planes, submarines and robots – killers will be the new martial weapons. Because of the speed of information processing in the future control and command centers of the artificial intelligence, very soon after that its use for making decisions will be needed. A huge debate is at hand about this autonomy – for example, the activation of nuclear weapons, and etc.

In this area we urgently need an introduction of regulations in the use of new technologies and artificial intelligence, because such types of weapons may be produced and distributed illegally, which may serve the goals of organized terrorists, or individual destructive actions.

The system of facial recognition is expected to be used for the detection of criminals, or for prevention, because it already provenly demonstrates it may identify a personality, linking it only with its image. Here are some examples in this area in China. A lot of ideas are tested firstly as an experiment. There are some cities where face recognition system is introduced and the result is self-regulation and crime disappearance. That might be also dangerous because China tends to introduce social credit system, where people are awarded or punished according to their social behavior.

AI and Mass media

In companies like Google, Facebook and Baidu (Google news, Facebook newsfeed and Baidu’s news app), the news content is created almost totally by algorithms and only a vague human surveillance is available. Again, in China, the first AI TV newsmen was shown few months ago. Obviously, we are entering the post truth era where deep fake news and dehumanization of media content threaten us. Another alarming trend is that due to the huge database and the great number of available personal information, all news and media contents will be personalized. Therefore, people will receive a different type of information on the grounds of their behavior in the network and the social media. Everyone will receive information “a la carte”, but this demonstrates as well one of the contradictions, which arise now and will continue in the future – the presence of more and more information and a tighter horizon of users, who are “closed” in their “echo-

chambers”[9]. The “echo chambers” are a phenomenon, where certain ideas, beliefs and data are reinforced by means of reiteration in closed systems, which does not allow movement of alternative or competing ideas to occur. By means of them, suggestions and beliefs will be successfully modelled. The more people get from a certain information, the more they are convinced that they are on the right sight, way. Artificial intelligence may be both provider of that or a guarantee for limiting these phenomena.

Education

Artificial intelligence will contribute to the acquisition of better school and university education. The effect of the so-called smart classrooms and academic training auditoriums may already be observed, where software AI is applied. It contributes to the efficiency of training, reinforces the personal approach, by meeting the unique needs of the students, and administrators. For example, a lot of history lessons are taught as a relevant computer game. “Gamefication enters in lessons”. All this supports the teachers and the lecturers to have enough time and freedom to emphasize on the understanding and adaptation of the new knowledge of the students.

Platforms for the spectrum, which covers the pre-school to the university educations, are created, which on the grounds of feedback questionnaires will fine-tune very precisely the education levels and the needs of their users. It was announced recently that by those who read the books from “Amazon” on the “Kindle device” information is accumulated on how the reader responds to the reading via attitudes and emotions. The same is expected as well by the educational platforms, which in the future, will be able to rely on the emotions of the person, so that they may anticipate if the content is understood and if they need to adapt it to the level of intelligence of everyone, who uses them.

These platforms will become universal classrooms or educational/scientific disciplines, which will be used by anyone, at a constantly dropping price or free of charge. On the one hand, this will contribute to the equality of the access [even children, who don’t speak languages, will be able to use functions of an instant translator] and will confirm the idea for the Internet and the technologies as an age of the [free of charge] abundance. But it will strengthen the ongoing tendencies for the disappearance of the classic forms of education, especially of the university one. This will affect as well the school education, which already possesses a key socializing function.

In conclusion, we may say that we are going to face huge paradigm shifts - a lot of key concepts will be blown up. The concepts for birth, education, career and death because of the progress of technologies. But we are not ready to suggest a viable alternative, that’s why we should consider all the possible consequences - good and bad in order to live in a better world.

Notes:

- [1] <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32874/narrow-artificial-intelligence-narrow-ai>
- [2] <https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/definition/artificial-general-intelligence-AGI>
- [3] <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/31619/artificial-superintelligence-asi>
- [4] <https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/future-of->

employment.pdf

- [5] <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjIx62TzabIAhVDwqYKHhXCxoQFjAAegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ibm.com%2Fwatson&usg=AOvVaw1gEuXgAIY8N0YKiJMrkWla>
- [6] <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/11/science/undiscovered-bach-no-a-computer-wrote-it.html>
- [7] <https://yandex.ru/alice/index>
- [8] <https://futurism.com/singularity-explain-it-to-me-like-im-5-years-old>
- [9] <https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-47447633>

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Ivan Katzarski¹

GLOBALIZATION AND WAR: BETWEEN THE BALTIC SEA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

Abstract

The first part of the report examines the general connection between globalization and war: globalization as a path to war, and war as an instrument of globalization. The second part analyzes the specific situation of political and military confrontation in the Black Sea region. The author argues that this region is the central segment of an arc of general geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia, an arc that encompasses the territories spanning between the Baltic Sea and the Persian Gulf. The article examines how this geopolitical arc was formed and the respective strategies applied by the main geopolitical players.

Keywords: globalization, war, Black Sea region, United States, NATO, Russia, European Union, China, Turkey

Globalization and war: do these two concepts have something in common?

According to the still dominant neoliberal doctrine, the connection between them is mostly negative. Globalization is perceived as contrary to the division of the world into hostile camps and therefore as excluding war as an instrument of politics. The era of globalization after the end of the Cold War has been represented as the victory of an economic and social system that is without alternative, a system based on the freedom of economic initiative and the autonomous action of market forces, and hence, a system alien to aggression and war.

A concise expression of this doctrine was the catchword "Free movement of capital, goods and people". Today, this appeal is hardly heard any more. The single cause of this is that it has become obvious even to the vehement proponents of globalization that contemporary reality has refuted the idea.

What happened?

I will set aside the anti-global movements that have taken root in various strata and groups of people throughout the world. These are movements of the losers from globalization: the workers and small entrepreneurs who have lost their jobs and livelihood, environmental protection activists, protectors of national cultures and identities. However, anti-globalism is no longer only a protest cause but has turned into a state policy. The outstanding example of this is the administration of Donald Trump, who is fulfilling a program to withdraw the United States from the "free trade" regime, to return capital to the U. S., and to restrict immigration drastically. It turns out that the citadel of "free enterprise" has started to feel itself a victim of the free movement of capital, goods, and people. In the countries of the European Union, anti-globalism has not yet become a dominant political tendency, but there is a clear perspective that it will.

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If even the world's richest and most influential countries already feel themselves to be victims of globalization, this feeling should be all the stronger in countries that do not have the economic and political capacity to defend their national interests.

However, the countries that were and continue to be targets of capital expansion are not all in the same position. Most of them are simply victims of this expansion, which is devastating them economically, socially and culturally. Yet some countries with great economic potential have succeeded in escaping from this hold and are using globalization in the interest of their own economic growth. The most salient example in this respect is, of course, China. The mechanism, in its most general outline, is the following: a skillful national strategy has enabled such countries to use migrating capital and the opening of the world market so as to accelerate their own industrialization and modernization. Enormous industrial potential was exported out of the developed economies into the fast-developing countries and began to work for the economic growth of the latter. In two or three decades, the politically and economically monocentric world became polycentric.

The world today is justly described as, among other things, chaotic. "Order" is easily achieved when a single super power dominates the planet, because "order" is equated with the dominance of that power. It is harder for this to happen when there are two super powers, but a balance can still be struck when the two divide the world into separate spheres of influence (the situation that lasted from the end of World War II till the breakdown of the Soviet Union). A balance of power is increasingly hard to achieve as a growing number of countries lays claim to the status of first-rank powers. Several such powers today are fighting for economic and political supremacy at world level: some of them are trying to expand their positions, others, to preserve them. Today the world is in a situation that resembles that at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, when the contradictions between the great powers led to two worldwide military catastrophes. Today, a similar prospect is not at all to be excluded.

The term globalization has some broader synonyms: enlargement, expansion, penetration. All of them designate taking hold of and control over new territories. This is achieved foremost through open coercion, aggressive conduct that is called war in reference to conflicts between various communities (clans, tribes, states). Starting from the time of the earliest civilizations, however, war has not been the only instrument of territorial expansion; it has been complemented and combined with two other basic instruments: trade and religion (ideology). Traders and religious missionaries often outpaced the military formations, but always accompanied them or followed them. From ancient times until at least the middle of the 19th century, trading expeditions were simultaneously military expeditions, and military expeditions were organized and conducted under a religious banner. Such triple unity has been especially typical of Christian and Muslim civilizations, but is not restricted to them².

In order for territorial expansion to occur, there must be a center that is the agent of expansion and a periphery that is its target. The center is distinguished by technological, economic, and military superiority with respect to the peripheral regions. However, with regard to the specific conjuncture of powers, this asymmetry cannot be, and never was, absolute and permanent. It is only the first phase of a historical cycle that then passes through a second phase, where a reversal of the roles takes place. By force of specific historical circumstances, the expansionist center grows weak, loses the initiative, and

becomes the target of other centers of expansion, which have emerged in what was previously the periphery as a result of the technological, military and organizational innovations assimilated from the old civilizational center. The latter may also become the victim of powerful migration streams coming from the periphery³.

The history of the Black Sea Region vividly illustrates these processes. This region has undergone the expansion of Persia, of the Greek city-states, of the Roman Empire, of Byzantium, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Western Europe. Under the influence of the old centers of civilization and power, by borrowing various innovations, new rival centers emerged (Ancient Rome was heir to and conqueror of the Greek city states; Byzantine civilization stimulated the emergence of rival state formations like Bulgaria, Kievan Rus, etc., but fell prey to conquerors, of whom the most successful were the Ottoman Turks). During its whole pre-modern history, the Black Sea Region was the stage of powerful migration waves (Scythians, Slavs, Bulgars, Mongols, Turks, and many others).

Today, it seems to me the main geopolitical fault line covers the territories spanning from the Baltic Sea through Ukraine, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and to the Persian Gulf. The Black Sea Region is a key element of this arc of strategic rivalry.

It is not at all accidental that the line of major opposition passes precisely there. On one side are the United States and their NATO allies, on the other is Russia, the heir to the Soviet Union, which lost the strategic competition with the West. In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union fell apart and became the arena of political conflicts, economic chaos, and social degradation. At the same time, NATO and the EU were working hard at their own eastward expansion and reached the boundaries of the former Soviet Union; in the Baltic region, they reached the boundaries of Russia itself. Moreover, Ukraine and Georgia have also become hostile to Russia and are striving for membership in NATO and the EU.

Such a development has no precedent in history. Similar changes have never occurred except as a result of a large-scale war waged with all available means. This could not have happened if the office of the leader of the totalitarian super-state, the office previously occupied by Stalin, had not been occupied by a dreamer – Mikhail Gorbachev. The system broke down at a fantastic speed, because it was headed by a man who wanted to cancel it and because it had no immunity against such an action.

At the time, both in the East and in the West, there were many dreamers (and there still are, as a matter of fact), who hailed the appearance and policy of Gorbachev: his glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("restructuring"), his "New Thinking", his fantasy about a "Common European Home", his disarmament policy, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, his withdrawal of support for the satellite regimes in East Europe, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. Of course, such a policy could not fail to please the politicians in Europe and North America. From the start of his leadership, Gorbachev was in close relations with leaders like German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the American President Ronald Reagan, and the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Mrs. Thatcher remarked, "I like Mr. Gorbachev; we can do business together".⁴

The West received a gift that was beyond its wildest dreams. However, as a result of Gorbachev's "reforms", Russia and the post-Soviet space sank into conflict

² See: Katzarski, Ivan. 2007. Power, Inequality and Stratification in Pre-industrial Societies. Veliko Tarnovo: Faber, p. 67-80 (in Bulgarian) [Кацарски, Иван, 2007. Власт, неравенство и стратификация в прединдустриалните общества. Велико Търново, Фабер, с. 67-80].

³ Ibid, p. 108-121

⁴ Gorbachev Becomes Soviet Leader (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/11/news-id_2538000/2538327.stm).

and chaos. Gorbachev needed the West's support, but did not receive it. In the US, the government, Congress and influential experts unanimously followed the political maxim "no bailout for Gorbachev". Typical of this was the motivation of President Reagan to refuse Gorbachev's proposal to stop the testing of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) systems. Richard Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs) convinced Reagan that a stop to the testing would allow the Soviets to stabilize their economy and improve the standard of living of their population.⁵ An appeal for support for Gorbachev's reforms came from an unexpected quarter. In his address to the U.S. Congress (February 21, 1990), the Vaclav Havel, former dissident and then President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, openly stated, "... I often hear the question: How can the United States of America help us today? My reply is as paradoxical as the whole of my life has been: You can help us most of all if you help the Soviet Union on its irreversible, but immensely complicated road to democracy. ...the sooner, the more quickly, and the more peacefully the Soviet Union begins to move along the road toward genuine political pluralism, respect for the rights of nations to their own integrity and to a working—that is a market—economy, the better it will be, not just for Czechs and Slovaks, but for the whole world."⁶

Obviously, the Western leaders had different plans. The successful reformation and prosperity of the Soviet Union and the countries of the post-Soviet space was not part of their plans. Each of these countries had to deal with challenges that were beyond their power. Is it strange then that Russia abandoned the Gorbachev doctrine and adopted the Putin doctrine? Today we have forgotten the phrases "New Thinking" and "a Common European Home". Russia is once again outside "Europe" and is even perceived as a basic strategic opponent.

Thus appeared the northern component of the contemporary geopolitical cleavage running between the Baltic Sea and the Persian Gulf. The southern component appeared in consequence of the elimination of the Soviet Union, of Russia's weakness as a geopolitical factor and even regional power, and of the fact that the U.S. became the sole super power immediately after the end of the Cold War. In striving to achieve full control over the oil resources of the Middle East, the U.S., together with its European allies, undertook the elimination by force of the political regimes that were inconvenient for them (Iraq, Libya, Syria). At present, even Erdogan's regime in Turkey has evidently become inconvenient (the attempted coup against him is hardly unrelated to this).⁷ After

5 Winik, Jay. 1996. On 1985: Gorbachev. The Brink: Dramatic Behind-the-Scenes of the Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 515.

6 Vaclav Havel's address to the US Congress, 21 February 1990 (<https://everything2.com/title/Vaclav+Havel%2527s+address+to+the+US+Congress%252C+21+February+1990>)

7 Interestingly, the plotters, who have designated themselves as the Peace at Home Council, legitimated their actions using terms present in the official political doctrine of the US and their allies. The Council declares itself against "the undermining of secularism", "elimination of democratic rule", "disregard for human rights", and "Turkey's loss of credibility in the international arena". [Kinney, Drew Holland. 2016. Civilian Actors in the Turkish Military Drama of July 2016. Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note. No. 10 (http://www.emgr.unic.ac.cy/wp-content/uploads/EMP_N_10.pdf).]; Pearson, Robert W. What Caused the Turkish Coup Attempt. Politico. Retrieved 22 July 2016. (<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/what-caused-the-turkish-coup-attempt-214057>)]. Ankara has usually declared Fethollah Gulen to be the inciter and organizer of the coup and has insisted on his extradition from the US. Soon after the attempted coup, Erdogan accused the U.S. generals Joseph Votel, John F. Campbell and certain high-ranking officers of the American intelligence services (Graham Fuller, Henri Barkey) of intervening on the side of the plotters. The future of the NATO military base in Incirlik was put in question. [Harvey, Benjamin. 2016. Turkey's Erdogan edges closer to blaming the US for coup attempt. (<https://www.smh.com.au/world/turkeys-erdogan-edges-closer-to-blaming-the-us-for-coup-attempt-20160730-gqh58p.html>); Atilla, Toygun. 1 December 2017. "Turkey issues arrest warrant for former CIA official Graham Fuller over coup attempt". Hurriyet Daily News. Retrieved 3 December 2017. ([http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-issues-arrest-warrant-for-for-](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-issues-arrest-warrant-for-for-mer-cia-official-graham-fuller-over-coup-attempt-123392)

consolidating its economic, political and military power, Russia intervened in the Middle East and, together with Iran, firmly opposed the U.S. and its allies. Turkey holds a key position, but its interests in the complex situation of the region do not permit it to support unreservedly either of the two camps.

On the part of the West, the country most strongly engaged in military-political rivalry with Russia is, of course, the United States. As for the EU countries, their assessments of the role of Russia and their policies towards Russia vary significantly. The EU is an unimportant military factor and will continue to be so if it does not emancipate itself from the U.S. and NATO.⁸ The Union's chief aim is economic penetration and influence, and it is not inclined to military expansion. The expansion of the EU and its economic opening to the East is hindered by contradictions between the member states, by economic weakness after the depression in the last decade, and by fears of possible migrant waves coming from the periphery. Under these circumstances, the U. S. strives to engage in its strategy against Russia primarily the countries bordering on the latter (the Baltic states, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan). It is especially important for the U. S. to draw Turkey to its side.⁹

What is the position of the other main geopolitical player, China? Its upward development after the 1970s is based on a strongly pragmatic approach that combines capitalist methods with systematic regulation through the structures of the state and the Communist Party. These structures have succeeded in making global capital work in the national interest of the country. China has become the workshop of the world. In parallel with this, it has pursued its worldwide economic expansion (trade and export of capital). China is a basic factor in African economies. Since recently, the European countries are facing the challenge of a massive penetration of Chinese capital into the European continent.

China is pragmatic in its external expansion as well. Its trade and investments are not tied to political conditions or ideological prescriptions. This is a particularly winning strategy because such economic penetration does not openly restrict the action of the local political elites with regard to ways of governing, ideologies, and cultural practices. This strategic orientation is quite different from the neoliberal doctrine of the West. Recently, President Trump has shown signs of striving for greater pragmatism in U. S. policy, but in this respect he is facing serious resistance in his own country.

However, historical experience has shown that large economic penetration by a world super power cannot long remain only economic. It inevitably paves the way for political, military, and ideological penetration, a path to complete domination. If the latter is exercised by an imperial power like China, with its enormous human resources, this would probably be combined with a change in the demographic balance of the dependent countries.

In the present geopolitical situation, it would not be useful for China to face a single world super power. Hence, its policy to support Russia, the weaker side, in

[mer-cia-official-graham-fuller-over-coup-attempt-123392](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-issues-arrest-warrant-for-for-mer-cia-official-graham-fuller-over-coup-attempt-123392)].

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Russia's rivalry with the West is logical. The maintenance of this rivalry is in the interest of China, because it consumes the resources and power of countries that are its own rivals as well.

It is deeply symptomatic of our times that politicians, experts, the media are constantly talking about war, about all sorts of wars (global, local, regional, conventional, nuclear, "hot", "cold", ideological, cyber, hybrid, etc.). Together with the Cold War, the various anti-war movements have become a thing of the past. It seems that peace is no longer a value for human individuals and society. This is a great loss, but we are not fully aware of its importance.

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